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Abstract 
Why are theories of global governance unsatisfactory? Why are theories of 
global governance unable to integrate the lived realities of the people of the 
global South? International law and its institutions are growing at an 
unprecedented speed and this expansion has captured the curiosity of 
international lawyers and international law scholars. As international law and its 
institutions continue to grow, there are concurrent concerns regarding their 
democratic foundations. A large body of scholarship encapsulates these 
anxieties through the prism of global governance. In particular, two specific 
theories of global governance, global constitutionalism, and global administrative 
law, seek to introduce ideas of constitutionalism and administration as theories of 
governance. Global governance institutions seek to regulate the people of the 
global South, but both global constitutionalism and global administrative law are 
uninformed about the people living in these regions. 
 
Two central arguments are pursued in this dissertation. First, as theories of 
global governance, both global constitutionalism and global administrative law 
ignore and obscure the colonial and imperial history of international law and its 
institutions. By ignoring international law’s lineage, scholars are not able to 
accurately theorise contemporary global governance through constitutionalism 
and administration. Without the inclusion of the global South, global 
constitutionalism and global administrative law, as theories, are caricatures of 
western universalism embedded in international law. In this respect, these two 
theories represent a false universalism, which must be challenged. The second 
 iii 
argument is that there must be an engagement with the global South if global 
governance is to be theorised accurately and holistically. As part of the second 
argument, this dissertation turns to the question of how we might theorise global 
governance from the perspective of the global South.  
 
In pursuing these two arguments, this dissertation is grounded in Third World 
Approaches to International Law. In order to present the foregoing arguments, 
this analysis will rely on three case studies from international criminal law and its 
respective institutions: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, and the International 
Criminal Court. 
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 1 
Introduction: Framing the Narrative 
 
Introduction  
Why are theories of global governance unsatisfactory? Why are theories of 
global governance unable to integrate the lived realities of the people of the 
global South? International law and its institutions are growing at an 
unprecedented speed and this expansion has captured the curiosity of 
international lawyers and international law scholars. As international law and its 
institutions continue to grow, there are concurrent concerns regarding their 
democratic foundations. A large body of scholarship encapsulates these 
anxieties through the prism of global governance. In particular, two specific 
theories of global governance, global constitutionalism, and global administrative 
law, seek to introduce ideas of constitutionalism and administration as theories of 
governance. Global governance institutions seek to regulate the people of the 
global South, but both global constitutionalism and global administrative law are 
uninformed about the people living in these regions.1 
 
To some, global governance is governing with authority on the global scale.2 For 
others, global governance is world politics.3 Scholars have thus sought to clarify 
                                            
1 David Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds, 
Ruling the World; Constitutionalism, international law, and Global Governance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 41 [D. Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance”]. 
2 Lawrence Finkelstein, “What Is Global Governance?” (1995) 1:3 Global Governance 368 at 
369; Finkelstein defined global governance as “governing, without sovereign authority, 
relationships that transcend national frontiers. Global governance is doing internationally what 
governments do at home”. 
 2 
the meaning and scope of global governance as a concept4 and have attempted 
to understand its contents.5 Even though the concept of global governance has 
been under the academic microscope for the past 20 years, a uniform meaning 
has yet to be agreed upon. Broadly, it is understood as a term used to identify 
and describe the transformation process in global politics.6 Global governance 
scholarship thus acknowledges “the emergence of autonomous spheres of 
authority beyond the national/international dichotomy”.7 
 
Scholars working in global constitutionalism and global administrative law 
theorise global governance for two reasons. First, global constitutionalism and 
global administrative law scholars theorise global governance because of the 
effects of globalisation. Globalisation is a heuristic used to explain changes in 
our contemporary global society. It describes a process of change that spans 
centuries.8 It captures our social reality that is precipitated by the boomerang-
type relocation of different actors, from local, to regional to international spaces 
and back again. The relocation of actors imbricated in the process of 
globalisation is intimately connected to the proliferation of international law and 
                                                                                                                                 
3 James N. Rosenau suggests: “[g]lobal governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all 
levels of human activity- from the family to the international organization- in which the pursuit of 
goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions”; James N. Rosenau, 
“Governance in the Twenty-first Century” (1995) 1:1 Global Governance at 14. 
4 Klaus Dingwerth & Phillip Pattberg, “Global Governance as a Perspective on Global Politics” 
(2006) 12 Global Governance 185 at 186 [Dingwerth & Pattberg, “Global Politics”]. 
5 Klaus Dingwerth & Phillip Pattberg, “How Global and Why Governance? Ambivalences, Blind 
Spots and Challenges for a Critical Global Governance Literature” (2010) 12 Intl Studies Rev  
702. 
6 Dingwerth & Pattberg, “Global Politics” supra note 4 at 196. 
7 Dingwerth & Pattberg, “Global Politics” supra note 4 at 197. 
8 William Twining, Globalization and Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000) at 6. 
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its institutions. Second, global constitutionalism and global administrative law 
scholars theorise global governance because of fragmentation of international 
law. Fragmentation of international law is caused by an increase in various 
international institutions making diverse and competing or overlapping 
interpretations about various principles of international law. The results have 
produced anxieties about the nature of the current global order.9 
 
Globalisation and the fragmentation of international law have prompted 
international lawyers and international law scholars to theorise global 
governance through global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation.10 
These writers are using a constitutionalist lens to study, confront, and compete 
with the fast-paced evolution of international law and its institutions.11 Scholars 
working on global constitutionalism argue that it is possible to use a 
constitutional vernacular to describe the emergence and operation of 
international law and its different institutions.12 Similarly, global administrative law 
scholars characterise global governance as administration. 13  For global 
administrative law scholars, global governance as administration allows them to 
                                            
9 Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties” 
(2002) 15 Leiden J Intl L 553 [Koskenniemi & Lenio, “Fragmentation of International Law?”]. 
10  Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, “A Functional Approach to International 
Constitutionalization” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds, Ruling the World; 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) at 5-9. 
11 Anne Peters & Klaus Armingeon, “Introduction—Global Constitutionalism from an 
Interdisciplinary Perspective” (2009) 16:2 Ind J Global Leg Stud 385 at 385. 
12 Ronald St. John Macdonald & D. M. Johnston, eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues 
on the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005). 
13  Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B Stewart, “The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law” (2005) 68 Law & Contemp Prob 1 at 22. 
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“recast many standard concerns about the legitimacy of international institutions 
in a more specific and focused way”.14 
 
Two central arguments will be pursued in this dissertation. First, as theories of 
global governance, both global constitutionalism and global administrative law 
ignore and obscure the colonial and imperial history of international law and its 
institutions. By ignoring international law’s lineage, scholars are not able to 
accurately theorise contemporary global governance through constitutionalism 
and administration. Without the inclusion of the global South, global 
constitutionalism and global administrative law, as theories, are caricatures of 
western universalism embedded in international law.15 In this respect, these two 
theories represent a false universalism that must be challenged.  
 
The second argument is that there must be an engagement with the global South 
if global governance is to be theorised accurately and holistically. As part of the 
second argument, this analysis will turn to the question of how we might theorise 
global governance from the perspective of the global South. In order to present 
the foregoing arguments, this analysis will rely on three case studies from 
international criminal law and its respective institutions: the International Criminal 
                                            
14 Ibid at 27. 
15 Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the 
Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 1-9 [Pahuja, 
Decolonising International Law]; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 1-18 [Anghie, Imperialism]. 
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Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
 
Domestic criminal law represents the raw power of the state to exercise 
surveillance, coercion and ultimately, punishment over its citizens. The 
introduction of criminal law to the international realm16 may arguably be the 
quintessential example of the use of local governance tools on the global scale. 
Furthermore, international criminal law and these three international criminal 
institutions are viewed in global administrative law and global constitutionalism 
literature, and the field of international criminal law itself as one of the greatest 
achievements of international law.17 They are good examples of how the raw 
powers of authoritarian and dictatorial post-colonial states are tamed.18  
 
International criminal law is one of the fastest evolving branches of international 
law. On the international political scene, some argue that international criminal 
prosecutions are frequently viewed as the best means to resolve divergent 
                                            
16 For an overview of international criminal law, see Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 3-
19 [Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law]. 
17 D.M Johnston, “World Constitutionalism in the Theory of International Law” in Ronald St. John 
Macdonald & D. M. Johnston, eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the Legal 
Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005); M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
“International Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective: The Tension Between States’ Interests 
and the Pursuit of International Justice” in Antonio Cassese, ed, Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
“From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-five Years: the Need to Establish a Permanent 
International Criminal Court” (1997) 10 Harv Hum Rts J 1. 
18 Bardo Fassbender, “The Meaning of International Constitutional Law” in Nicholas Tsagourias 
ed, Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Axel Marschik, “Legislative Powers of the Security Council” 
in Ronald St. John Macdonald & D. M. Johnston eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues 
on the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005) at 461-472. 
 6 
violent conflicts and confront the perpetrators of international crimes.19 But this is 
a superficial account, as it is only true for non-Western states. With the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and end of the Cold War in 1989, there was a resurgence of the 
number of international institutions focusing on prosecuting international crimes. 
The emergence of these institutions confirms the anxieties about the 
fragmentation of international law.20 Conversely, the desire to end impunity and 
prosecute those responsible for mass human rights violations is an illustration of 
the degree of interconnectedness and interdependence between and amongst 
communities across borders. One of central the tasks of these international 
regimes is to pierce the veil of immunity afforded to government officials under 
traditional international law. Holding government officials individually accountable 
for international crimes is a new phenomenon. International law doctrines such 
as state sovereignty and equality of states have traditionally resulted in a strict 
reading of the immunities bestowed upon incumbent heads of state and foreign 
ministers, applying even to their participation in mass human rights violations in 
times of conflict and peacetime. Another central task for international criminal law 
is to act as a tool against non-state actors operating with impunity. 
 
                                            
19 Sujith Xavier “Looking for ‘Justice’ in all the Wrong Places: An International Mechanism or 
Multidimensional Domestic Strategy for Mass Human Rights Violations in Sri Lanka?” in 
Amarnath Amarasingam & Daniel Bass, eds, Post-War Sri Lanka: Problems and Prospects 
(Forthcoming New York: Hurst University Press, 2015). 
20 Koskenniemi & Lenio, “Fragmentation of International Law?” supra note 9. 
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International criminal law is at the forefront of jurisprudential innovation, where 
some of the more contentious issues such as sovereign immunity21 and other 
various international criminal law doctrines are deployed.22 There are numerous 
instances in which judges of these international criminal institutions have 
invented legal doctrines, for example joint criminal enterprise. 23  These 
innovations in international criminal law and procedure raise questions of 
legitimacy and the role of judges in crafting legal rules as opposed to applying 
existing international law.  
 
The international criminal institutions created to prosecute state and non-state 
actors are predominantly focused on conflicts in the global South (for example 
the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia; the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Court prosecutions in 
Africa, the Sierra Leone Special Court; the Special Tribunal for Lebanon). These 
institutions suffer from various criticisms.  
 
Amongst these criticisms is a persistent anxiety that there is a crisis of legitimacy 
within the international criminal institutions about the law they create and apply. 
This crisis stems from a democratic disconnect from those populations most 
affected by the work of the international criminal institutions. This crisis is best 
                                            
21 Asad G. Kiyani, “Al-Bashir & the ICC: The Problem of Head of State Immunity” (2013) 12:3 
Chinese J Intl L 467. 
22 Beatrice I. Bonafé, “Finding a Proper Role for Command Responsibility”  (2007) 5:3 J Int’l Crim 
Just 599. 
23 Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law supra note 16 at 356-363. 
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articulated by scholars working on locating the global South in opposition to, and 
in distinction from the global North. These scholars, working under the banner of 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), have sought to bring into 
focus the role of international law and its institutions in the subjugation and 
oppression of people of the global South through colonialism and imperialism.  
 
I use the term global South to connote a particular, and contemporary, material 
reality. Granted, the popularity of the term has recently grown, especially as 
other descriptors of “developing”, “poor”, and “Third World” have fallen out of 
favour as “derogatory and anachronistic”.24 I use it as both a placeholder of an 
imagined space in the here and now, and as progeny of the term Third World. 
Vijay Prashad has described the Third World in the following manner: “The Third 
World is not a place; it was a project”.25 This project, the Third World, Prashad 
suggests had three goals: peace, bread and justice.26 The emergence of the 
Third World thus must be placed within the Post-War period and the rise of newly 
independent states as a result of decolonisation, which encapsulate these three 
goals of peace, bread and justice. The three goals speak to a desire for peace in 
the aftermath of the WWII 27 , greater redistribution of wealth and poverty 
alleviation28 and greater access to justice at the broader conceptual levels.  The 
end of the Cold War, neoliberalism and rise of Third World economies has 
                                            
24 Pahuja, Decolonising International Law supra note 15 at 261. 
25 Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (New York London: 
The New Press, 2007) at xv; Vijay Prashad, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global 
South (New York London: Verso, 2012) at 1 [Prashad, Poorer Nations]. 
26 Prashad, Poorer Nations supra note 25 at 1-3. 
27 Ibid at 2. 
28 Ibid. 
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significantly altered our landscape since 1989. All of these factors have resulted 
in the emergence of the term global South. Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff 
offer the following remarks in describing the global South: 
 
In the upshot, ‘the South’, technically speaking, has more complex 
connotations than did the World formerly Known as ‘Third’. It 
describes a polythetic category, its members sharing one or more—
but not all, or even most—of a diverse set of features. The closest 
thing to a common denominator among them is that many were 
once colonies or protectorates, albeit not necessarily during the 
same epochs. ‘Postcolonial’, therefore, is something of a synonym, 
but only an inexact one. What is more, like all indexical categories, 
‘the Global South’ assumes meaning by virtue not of its content, but 
of its context, of the way in which it points to something else in a 
field of signs—in this instance, to its antinomy to ‘the Global North’, 
an opposition that carries a great deal of imaginative baggage 
congealed around the contrast between centrality and marginality, 
free-market modernity and its absence. 
 
[….] 
 
Which is why ‘the Global South’ cannot be defined, a priori, in 
substantive terms. The label bespeaks a relation, not a thing in or 
for itself. It is a labile signifier whose content is determined by 
everyday material and political processes. Analytically, though, to 
return to the point made by Homi Bhabha, whatever it may connote 
at any given moment, it always points to an ‘ex-centric’ location, an 
outside to Euro-America.  […] As such, what else it may be 
presumed to be, whatever political or economic ends its invocation 
may serve, “the south” is a window on the world at large, a world 
whose geography, pace Kant and Von Homboldt, is being recast as 
a spatio-temporal order made of a multitude of variously articulated 
flows and dimensions, at once political, juridical, cultural, material, 
virtual – a world that, ultimately, transcends the very dualism of 
north and south.29 
 
                                            
29 Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Theory From The South or, How Euro-America Is Evolving 
Toward Africa (London: Paradigm Publisher, 2012) at 45 & 47. 
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In response to criticisms about their description of the global South30, Comaroff 
and Comaroff added the following to their understanding of the global South: 
 
It is not difficult to show that there is much south in the North, much 
north in the South, and more of both to come in the future. All of 
which is underscored by the deep structural articulation—indeed, by 
the mutual entailment—of hemispheric economies, not to mention 
by the labyrinthine capillaries of the world of finance, which defy any 
attempt to unravel them along geopolitical axes. In the complex 
hyphenation that links economy to governance and both to the 
enterprises of everyday life, then, the contemporary global order 
rests on a highly flexible, inordinately intricate web of synapses, a 
web that both reinforces and eradicates, both sharpens and 
ambiguates, the lines between hemispheres. As a result, what 
precisely is north, and what south, becomes ever harder to pin 
down.31 
 
The global South is a condition brought about by various forces of history 
including colonialism, imperialism and capitalism. It describes a relationship 
between the colonised and coloniser, as shaped by the forces of globalisation. 
Ultimately, it captures power relations at all levels between communities inside 
and outside established borders. An important aspect of the term global South is 
recognition that there are multitudes of claims in various spaces. In particular, 
the possibility of a south in the North and a north in the South is important. This 
speaks to the recognition of indigenous groups in the global North as 
                                            
30  Srinivas Aravamudan “Surpassing the North: Can the Antipodean Avantgarde Trump 
Postcolonial Belatedness?” online: (2012) 5 The Salon 
<http://jwtc.org.za/salon_volume_5/srinivas_aravamudan.htm>. 
31 Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Theory from the South: A Rejoinder” online: (February 
20012) Cultural Anthropology <http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/273-theory-from-the-south-a-
rejoinder>. 
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engendering a Fourth World.32 Global South thus encapsulates a number of 
various claims predicated on historical progress, which includes indigenous 
people, migrants, former slaves and their descendants in the global North.  
 
There is another iteration of the global South that can be added to this 
complicated description. Vijay Prashad suggests that the global South signifies a 
form of resistance to the transformations described above as the coming 
together of various forces. He argues that given the manner in which world 
politics operates, especially as a result of neoliberalism, the global South has 
come to be identified with protests “against the theft of the commons, against the 
theft of human dignity and rights, against the undermining of democratic 
institutions […]”.33 
 
This complex but nuanced description of the global South is important for this 
project and shapes its direction. As noted earlier, the following chapters first seek 
to detail how two theories of global governance inaccurately theorise the current 
state of global affairs. In particular, by focusing on global constitutionalism and 
global administrative law through the lens of the three cases studies on 
international criminal institutions, evidence can be gathered that indicates 
international lawyers and international law scholars are unable to describe the 
                                            
32Amar Bhatia “The South of the North: Building on Critical Approaches to International Law with 
Lessons from the Fourth World” (2012) 14:1 Or Rev Int’l L 131. 
33Prashad, Poorer Nations supra note 25 at 9. This point was made earlier by Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos as insurgent cosmopolitanism; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal 
Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002) 
at 179.   
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complicated and often difficult-to-imagine dynamics of international institutions. 
The current scholarly literature that presents these theories of global governance 
emphasises the legislative and judicial functions of international institutions. 
However, by concentrating on these elements, these theories forgo the 
opportunity to truly examine how international institutions function. The 
functioning of these international institutions is part of the very nature of 
international law and its history.  
 
International law was forged as a means to regulate the interactions between the 
Europeans and the inhabitants of the new world. When the Europeans arrived on 
the shores of the new world, they discovered social systems with their own 
norms and laws.34 Rather than trying to learn about the values and traditions of 
the indigenous peoples of the new world, the Europeans set out to apply 
European norms and laws to the indigenous populations and their land.35 The 
application of European norms to the indigenous groups facilitated the 
colonisation, occupation and genocide of the inhabitants of new world.36 This 
                                            
34 Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World 1492-1640 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 16-40; Bruge G. Trigger & Wilcomb 
Washburn, “Native Peoples in Euro-American Historiography” in Bruge G. Trigger & Wilcomb 
Washburn, eds, The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 61-81. 
35 Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1947) at 86-
92. 
36 Canada, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling 
for the Future, Executive Summary (online: 
http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/File/2015/Findings/Exec_Summary_2015_05_31_web_o.
pdf ) at 1-6. 
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process continues to this day. This practise was aided by the use of international 
law.37  
 
International law and its institutions have a significant effect on the people of the 
global South. Predictably, the two global governance theories of global 
constitutionalism and global administrative law do not take into account these 
key definitional elements of international law. In theorising global governance, 
global constitutionalism and global administrative law seem oblivious to the 
manner in which international law and international institutions were created and 
how they continue to function. Subsequently, by ignoring these foundational 
aspects of the international order, their contributions are incomplete. 
 
Leveraging global governance from the perspective of the global South is one 
method of transcending the limitations of these theories. This is the second 
argument that this dissertation will unfold. By pursuing the possibility of 
theorising global governance from the global South, the central concerns that will 
be addressed are whether or not global governance should be theorised, and 
how can we theorise global governance from the perspective of the global South. 
By focusing on the “should” and the subsequent “how” questions, this analysis 
will suggest two specific methods that can be used to build bridges between the 
diverse body of literature on the global South and global governance theory. In 
this respect, this dissertation will offer two novel insights that can used as a 
                                            
37 Anghie, Imperialism supra note 15 at 1-18. 
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means to construct these linkages from the current literature: ethnography38 and 
ethics, intellectuals, and international law. 39  The first concentrates on 
international lawyers, international law scholars and their understanding of 
international law as a field of practice. There are forces that mould the manner in 
which international law doctrines and institutions are utilised and deployed. 
Ultimately, there is a need for greater understanding of this field of practice 
through the everyday operation of international law. 40  The second insight 
examines how international lawyers and international law scholars, as 
intellectuals, can shape the dynamics of their field.  
 
In pursing these two arguments, the focus is on scholars writing about global 
constitutionalism and global administrative in the respective chapters. I do not 
draw a distinction between lawyers and scholars writing on international law, 
given the very nature of international practice and scholarship and will further 
examine this particular point in the final chapter.  
Methodology 
This dissertation is grounded in Third World Approaches to International Law. 
Specifically, I use a TWAIL method to ground the argument that global 
                                            
38 Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, “Beyond the (Post)Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life of 
International Law” (2012) 45:2 Journal of Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America - 
Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 195 at 213; Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus 
{Political Life Across Borders of Settler States} (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014). 
39 Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith lectures (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1996); Buphinder Chimni, “The Self, Modern Civilization, and International Law: Learning 
from Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule” (2012) 23:4 EJIL1159 
at 1160. 
40 Luis Eslava, “Istanbul Vignettes: Observing the Everyday Operation of International 
Law” (2014) 2 London Rev Intl L (forthcoming). 
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governance theories of global constitutionalism and global administrative law 
ignore and obscure the history of international law. TWAIL’s central epistemic 
claims can be characterised as follows: to unpack, deconstruct and then 
reconstruct international law. 41  The constructive objectives of my research 
project to theorise global governance borrow from neighbouring disciplines to 
advance progressive and practical solutions to the challenges resulting from the 
exclusionary nature of contemporary international legal doctrines and 
international institutions.  
 
Numerous rationales exist in adopting a TWAIL perspective about international 
law, international institutions and global governance. The first, and most relevant 
is the effect that international law and its institutions had, and continue to have, 
on the global South. The global South is where the decisions made by the World 
Trade Organisation or the International Criminal Court take direct effect. As 
David Kennedy has suggested, the global South is where the rubber of global 
governance hits the road.42 With reference to the ICC, all of the cases in the 
Court’s docket at the moment pertain to the African continent. The Court’s work 
will undoubtedly have significant effect on the manner in which the individuals 
and their respective countries conceptualise international criminal justice.   
                                            
41 Makau Mutua “What is TWAIL?” (2000) 94 American Society of Intl L Proceedings 31; Antony 
Anghie “What is TWAIL: Comment” (2000) 94 Am Soc Int’l Proc 39; Obiora C. Okafor, “Critical 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, or Both?” (2010) 10 
Intl Community L Rev 37. 
42 D. Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance” supra note 1. 
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Structure  
The two arguments identified above will be discussed in the following manner 
through the preceding five chapters. In the first chapter, a purposeful account of 
international law and international institutions is outlined by examining how 
international law and its institutions have evolved from the 17th to the 20th century 
in order to understand how they function. I offer the mainstream account of this 
evolution of international law and juxtapose narratives that seek to challenge 
these accounts. In this respect, I will detail how international law and its 
institutions were forged as response to the colonial encounter, how this 
encounter continues to shape international law and its institutions. The argument 
is centred on how international law and its institutions carry with them a particular 
western universalism as they travel to their respective destinations. Once this 
particular history of this field is presented, there will be an examination of how 
this practice continues by examining the three contemporary international 
criminal institutions identified earlier.  
 
The second chapter explores globalisation and fragmentation of international 
law. In this chapter, I describe and engage with both theoretical discussions that 
seek to understand the rapid expansion of world order. Globalisation, a heuristic 
device, helps explain the expansion of international law and its institutions as 
part of greater connectedness and interconnectedness across borders and social 
interactions. As our public and private institutions expand on the global scene, 
we are witnessing a diversification of international norms by different 
adjudicatory bodies. Fragmentation of international law, coined as a postmodern 
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anxiety,43 has inspired scholars to search for ways in which accountability and 
legitimacy can be introduced to international law and international institutions. 
These two chapters form the backdrop to the first central claim that the two 
theories of global governance, global constitutionalism and global administrative 
law, present a false universalism.  
 
The literature on global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation is vast. 
In the third chapter, the first section explores the four corners of global 
constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation. From this analysis, the chapter 
then tracks three specific camps in the current literature on global 
constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation. By using the case studies of 
the three international criminal institutions, the basic premises outlined by global 
constitutionalism scholars in their respective camps will be challenged. The 
challenge will be based how their versions of constitutionalism and 
constitutionalisation deploy and entrench the universalisms embedded in 
international law chronicled in the first chapter. In this chapter, I will briefly 
explore various avenues by which global constitutionalism can transcend its 
limitations. 
 
The fourth chapter chronicles global administrative law. It examines two 
particular sets of claims housed in global administrative law. The first set of 
global administrative law scholars provide a detailed description of how 
                                            
43 Koskenniemi & Lenio, “Fragmentation of International Law?” supra note 9. 
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international institutions deploy administrative law in their everyday interactions. 
The second set of claims acknowledges and concedes to the challenges 
encountered by analogising in this manner, and proposes to read in 
accountability in how these institutions functions. Analogous to the third chapter 
on global constitutionalism, I will use the empirical evidence from the 
international criminal institutions to challenge the universalism embedded in 
global administrative law. The central argument in this chapter is that global 
administrative law ignores, obscures, and effaces the underlying context of 
international institutions. It presents a unique western understanding of 
administrative law as universal.  
 
The final chapter seeks to build bridges between theories of global governance 
and the global South. In this chapter, the discussion turns to the recent scholarly 
interventions that engage with the lived realities of the people of the global 
South. This chapter asks: how can international lawyers and international law 
scholars learn from the global South?  This prompts moreover another related 
question, what should we learn from the global South?
 19 
 
Chapter 1:  Tracing the Evolution of International Institutions (and 
International Law) through the Dynamics of Difference   
1.1 Introduction   
In this chapter, I trace the evolution of international criminal institutions to provide 
the empirical backdrop to this dissertation. Contemporary global governance 
theories, such as global constitutionalism and global administrative law, omit and 
obscure the true nature of international law and its institutions. This is part of a 
larger trend in international law to present a particular and singular western 
perspective as universally applicable across the globe. This is not a new 
argument in international law1, rather it is part of a rich history of arguments that 
unite under Third World Approaches to International Law. TWAIL is both theory 
and method2 that traces the “glib universality narratives based on an ahistorical 
reading of international law and international relations”.3 
 
In order to understand the glib universal narratives embedded in international 
criminal institutions and its significance to theories of global governance, it is 
important to study the history of international institutions. The history of 
                                            
1Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) [Anghie, Imperialism]; Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising 
International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
2 Obiora C. Okafor, “Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, 
Methodology, or Both?” (2010) 10 Intl Community L Rev 37 [Okafor, Theory or Method]. 
3 Obiora C. Okafor, “Re-Defining Legitimacy: International Law, Multilateral Institutions and the 
Problem of Socio-Cultural Fragmentation Within Established African States” (PhD Thesis, UBC, 
Faculty of Law, 1998) online: < http://law.library.ubc.ca/abstracts/#1998>. 
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international law has been recounted from various perspectives. Most often, as 
Martti Koskenniemi suggests, the history of international law is presented as a 
caricature.4  It is characterised as a narrative of conquest, colonisation and 
extreme violence through a placid perspective rooted in western notions of 
progress and development.  
 
Generally, the history of international law has been presented as the search for 
universal law based on western legal traditions that would apply to everyone.5 
International law’s history has been conceptualised as epochs.6 It has been told 
through the rise and fall of international law and its profession.7 TWAIL scholars 
have challenged some of these historical accounts of international law. 
TWAIL scholars have argued that the traditional accounts that characterise the 
origins of international law as a search for universal law ignore the dark and 
barbaric realities of colonialism and imperialism facilitated by international law, 
and the continuing effects of these phenomena.8   
 
To better understand the evolution of international criminal institutions, we must 
first study the evolution of international law and its institutions. This is not an 
                                            
4 Martti Koskenniemi, “A History of International Law Histories” in Bardo Fassbender et al, eds, 
The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 
at 945. 
5 Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1947) 
[Nussbaum, Law of Nations]. 
6 Wilhelm Grewe, Epochs of International Law (Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 2000) [Translated 
and revised by Michael Byers]. 
7 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 
1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at p. 4. 
8 Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 1. 
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easy task. I acknowledge that this may be a difficult task given the challenges 
legal scholars have in writing history.9 I also acknowledge the dangers of this 
type of scholarship of cherry-picking historical events to demonstrate a particular 
outcome. Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie has articulated the problems with this type 
of approach as the dangers of a single story.10 Presenting certain historical 
events without the context is problematic and leads to narrow and particular 
interpretation. There are number of experts engaged in this debate that have 
explored these challenges.11 Even though I acknowledge all of these dangers, 
for my purpose, it is crucial to trace the manner in which in international 
institutions and in particular international criminal institutions have evolved to 
demonstrate that there are relics of colonialism and imperialism embedded in 
contemporary international law and its institutions. Moreover, in presenting the 
materials ahead, I juxtapose the traditional understanding of international law 
and its institutions and then present an alternative TWAIL based reading. I do so 
                                            
9 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” (1969) 8 History and 
Theory 3; Quentin Skinner, “Interpretation and the Understanding of Speech Acts” in Quentin 
Skinner, Visions of Politics: Volume I, Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) at 103; George Cavaller, “Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: Accomplices 
of European Colonialism and Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans?” (2008) 10 J Hist Int’l Law 
181; Ian Hunter, “Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics: On the Critical History of the Law of 
Nature and Nations” in Shaunnagh Dorsett & Ian Hunter eds, Law and Politics in British Colonial 
Thought: Transpositions of Empire (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) at 11; Annabel Brett, 
Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law (New Jersey: 
Princeton UP, 2011) at 14–15. 
10 Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, “Dangers of a Single Story” (TED TALKS, February 2009) online: 
< http://www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story?language=en> 
11Anne Orford, “On international legal method”, (2013) 1:1 London Rev Intl L 166; Charlotte 
Peevers, “Conducting international authority: Hammarskjöld, the Great Powers and the Suez 
Crisis”, (2013) 1:1 London Rev Intl L 131; Jacqueline Mowbray, “International authority, the 
responsibility to protect and the culture of the international executive”, (2013) 1:1 London Rev Intl 
L 148. 
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as way to illustrate how contemporary global governance theories do not engage 
with the actual realities of international law and its institutions.    
 
What follows is a deliberately cursory account of international law and its 
institutions. Relying on international lawyers and their assertions to narrate this 
historical account, I will first set out the evolution of international law and its 
institutions from the 17th to the 20th century. I will present the standard historical 
claims. Then I will posit insights that are critical of these accounts to demonstrate 
how international law and its institutions developed as part and parcel of  
colonialism and imperialism. International law and its institutions thus embody a 
particular western perspective that can be characterised as universalist. 
Sundhya Phahuja and Antony Anghie are two writers that have pioneered this 
approach.12 Their respective contributions have explored the universalism of 
international law and its institutions in various historical moments. There are 
other TWAIL scholars that have embarked on similar journeys.13  
 
In this chapter, I rely on the work of Antony Anghie to trace the universalism 
embedded in international law.14   Once I have presented this particular history of 
                                            
12  Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 1; Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: 
Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
13 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “Counterhegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and 
Development as a Third World Strategy”, (2006) 27:5 Third World Q 767; Michael Fakhri, Sugar 
and the Making of International Trade Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
14 There are two specific reasons for this: First, Anghie’s scholarship traces the evolution of 
international law back to the first contact between European colonisers and the indigenous 
communities. This is useful for my project as this analysis provides a window by which to 
examine the development of international law and its institutions that have now become an 
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international law and its institutions, I will illustrate the continuation of this 
practice of presenting a singular western perspective as universal in one of the 
fastest growing contemporary fields of international law: international criminal 
justice. In the first section I develop international law’s universalism by tracing 
international law’s origins back to the Treaty of Westphalia and then chronicling 
the development of international institutions. I focus on telling the story of 
international law through the lens of its institutions. Additionally I pay close 
attention the manner in which international criminal institutions emerged as part 
of the evolution of international institutions.  Then I develop this second line of 
inquiry through case studies of three international criminal institutions: the 
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC).  
1.2 Glimpses of World History: Evolution of International Law and 
International Institutions from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) 
It is suggested that the emergence of the modern nation state in the early 15th 
century prompted the proliferation of multifaceted governance regimes.15 The 
development of our modern sovereign16  engendered a seismic shift in how 
societies were regulated at that time, and more relevantly, how the international 
                                                                                                                                 
important part of global governance discussions. Second, by exposing the relationship between 
international law and colonialism, Anghie develops the dynamic of difference. I adopt this concept 
as a means to illustrate how international criminal law has developed and importantly, the 
significance of the dynamic of difference as it relates to the efforts to theorise global governance 
through global constitutionalism and global administrative law; Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 1. 
15 Helmut Willke, Smart Governance: Governing the Global Knowledge Society (Frankfurt New 
York: Campus, 2007) at 11; Willke defines governance as “the activity of coordinating 
communications in order to achieve collective goals through collaboration”; Nussbaum, Law of 
Nations supra note 5. . 
16  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth 
Ecclesiastical and Civil, ed by J.C.A Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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community is regulated now.  In this section, the historical development of 
international law and its institutions will be presented in a chronological manner 
starting with the Treaty of Westphalia and concluding with the Post-War era and 
fall of the Berlin Wall.  
 
The nation state’s precise date of birth is contested; some trace it back to the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648,17 while others date it as early as the late 1400s.18 
The discussion about the precise date of the birth of the modern nation state 
alludes to a broader theoretical disagreement between scholars as to the very 
origins of international law. By dating the emergence of the modern nation state 
to 1648 and placing the event in Europe, there is an obvious erasure of other 
potentials and possibilities. This erasure is indicative of a broader theme in the 
history of international law that omits or forgets that there were, and continue to 
be, thriving indigenous communities in the new world with advanced cultures. 
 
Moving beyond the question of when and how the nation state, and by extension 
the international order, were created, the arrival of the nation state necessitated 
innovative means of creating agreement between different sovereigns. In Europe 
particularly, the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 resulted in a landmark 
change in international relations with the Peace Treaty of Westphalia between 
                                            
17 Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1. 
18Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 52; Martti Koskenniemi, “International Law and 
Raison D’Etat: Rethinking the Prehistory of International Law” in Benedict Kingsbury and 
Benjamin Straumann, eds, The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and 
the Justice of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 297. 
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the Holy Roman Emperor, the King of France, and their respective allies.19 The 
Treaty was Europe’s central organising framework in the 17th and 18th centuries 
and ushered in the sovereigns’ right to rule over their subjects without any 
external interference. The Peace Treaty of Westphalia guaranteed sovereign 
states exclusive control over their territories.20 It stipulated that all sovereigns 
were to be treated as equal, and institutionalised the self-interested nature of the 
nation state.21  
 
The consequential economic stability and growth stemming from the interactions 
between sovereign states allowed international law to flourish. 22  The trade 
among the European sovereigns and, more importantly trade relations with their 
newly-colonised subjects in the new world, were essential to ensuring growth 
and stability.23 Consequentially, there was potential for international regulatory 
control to limit the new sovereigns desire to enter into conflict with each other, 
particularly over human and natural resources.24  The desire for peace and 
                                            
19 Heinz Dunchhardt, “From the Peace of Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna” in Bardo 
Fassbender et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 2014) 628 at 629; Stephan Verosta, “History of International Law, 1648 to 
1815”, in R. Wolfrum ed, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2008 online edition) at 3-5. 
20 This principle was later codified in the Montevideo Convention the Rights and Duties of States 
1933, 165 L.N.T.S 19; U.S.T.S 881. 
21 United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945, 39 A.J.I.L. 190 Supp, (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) 
[UN Charter]. 
22 Frank Walters, History of the League of Nations (Oxford: OUP 1952) [Walters, League] at 7; 
Walters suggests that “[E]xtraordinary increases in population, the revolutionary effects of the 
steamship, the railway and the telegraph, the enormous extension of external trade and internal 
wealth- these and other changes multiplied many times over the fields of contact between 
nations and between governments”. 
23Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 86-92. 
24 Richard Falk, “Introduction” in Charles S. Edwards, ed, Hugo Grotius The Miracle of Holland; A 
study in Political and Legal Thought (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981) at 2. 
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conflict resolution was a central theme that animated the evolution of 
international law.25 This desire would trigger the institutionalisation of dispute 
resolution mechanisms as early as 1815 in Europe. The development of these 
mechanisms would eventually pave the way for early international institutions of 
the 19th and 20th centuries that are now an important part of our global 
governance discussions.26  
 
Conversely, there was also a need to legitimise European occupation and 
conquest in the new world. In an attempt to contain the raw power of the new 
and all-powerful sovereign, early writers of international law formulated some of 
the key elements of modern international law.27  
 
Some of these early scholars of international law, such as Francisco de Vitoria 
(1480-1546) created governance mechanisms in the form of specific 
international law doctrines. Sovereignty was one of these newly formulated 
doctrines. The doctrine of sovereignty regulates relationships between the local 
inhabitants and the colonisers of the new territories. Arthur Nussbaum chronicles 
the emergence of the sovereignty doctrine in the 16th century. Nussbaum 
ascribes the development of sovereignty to the scholarship of Vitoria and his 
                                            
25 Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 86-92. 
26 Walters, League supra note 22 at 9: “In particular, the idea of arbitration acquired immense 
importance. Between 1815 and 1900, disputes and differences between States were submitted 
to arbitration on some two hundred occasions”.  
27 Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 86 &107; Anne Orford, “The Past as Law or 
History? The Relevance of Imperialism for Modern International Law" in Emmanuelle Jouannet, 
Helene Ruiz Fabri and Mark Toufayan, eds, Tiers Monde: Bilan et perspectives (Paris: Société 
de Législation Comparée, 2013); Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 13-31. 
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assessment of whether the “war of the Spaniards against the Indian aborigines 
was or was not just”.28   
 
Vitoria formulated some of the following questions: “Who is the sovereign? What 
are the powers of a sovereign? Are the Indians Sovereigns? What are the rights 
and duties of the Indians and the Spaniards? How are the respective rights and 
duties of the Spanish and [Indians] to be decided?”29 Antony Anghie argues that 
Vitoria developed the sovereignty doctrine by answering these questions while 
focusing on the social and cultural practices of both the indigenous communities 
and the Spaniards. In doing so, Vitoria succumbs to what Antony Anghie has 
coined as the dynamic of difference. This is a process that creates a gap 
between two different cultures, characterising one as universal, the other as 
uncivilised and as a consequence developing techniques to bridge this gap.30  
 
The indigenous communities and the Spaniards had different cultures with two 
divergent conceptions of governance and ownership.31 In developing the early 
conceptions of sovereignty, Vitoria challenged the existing practice of applying 
divine law to the indigenous communities (or heathens).32 Subsequently, Vitoria 
removed the role of the Pope and divine law and replaced it with natural law. The 
argument is that if divine law does not apply to the indigenous communities and 
                                            
28 Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 59. 
29 Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 15. 
30 Ibid at 4. 
31 Ibid at 16. 
32 Ibid at 17; Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 61. 
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they had recourse to natural law given their political institutions, then they were 
logically part of a different political and legal order. The central problem therefore 
was how to bridge the two divergent indigenous and Spanish cultures.  
 
In bridging the cultural gap, or what Anghie terms as the “juridical problem of 
jurisdiction”, Vitoria uses two techniques: first he focuses on the personality of 
the indigenous communities and second, he looks at the application of the 
universal natural law system. 33  In Vitoria’s assessment, the indigenous 
communities of the Americas were not barbarians or sinners (as decided by 
divine law). Rather, they possessed reason because of their political and social 
order. The indigenous communities were able to establish “their own versions of 
the institutions” found in Vitoria’s world because they possessed reason.34 By 
making natural law applicable to the indigenous communities, Vitoria extends 
natural law to the Spanish-Indigenous relationship.35  Under natural law, the 
Spaniards had the right to travel, “to sojourn” in indigenous territory36 provided 
that they “did not harm the Indians”.37 
 
Natural law is used as a means to legitimise a system of interaction between the 
indigenous people and European colonisers as equals. This interaction is 
characterised as occurring between two parties with equal and analogous 
                                            
33 Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 19. 
34 Ibid at 20-21. 
35 Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 62. 
36 Ibid at 62. 
37 Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 20. 
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understanding of the systems of governance premised on natural law. Yet this 
natural law is not predicated on an indigenous understanding of norms of land 
ownership (i.e. sharing of the land).38 Rather it is predicated on a Spanish 
understanding of ownership and governance and this understanding is taken to 
be the universal understanding of ownership and governance. It is then used as 
the basis to determine the legality or justness of indigenous behaviour. Anghie 
captures the results of resolving the juridical problem of jurisdiction as follows:  
 
Seen in this way, Vitoria’s scheme finally endorses and legitimises 
endless Spanish incursions into Indian society. Vitoria’s apparently 
innocuous enunciation of a right to travel and sojourn extends finally 
to the creation of a comprehensive, indeed inescapable system of 
norms which are inevitably violated by the Indians. For example, 
Vitoria asserts that to keep certain people out of the city or province 
as enemies, or to expel them when already there, are acts of war. 
Thus any Indian attempt to resist Spanish penetration would amount 
to an act of war, which would justify Spanish retaliation. Each 
encounter between the Spanish and the Indians therefore entitles 
the Spanish to defend themselves against Indian aggression and in 
so doing, continuously expand Spanish territory […].39 
 
This illustration of the sovereignty doctrine40 demonstrates that the development 
of international law was shaped by and intrinsically linked to colonialism and 
imperialism. Features such as the dynamic of difference, that is to characterise 
one culture as primitive and the other as universal, are deeply embedded within 
the structure of contemporary international law. These features can be traced 
                                            
38Aimée Craft, “Living Treaties, Breathing Research” (2014) 26 Can J Women & L 1 at 4-7; Craft 
presents a good illustration, albeit in the late 1800’s, of treaty negotiations between European 
colonisers and the indigenous people of what is now Manitoba, Canada. 
39 Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 21-22. 
40 For Anghie, sovereignty doctrine is as follows: “[…] the complex of rules deciding what entities 
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back to the origins of international law and continue have an effect on the 
manner in which international law has evolved and continues to function today.  
  
By the 19th century there was an increase in positive law through bilateral and 
multilateral treaties and state practice. The evolution of international law, from 
the Peace Treaty of Westphalia to the 17th and 18th centuries, accelerated rapidly 
during the 19th century.41 The French and the American Revolutions and the 
Napoleonic wars had lasting effects well into the 19th century. The Congress of 
Vienna, held under the supervision of Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, sought 
to restore the balance of power that existed during the 17th and 18th centuries.42 
The Vienna Congress ushered in a new 19th century political order.43 At this time, 
there was a general trend towards conquest, exploitation and control of the rest 
of the globe, exasperating the relationship between the Europeans sovereigns. 
As suggested by Anghie, “the universalization of international law was principally 
a consequence of the imperial expansion which took place towards the end of 
the [19th] century”.44  
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International law’s progress is described in the following manner: the 19th century 
shift towards state practice and positive law can be seen through the creation of 
legal institutions, the prolific use of treaties as a means to regulate intercourse 
between states, and the embryonic “move to institutions”.45 These developments 
to codify international law - or in Lassa Oppenheim’s words, “plough the fields of 
international law” - are arguably the first phase of the hyper-specialisation that 
has resulted in the contemporary proliferation of international regulatory regimes 
and global governance. The solidification of international law eventually leads to 
a ramping up in creating global governance regimes by the latter part of the 19th 
century.   
 
As sovereign entities continued to interact through treaties and various 
agreements, there was a need to create dispute resolution mechanisms to 
resolve conflicts arising from these newly formed relationships. The first instance 
of institutionalisation occurred in the early 19th century, with the creation of the 
waterways commissions.46 A multi-state organisation was established as result 
of the internationalisation of the Rhine and Danube waterways. 47  These 
commissions (or international institutions), especially the Danube Commission, 
                                            
45 David Kennedy, “The Move to Institutions” (1987) 8 Cardozo L Rev 841 [Kennedy, “Move to 
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Am Soc Int’l L Proc 287. 
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were powerful. They were granted “rule-making, executive and judicial powers”.48 
Similarly, in the 19th century, numerous international organisations, originally 
called Administrative Unions, were created.49 For example, there was the Central 
Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (1875), the International Telegraph 
Union (1875), the Universal Postal Union (1878) and the Berne Bureau for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (1883). These unions were given dispute 
settlement powers but they did not have the capacity to create laws. However 
their decisions had binding effects on the respective parties and potential new 
members. In effect, these international bodies, with their new international 
personality, were creating universally applicable international law through their 
policies and judicial decisions.50 
 
In describing the history of international law, scholars often succumb to a linear 
idea of progress (as can be seen in the previous two paragraphs) that suggests 
that there was a search for some form of universal law that would become 
globally applicable. Marti Koskenniemi describes this project as: “law that would 
recognize all humans as bearers of rights, citizens of their nations, organised as 
secular states […]. This was a project for progress, for a global modernity –the 
dream of the entire world one day resembling Europe’s idealised image of 
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itself”.51 The search for universal law, characterised as the progress narrative of 
international law, is Eurocentric and is part of the universalism that is layered into 
the way international law operates. This layering process has consequences. 
This process has affected the very nature of law creation at the international 
level and importantly it has structured international law for the benefit of some. 
Subsequently there is an emphasis on the development of the doctrines and 
principles by European powers for their benefit as demonstrated by the dynamic 
of difference in Francisco de Vitoria scholarship and the creation of the 
sovereignty doctrine.  
 
The idea of progress in international law obscures its violent use. Particularly the 
sovereignty doctrine was used as a tool to regulate the interactions of Europeans 
and non-Europeans.52 A handful of international lawyers have pointed to the 
monolithic universalising nature of international law.53 Anghie and other scholars 
have thus historicised the evolution of sovereignty doctrine as part of the colonial 
encounter starting with the Spanish theologians dating back to the 15th century, 
as a means to subjugate the original inhabitants of the new world.54  
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The 19th century ended, by most accounts, immediately before the outbreak of 
the WWI in 1914. 55  During the 19th century, international law was loosely 
consolidated. Yet the existing international regulatory regimes could not prevent 
the escalation of the hostilities and the eventual collapse of the balance of power 
established by the great powers between 1815 and 1915.56 The outbreak of WWI 
highlighted the urgency for the much-needed reforms of the international system. 
Reforming the international system was a possible technique to prevent future 
wars. 57  In the previous centuries, international law had concentrated on 
examining the interaction between nation states and how to control this 
relationship. Relying on the ideas encapsulated within the Treaty of Westphalia, 
and the subsequent drive to control and contain the sovereign nation states, 
international lawyers and international law scholars, activists and politicians had 
focused on the nature of the relationship between states.  
 
As David Kennedy notes, most scholars engaged in historical examination have 
romanticised the 19th century as paving the way forward for the creation of the 
League of Nations.58 The 19th century is characterised as classical, leading to the 
codification of international law. However, the turn to formalism away from 
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politics is highly contested.59 Ultimately, the development of international law in 
19th and 20th century was challenged.  
 
For example, John Austin questioned the merits of international law. Austin 
asserted that “law properly so-called” could only emanate from a proper 
sovereign. International law regulated the behaviour of nation states, there was 
necessarily no international sovereign at the helm. International law could not 
amount to “properly so-called” law similar to the laws found within the nation 
state.60 For Austin, international law was non-law and consisted “of opinions and 
sentiments current among nations generally”.61 Understandably, Austin’s views  
have haunted international lawyers throughout the 19th century and beyond. The 
development of the consent-based treaty system and state practices can be 
credited with countering Austin’s claims. Austin’s arguments about international 
law have found a contemporary home in the writings of the American 
international lawyers, like Eric Posner and Jack Goldsmith.62 
 
Kant’s idea of perpetual peace and the failure of 19th century international law 
inspired the creation of the first real international institution in the 20th century: 
the League of Nations. The League was created with the hope that it would 
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potentially prevent future wars and institutionalise peace on a global scale.63 
International lawyers, peace activists, and other various stakeholders, allegedly 
received their cue from Jan Smuts of South Africa, the founder of South African 
apartheid and United States President Woodrow Wilson. These two men are 
often depicted as supporting the internationalist ideals of formalism and 
legalisation that brought about the League of Nations. In fact, Smuts can be 
credited with attempts to institutionalise colonial mentalities through the Mandate 
System.64  As the father of South Africa’s apartheid, Smuts’ involvement allude to 
broader problems in the creation of the League of Nations.65  
 
The end of the WWI signalled a remarkable shift in the desire for peace as 
articulated by the leaders of the United Kingdom and the United States.66 Both 
Prime Minister Lloyd George and President Wilson (through his Fourteen Points) 
made references to the institutionalisation of peace through an international 
organisation.67 The victors of the war agreed on the Armistice agreement but the 
resulting peace treaty would be controversial. The Allied and Associated Powers 
forced severe and draconian conditions upon the losers of the war that would 
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precipitate the next world war, less than a generation later.68 Vladimir Lenin 
described the peace agreements as: “A peace of usurers and executioners has 
been imposed on Germany. This country has been plundered and dismembered.  
[…] All its means of survival were taken away. This is an incredible bandits' 
peace”.69  
 
One week after the commencement of WWI Peace Conference in January 1919, 
the Allied and Associated Powers created a commission to inquire into the 
causes and responsibilities for the recently concluded war.70 The Commission, 
the first international investigative body of its kind, was tasked with determining 
responsibility for the start of the war and individual criminal responsibility for the 
violations of the laws of war.71 The Commission in its final report suggested that 
the Central Powers (essentially the German, Hapsburg and Ottoman empires) 
were responsible for starting the war and much more importantly, had committed 
violations of the laws of war. As such, the Commission recommended the “High 
Officials, including Kaiser Wilhelm II, to be tried for ordering such crimes and on 
the basis of command responsibility”.72 As result of the Commission’s report, the 
Treaty of Versailles included a provision (article 227) envisioning the prosecution 
Kaiser Wilhelm II and other high officials. This requirement of the treaty was not 
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implemented.73 The first signs of international criminal law can be seen through 
the Commission’s attempts to institutionalise accountability for the violation of the 
laws of war.74   The French and the British were strong supporters of this 
initiative.75  Their attempts to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II were defeated by 
arguments that favoured sovereignty, championed by the Americans and the 
Japanese.76 
 
Moving beyond the responsibility for war crimes, the WWI Peace Conference 
and the resulting Treaty of Versailles ensured peace through the Covenant of the 
League of Nations and the concept of collective security.77 The draft covenant of 
the League of Nations was negotiated in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and 
the Treaty of Versailles established the League of Nations.78 There were 22 
original and associated members and 13 neutral member states of the League.79 
Germany joined in 1926 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1934. The 
central aim of the League of Nations was to “promote international co-operation 
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and to achieve international peace and security”.80 The lifespan of the League 
was short lived and by the late 1930’s, the League was in decline. 
 
Even though the purpose of preventing future war was commendable, the 
League was nonetheless vulnerable to the same universalism-based critiques 
that we encountered with respect to international law in the earlier centuries. 
Marc Mazower has characterized the League of Nations as a“[V]ictorian 
institution, based on the notional superiority of the great powers, an instrument 
for a global civilising mission through the use of international law”.81 At the same 
time it was a way of understanding “British imperial world leadership and 
cementing its partnership with the United States”.82 Moreover these pragmatic 
aspects of this story are often ignored, especially at the beginning stages of the 
League of Nations. These pragmatic aspects, for example the political 
compromises, are relegated out of the story of the League. The politics are 
ignored as a means to present the break forward, as part of international law’s 
progressive response to the atrocities of war and cruelty.83 In fact, politicians who 
held the balance of power at the Paris Conference endorsed a system that would 
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be deferential to politics through law, an outcome that would continue through to 
the United Nations.84  
 
The creation of the United Nations through the Charter of the United Nations 
ushered in a new era of specialisation in international law. The multiplication of 
international norms initiated in the 19th century, if not before gained further 
momentum with the creation of the League of Nations’ successor, the United 
Nations. The first steps in creating the United Nations were initiated during the 
summer of 1944 at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference by representatives from 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, United States, and 
subsequently the Republic of China. 85  They were able to reach decisive 
conclusions on the “purpose and principles of the organization, its membership 
and its principal organs”.86  
 
The development of the United Nations and its various branches continued the 
work of the League of Nations, especially as it related to the process of 
decolonisation of former colonies. 87  The doctrine of self-determination, an 
essential part of the decolonisation process was formulated as a response 
allowing former colonies to become independent, demonstrating fully the 
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universal applicability of international law.88 Once their independence was gained 
for example, former colonies from the continents of Asia and Africa would be 
able participate as full sovereign entities within the United Nations and other 
international organisations.  The primary purpose of the United Nations is: to 
maintain peace and security, peacefully resolve disputes, foster equality of 
member states and self-determination, foster social and economic cooperation, 
and finally promote and protect of human rights.89 The ancillary purposes of the 
United Nations include disarmament and development and codification of 
international law. 90  
 
In the next few pages, I will focus on one of the central purposes of the United 
Nations: human rights. I focus on human rights, as it is one of the central 
precursors to the contemporary international criminal justice regimes. 
Simultaneously, I recognise that there are other contributions to the development 
of the international criminal justice regime that is just as important as the United 
Nations and human rights. For example, Anne Orford’s interventions about the 
origins of the responsibility to protect doctrine examines the role of the UN 
Secretary General in maintaining peace and order through an international 
executive rule in newly decolonised countries.91 The international executive rule 
and role of the UN Secretary General that commenced in the early 1960’s would 
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prove invaluable in creating the two ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia.92 It is important to keep all of these various factors at the forefront, 
especially in setting out the development of the international criminal justice 
regime. 
 
The creation of the United Nations is heralded as the era of human rights.93 The 
development of the different human rights protection regimes within the United 
Nations, the codification of the prohibition of genocide and other similar 
mechanisms as a result of WWII are used as indicia to support this claim. Yet, as 
Mazower argues, the result of such a claim is “if anything, to deepen the crisis 
facing the world organization and to obscure rather than illuminate its real 
achievements”.94  
 
Claims that the contemporary system of international human rights is connected 
to the creation of the United Nations are contested.95 Samuel Moyn challenges 
the assertions that the human rights discourse emerged out of the Holocaust and 
subsequently through the creation of the United Nations.96 Moyn on the other 
hand asserts that the history of human rights is rather recent and is imbricated 
with the development of international human rights organisations such as 
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Amnesty International. Such a broad claim is not without its problems either.97  
Philip Alston argues that the “heated controversy that has been generated in the 
recent literature over whether and how the origins of human rights may be 
discerned is due primarily to a failure to acknowledge the polycentric nature of 
the human rights enterprise”.98 He questions these “attempts to capture the 
alleged essence of that enterprise by viewing it through a single lens” and 
suggests that Moyn and others 99  arguments “are intrinsically flawed and 
potentially deeply misleading”.100  
 
That said, the United Nations legal framework did in fact foster the creation of the 
contemporary human rights regimes starting with the Universal Declaration of the 
Human Rights and its accompanying two covenants, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (collectively known as the International Bill of Rights).101 The 
International Bill of Rights has spawned a vast amount of jurisprudence through 
the various monitoring bodies of the two covenants as well as domestic 
jurisprudence as a result of its acceptance by the members of the United 
Nations. The international human rights regime is just one illustration of the 
growth of international law. Under the auspice of the United Nations, multiple and 
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fragmented subspecies of international law evolved. In particular, there was a 
strong push to create a specific field of international criminal law rooted in the 
successes of Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and the failures of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East.102  
 
The expansion of the United Nations was not the sole focus of the Post-War 
period proliferation of international law. For example, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and other international institutions emerged at the 
same time.  There were universalising innovations in several other registers with 
the expansion of the international legal order through the processes of 
globalisation. The older image of the international order as a pyramidal structure 
with the nation state at the apex was no longer viable.103  This image was 
replaced by a dense web of “overlapping and detailed prescriptions in subject 
areas as diverse as […] human rights and international trade” through the 
expansion of international law and its different institutions in the late 20th 
century.104  
Self-contained regimes or highly specialised areas of law, such as diplomatic 
law, the law of the European Union and human rights instruments were unique 
subsystems that embraced in principle, full of exhaustive and definite rules of 
interpretation “concerning the consequences of breaches of their respective 
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primary norms”. 105  The expansion of the international institutions through 
globalisation led to a unique set of anxieties about the very nature of 
international law. These anxieties would later shape the discourse.106  I will 
explore the two concepts of fragmentation of international law and globalisation 
in the following chapter. 
 
The Cold War stalemate between the Western powers and their communist 
counterparts significantly diminished the United Nations’ potential for success. 
While some of the self-contained bodies of international law grew as a result of 
expanding trade and the movement of people and goods, the body of law 
encapsulated under the rubric of international criminal law did not and the 
potential promise of Nuremberg did not take off.107 The precedent of prosecuting 
the Axis and Japanese war criminals from WWII did not result in the creation of 
International Criminal Court or prosecution of war crimes until the early 1990s.108  
 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals did have an impact. The United Nations 
General Assembly “unanimously affirmed the principles of international law 
recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgement of the 
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Tribunal”. 109  Based on Nuremberg Tribunal’s decisions, the UN General 
Assembly subsequently asked the International Law Commission to draft a code 
of offences against the peace and security of mankind.110 The Law Commission 
formulated a number of international crimes and the notion of individual criminal 
responsibility, but its work was slow. By 1996, it drafted close to 20 provisions as 
part of the Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.111  
 
While during this Post-War period, there was little movement in the prosecution 
of war crimes similar to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. There were 
however large-scale expansion of international human rights laws and the laws 
of war. For example, the European Court of Human Rights commenced its 
important work in 1959 along with other UN bodies that sought to monitor the 
application of specific treaties. The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, adopted in 1966, prohibits the crime of torture, an intrinsic component of 
war crimes, as well as crimes against humanity and genocide. In a similar vein, 
the adoption of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide sought to prohibit genocide. 112  The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions regulated the conduct of war and most importantly entrenched the 
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prosecution of violation of the laws of war.113 There was a rapid expansion in 
both laws of war and international human rights during the Post-War era. But the 
same cannot be said about international criminal law. Cherif Bassiouni, one of 
the pioneers of international criminal law has captured the lull in international 
criminal law as follows: 
 
Between 1919 and 1994 there were five ad hoc international 
commissions, four ad hoc international criminal tribunals, there 
internationally mandated or authorized national prosecutions arising 
out of World War I and World War II. These processes were 
established by different legal means with varying mandates, many 
of them producing results contrary to those original contemplated.  
 
These investigations and prosecutions were established to appease 
public demand for a response to the tragic events and shocking 
conduct during armed conflict. Despite the public pressure 
demanding justice, investigative and adjudicating bodies were 
established for only a few international conflicts. Domestic conflicts, 
no matter how brutal, drew less attention from the world’s major 
powers, whose political will has been imperative to the 
establishment of such bodies.114 
 
Bassiouni’s disappointment with international criminal law and its applicability to 
domestic conflicts alludes to a larger problem with the development of 
international law and its institutions in the Post-War context. On the one hand, 
there was the development of international law, the various subspecies of 
international law and the other relevant institutions noted above. All of these 
mechanisms, in principle, allowed newly-formed states to participate in the 
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international system as sovereign entities. But these newly-formed states were 
conceptualised, and their borders were demarcated, during the colonial period. 
They were then given their sovereignty either through the League’s Mandate 
system or the United Nations’ decolonisation process.115  
 
These newly-formed states however included populations, and not infrequently, 
governments that challenged the delineation of borders by the colonial powers, 
which subsequently lead to mass rupture and violence in the Post-War era.116 In 
the context of the African continent, Obiora Okafor argues “[w]hether in Sudan or 
South Africa, Nigeria or Niger, Rwanda or Burundi […] the post-colonial African 
State continues to be weakened, even torn apart by a multitude of dissociative 
forces”. 117  The colonial delineations constructed at the outset of the 
decolonisation process are seen by some as a “straightjacket with time bombs 
ready to explode.”118  
 
The central problem is that the colonisers crafted the borders of existing units of 
sovereign states. Such a process includes and/or excludes certain portions of 
the populations that may not or may have an allegiance to the newly formed 
                                            
115 Martin Shipway, Decolonization and its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of the 
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Faculty of Law, 1998) online: < http://law.library.ubc.ca/abstracts/#1998> at 2 & 25-27 (for a 
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sovereign state. Conversely, the officials populating the state may have 
grievances with particular minority communities within their borders. In this 
context, the convergence of allegiance or grievance may lead to a stumbling 
roadblock of disagreements and disadvantages may potentially precipitate 
violence, as suggested by Okafor.   
 
Anghie offers another layer of insight about the relationship between newly 
formed sovereigns and their respective minority communities in the Post-War 
period. He writes: “[…] we might see the relationship between the state and 
minorities, as it has been characterised in international law, as reproducing the 
dynamic of difference; the minority is characterised as the primitive that must be 
managed and controlled in the interests of preserving the modern and universal 
state”.119  
 
Even though we see the continuation of the dynamic of difference in the Post-
War period, the newly formed Third World States were not without agency. 
These states understood the role of international law and thus they attempted to 
use it as a force for justice and to challenge its very structures. Sundhya Pahuja 
characterises this move as: “a call for international law to transcend its imperial 
origins in the name of the universal”.120 The attempts to use international law as 
a tool of emancipation by the international law scholars allied to the Third World 
                                            
119 Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 207. 
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Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) [Pahuja, Decolonising]. 
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has been aptly denoted as the first incarnations of Third World Approaches to 
International Law.121 
 
The dynamic of difference during this period can be summed up with the 
following: The logic of the Post-War system and the end of the Cold War gave 
way to an internationalist moment in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 
build-up of international institutions and their inability to function given the geo-
political climate of the Post-War period created a vacuous space. Most 
international institutions were rendered powerless. They were captured by the 
politics between the West and the Soviet Block. The implosion of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and its Warsaw Pact caused a geo-political shift in the 
early 1990s. There was a proliferation of international justice regimes as result of 
the implosion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the conclusion of the 
Cold War détente.122 More importantly, from this period onwards, there was a 
rapid expansion of international criminal regimes and international criminal law. 
 
Thus far, the narrative that I have presented demonstrates the evolution of 
international law and its institutions. In doing so, I have paid close attention to 
how the development of both international law and its institutions occurred. I 
exposed the inadequacies of international law and its institutions by illustrating 
the potential pitfalls of its universalising nature, which started at the early stages 
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of international law with Vitoria’s concept of sovereignty. The move to 
international institutions in the global order that I have chronicled is the basis for 
a number of theoretical claims by international lawyers and international law 
scholars encapsulated within the theories of global governance. For example, 
some scholars use the development of the Charter of United Nations and the 
United Nations institutions as an illustration of global constitutionalism.123 Global 
administrative lawyers trace the emergence of their specific theory of global 
governance back to the administrative unions of the 18th century.124 I will explore 
these two theories in greater detail in the following chapters.  
 
In this section, I traced the evolution of international law and its institutions from 
a broad historical perspective as means to introduce the universalism of 
international law and to trace the evolution of international institutions. Within this 
evolution, I paid particular attention to the development of international criminal 
law. In the next section, I turn to the three case studies from international 
criminal law. In this respect, I will trace the evolution of international criminal 
institutions and then I will chronicle the development of two ad hoc international 
criminal institutions of ICTR and ICTY and the International Criminal Court. By 
focusing on this particular subfield of international law, I will to demonstrate the 
continued effects of the dynamic of difference and the subsequent false 
universalism in how we theorise global governance.   
                                            
123Bardo Fassbender, “The meaning of International Constitutional Law” in Nicholas Tsagourias, 
ed, Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
124 Kingsbury et al, “Emergence of GAL” supra note 49 at 17. 
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1.3 Situating ICL institutions in Development of International Institutions: 
Cherif Bassiouni dates the origins of international criminal law to the trials of 
Conradin von Hohenstaufen in 1268 and Peter von Hagenbach in 1474.125  
Robert Cryer has sought to trace the emergence of international criminal law all 
the way back to the antiquity. He suggests that some elements of criminal 
prosecution can be found in what are now China, Egypt, Greece and India.126 
Other scholars locate the first example of war crimes prosecution to the early 
14th and 15th centuries, with the trial of William Wallace (Braveheart, 1305) and 
Joan of Arc (1431).127 In the early 20th century there was one important instance 
of a potential international criminal prosecution:128 the attempts by victors of WWI 
to establish an international criminal institution to prosecute the German and 
Ottoman war criminals.129  
 
Historical scholarship further supports the assertion that international criminal 
law started taking on its modern form right after WWI. Kristen Sellars for example 
                                            
125  M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Perspectives on International Criminal Justice" (2010) 50 Virginia 
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examines the French and British desire to prosecute the deposed Kaiser Wilhelm 
II.130 These attempts, as Justice Antonio Cassese, the former President of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, argues, were fruitless owing to numerous different 
factors, such as sovereign equality of nation states. An international institution, 
therefore, was not created.131 
 
Prosecuting the perpetrators of international crimes was not possible after WWI. 
The consensus to pursue justice on the part of the Allies resulted in the two 
different international criminal prosecutions of the German and Japanese 
perpetrators of mass atrocities for acts against “peace, security and well-being of 
the world”.132  The establishment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 
(NIMT) and International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) are frequently 
represented as an important policy shift in understanding state sovereignty in the 
international criminal law literature.133 As seen through the WWI example, the 
grand narrative of state sovereignty prevented attribution of individual criminal 
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responsibility for conduct during war.134 The sovereignty principle, developed 
through the scholarship of Vitoria, meant that states were immune from any 
outside interference, and individuals in power enjoyed immunity from prosecution 
for any acts conducted during their tenure as public officials.135 Immunity (both 
functional and personal) is a fundamental doctrine of international law that is 
deeply contested in the context of international crimes.136 State sovereignty was 
one of the central arguments used by the Americans for refusing to support the 
prosecution of the Kaiser Wilhelm II at the end of WWI.137 
 
The desire to prosecute the officials of the Axis Powers started as early as 1943, 
if not before.138 Various official statements made by the Allies during the war 
demanded the prosecution of war crimes by the Axis Powers. The most 
significant of these statements was the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 
1943, which provided the political backdrop for the creation of the international 
tribunal in Nuremberg.139 A month prior to the Moscow Declaration, the Allies 
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had created the United Nations War Crimes Commission. The Commission was 
tasked with investigating war crimes and providing advice on the punishment. 
The Commission operated from 1943 to 1948 to investigate war crimes and, 
later, to advise on the process for punishment.140   
 
The Moscow Declaration was a promise to punish those responsible for war 
crimes. There was considerable discussion about the type of punishment and in 
the end British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had to be convinced of the 
merits of an international trial rather than summary execution. 141  Cassese 
suggests that “[A]fter the defeat of Germany, the British led by Churchill, stated 
that it was enough to arrest and hang those primarily responsible […], without 
wasting time on legal procedures”.142 The Americans, and to some extent their 
Russian counterparts, had to convince Churchill of the advantages of 
prosecuting the war criminals. 143  There were various arguments that were 
advanced in support of the triumph of rule of law over barbarism.144   The first 
and most important reason was to ensure that rule of law and democracy 
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prevailed by affording the accused with a fair trial.145  The Chief Prosecutor of the 
NIMT, Robert Jackson in his opening address captured the triumph of rule of law 
in the following manner in 1945:  
That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury 
stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive 
enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant 
tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason. This inquest 
represents the practical effort of four of the most mighty of nations, 
with the support of 17 more, to utilize international law to meet the 
greatest menace of our times-aggressive war. The common sense 
of mankind demands that law shall not stop with the punishment of 
petty crimes by little people. It must also reach men who possess 
themselves of great power and make deliberate and concerted use 
of it to set in motion evils which leave no home in the world 
untouched.146 
 
Upon this basis, the London Agreement established the NIMT, which was 
negotiated as a treaty between the Allies.147 The NIMT was created through a 
multilateral agreement between the allied nations, United Kingdom, United 
States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and France.148 The Agreement was 
the result of concessions between the Americans and their Soviet counterparts. 
The disagreements during the negotiations seemed so fundamental and often 
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turned on conceptions of law and legal process, such as the distinctions between 
the adversarial and inquisitorial legal traditions. The Tribunal included eight 
judges (one main and one alternate for each of the allied powers).149 It received 
the indictments on 1 October 1945, which included four different charges based 
on the NIMT’s Charter: the crime of conspiracy, crimes against the peace, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. The four respective Allies each provided a 
‘chief prosecutor’ responsible for the prosecution of these crimes.150 The Tribunal 
indicted 24 defendants and seven organizations.151 
 
Unlike their response to German actions, the Allies did not make statements of 
criminal responsibility regarding the Japanese until the latter part of WWII. The 
most important statement by the Allies is the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, 
which set out the terms of surrender of the Japanese.152 The IMTFE was created 
through an executive decree of General Douglas MacArthur, the supreme 
commander of the Allied Powers in Japan. He was acting under the authority of 
the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.153 This founding instrument of the IMTFE 
was, therefore, legally a matter of US domestic law.154 Similar to the NIMT, the 
IMTFE included 11 judges and sought to prosecute 28 defendants with over 750 
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individual charges. The Emperor of Japan was not prosecuted. These charges 
related to crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.155  
 
These two examples of international prosecutions were replete with problematic 
procedure and practices. These problems take us back to Anghie’s dynamic of 
difference that chronicled in the first section of this chapter. The problems 
centred on victors’ justice, denial of due process rights, and violation of 
fundamental rights.156 Trial fairness was a genuine concern for the IMTFE’s 
Indian Justice Radhabinod Pal and this was included in his dissenting opinion.  
Justice Pal’s dissent deemed the prosecution of the Japanese as ‘vindictive 
retaliation’ and an exercise of neo-colonialism by the war’s victors.157 He argued 
that the exemption from prosecution for the atomic bombing of Japan by the 
Americans, colonial aggression and territorial annexation by the Allies all 
rendered any attempts to punish the Japanese unjust. More importantly, he was 
highly critical of the decision to mandate the tribunal to prosecute undefined 
crimes: 
To say that the victor can define a crime at his will and then punish 
for that crime would be to revert back to those days when he was 
allowed to devastate the occupied country with fire and sword, 
appropriate all public and private property therein, and kill the 
inhabitants or take them away into captivity. When international law 
will have to allow a victor nation thus to define a crime at his will, it 
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will […] find itself back on the same spot whence it started on its 
apparently onward journey several centuries ago.158 
 
Justice Pal’s dissent then is encapsulated in the interruptions I presented in the 
earlier section vis-à-vis the universalism through Anghie’s dynamic of difference 
endemic in international law and international institutions. Justice Pal dissent is 
perhaps the first TWAIL based critique of international criminal law. The dissent 
represents a dark and often forgotten aspect of international criminal law.159 
Furthermore, in thinking about international prosecutions, we can see how a gap 
is created between distinct cultures, or parties at war, where the victors’ ideals of 
justice are hoisted up as the universal and the losers’ practices are deemed 
barbaric. Prosecuting the losers for international crimes then fills the gap.160 This 
is even more illustrative in the context of the atomic bomb and its enduring 
effects on Hiroshima.  
 
According to the traditional progress narrative of international law161, the two sui 
generis tribunals of ICTR and ICTY and the International Criminal Court are the 
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direct descendants of the NMIT and IMTFE.162 The gap of nearly 60 years 
between the two instantiations of international prosecution is largely credited to 
the politics of this period.163 It is often argued that a casualty of the Cold War was 
the desire to prosecute those responsible for mass human atrocities. 164 
Bassiouni alludes to this with the following reflection: “[S]oon after World War II, 
the cold war began and efforts to advance international criminal justice gave way 
to the political conflict between East and West”.165  Putting aside the linear 
progress-based narratives, there is some truth to the assertions that Cold War 
politics prevented the international community from acting to either prosecute 
those responsible for mass human rights violations or prevent such atrocities. 
For example, the United Nations Security Council, and even the United Nations 
General Assembly, was often unable to deliver concrete decisions given the 
voting patterns of the West and its allies and the Eastern communist block during 
the Post-War period. Ultimately, allegations of international crimes were often 
marshalled by one side against the other, with little benefit for those on the 
ground experiencing human rights violations.  
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The following sections will provide an account of the process by which modern 
international criminal institutions have been created since 1989 as set out in the 
current academic literature. This account is provided to illustrate the history of 
these institutions. My central purpose is to present the ideals encapsulated in the 
creation of these institutions through their formal mechanisms. Subsequently, I 
will demonstrate how the institutions present a singular aspiration to promote a 
particular Western narrative of justice, that is part of the history of international 
law. This chapter (and the previous section specifically) established how 
international law and international institutions have evolved and how this 
evolution is described in the contemporary literature. Moreover, as is apparent in 
preceding descriptions of international law and international institutions, there is 
often an omission of certain key-facts. For example, international lawyers and 
international law scholars often ignore the role of colonialism and imperialism in 
the development of the sovereignty doctrine and international law in general. Our 
orthodox historical understanding of Vitoria does not include his role in theorising 
the relationship between the Spanish colonisers and the local indigenous 
inhabitants. This omission, as I argue in the chapters that follow, is a key feature 
of international law and its institutions and this feature is very relevant in how we 
theorise global governance today.  
 
The manner in which three different international criminal institutions were 
created will be set out in the following sections. Some of the difficulties that these 
institutions have encountered will also be explored. I characterise these 
difficulties as part of international law’s tendency to present the western 
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particular as universally applicable. These three case studies demonstrate that 
the repetition of the dynamic of difference is present at all levels of international 
prosecutions and adjudication. The dynamic of difference, for example, is visible 
in the selectivity both of creating these tribunals and of prosecuting particular 
(African) heads of state. Moreover, it is also visible in how the procedures are 
created and implemented within the institutions. In the following section, I focus 
on the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. I will not include the three other current institutions – 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, that form an intimate part of the 
international criminal justice regime. 
 
In the first case study, the focus is on ICTY and its completion strategy as it 
relates to the rights of the accused. I will present the changes to the Rules of 
Evidence and Procedure as law-making by the judges of the tribunals and outline 
the deleterious effects of these initiatives on the rights of the accused in three 
registers: First, the amendments to the rules have repealed judicial decisions in 
certain cases; second, the changes to the rules have precipitated trial delay; and 
third, reformulation of the rules has allowed new evidence on appeal to be 
admitted. By honing in on these three aspects, what becomes demonstrable is 
the disparity between the goals of the ICTY in providing justice to the victims and 
bringing the accused to justice through the violation of the rights of the accused. 
In exploring these disparities, the dynamic of difference theorised by Anghie is 
once again made visible.  
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The dynamic of difference as noted earlier, is the creation of cultural differences 
between two cultures, characterising one as universal and the other as 
uncivilized, and thus bridging the gap between these two cultures. The ICTY 
Statute and international human rights standards prohibit trial unfairness. Trial 
fairness is jeopardised when judicial decisions are repealed through what may 
seem like a judicial fiat by changing the rules of evidence and procedure. But 
these international human rights standards are not applicable to the accused 
before the ICTY because they have allegedly committed barbaric atrocities 
against civilian populations. The barbaric war criminals are deemed unworthy of 
these basic fundamental rights. What emerges from this first case study is a 
dichotomy between ending impunity and doing so while affording the due 
process guarantees to the accused. The lens of the dynamic of difference allows 
us to see how the singular narrative of ending impunity, a universal aspiration 
encompassed in the development of international law, is extended to the 
barbaric acts of the perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide. But simultaneously, the exercise of bridging the gap between the 
universal and uncivilized does not occur completely rather it is somewhat 
lackadaisical. Similarly in the second case study, I focus on ICTR and witness 
testimony and the role of experts, which demonstrates the dynamic of difference 
in operation. In the third case study, I explore the International Criminal Court 
and its prosecutorial policy as evidence of Anghie’s dynamic of difference.  
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1.4 ICTY and ICTR: From Nuremberg to The Hague, the continuation of the 
progress narrative? 
The break-up of the former Yugoslavia started in the early 1990’s and eventually 
escalated into an international armed conflict with mass human rights 
violations.166  In 1992, the UN Security Council (UNSC) requested that the UN 
Secretary General establish an impartial Commission of Experts to examine, 
analyse, and provide “conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia”.167  In its first interim report, the Commission, chaired by Cherif 
Bassiouni, concluded that grave breaches and other violations of international 
humanitarian law had been committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia.168 
While the Commission undertook its important work, the UN Secretary General 
canvassed states about the creation of a future tribunal as a UN Security Council 
subsidiary organ, rather than a treaty based institution.169 With the submission of 
the first interim report by the Commission of Experts,170 the Security Council 
decided to prosecute those responsible for the crimes against humanity, 
genocide and war crimes. In response to a request by the UN Security Council 
through Resolution 808, the UN Secretary General recommended a tribunal by 
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India, Japan, Morocco, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
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resolution, rather a treaty based institution.171 The UN Secretary General’s report 
included a draft statute for the tribunal, in which the he laid out the possible 
language for the future statute based on “provisions found within the existing 
international law, particularly with regard to the competence of the rationae 
materiae”.172 In some ways, this statute was modelled on “on the Nuremberg 
IMT’s Charter”. 173  The report also contained a brief commentary on each 
proposed provision of the statute. Pursuant to Resolution 827, the UN Security 
Council created the ICTY on 27 May 1992, relying on its United Nations Charter 
Chapter VII powers to maintain peace and security.174  
 
During the same time period, the conflict between the Rwandan Peoples Front 
(RPF) and the Hutu led Rwandan government escalated. By mid 1994, it was 
clear to the international community that genocide was occurring in Rwanda.175 
Even though many of the factors that precipitated the creation of the ICTY were 
present in the Rwandan context, there was some reluctance on the part of the 
world leaders to create an international tribunal because of the costs associated 
with such a project.176 Cassese suggests the following:  
                                            
171 Cryer, An Introduction to ICL supra note 71 at 128; UNSCOR, UNSC Resolution 808, 3175th 
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175 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Volume 1 
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“[S]ensitive to the criticisms that the establishment of the ICTY 
represented yet another illustration of the disproportionate attention 
paid to the problems of Europe vis-à-vis the developing world, the 
international community was also anxious to establish a Tribunal for 
Rwanda so as to assuage its conscience and shield itself from 
accusations of double standards”.177    
 
Almost 18 months later, through Resolution 935, the UNSC established the 
Commission of Experts to investigate the atrocities committed during the 
Rwandan genocide from January 1994 to December 1994.178 The Secretary 
General of the UN appointed three experts from the region to the Commission of 
Inquiry, and a final report was submitted to the UN Security Council in October 
1994. According to the Commission of Experts, “since 6 April 1994, an estimated 
500,000 unarmed civilians have been murdered in Rwanda”.179 Resolution 955 
established the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda along with its 
empowering Statute.180  
  
Leading up to the resolution, the issue of whether the Rwandan conflict was an 
international armed conflict or non-international conflict was fervently debated by 
the various parties. The Commission of Experts report clearly states that the 
Rwandan conflict was a non-international conflict. 181  The severity of the 
                                            
177 Cassese, ICL supra note 131at 327. 
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atrocities, however, caused the United Nations Security Council to utilise its 
Chapter VII powers to create the institution. In the context of the ICTR, the 
United Nations Security Council followed a one-step process in creating the 
tribunal, rather than the two-step process that was followed with the ICTY.182  
 
The negotiations within the United Nations Security Council were spearheaded 
by the United States and New Zealand, including the drafting of the statute. Even 
though the RPF initially supported the Tribunal, once it formed the Unity 
Government, there was an attempt to rethink its commitment to international 
prosecutions.183 Rwanda voted against the resolution at the end. It did however 
promise to co-operate with ICTR, while China abstained.184 
 
The ICTY Statute has 34 provisions and ICTR Statute has 32 provisions, which 
delineate the international crimes, the organisational structure and the 
composition of the tribunal. 185  The statutes set out four punishable crimes 
(genocide, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity186). Since both institutions were temporary, the judges 
initiated the completion strategy in 2003 (ICTR) and 2004 (ICTY)187 respectively 
so that both tribunals were expected to complete their cases in the following 
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183 Morris & Scharf, ICTR V1 supra note 175 at 66. 
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years. The ICTY is set to deliver its final judgment in 2016 (trial level), while the 
ICTR hoped to deliver its final appeal decision in July 2015.188 Both institutions 
have also adopted a policy to strengthen the national judicial system of each 
respective institution. 
 
ICTY is the catalyst for creating war crimes chambers in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia, and Croatia with the support of the United Nations Security 
Council. These chambers focus on the intermediate and lower-level officials 
accused of committing serious human rights violations, and are also part of 
ICTY’s completion strategy. Similarly, the Rwandan regular and Gacaca courts 
are in the process of prosecuting intermediate and lower-level officials.189  
 
As set out in the resolutions, the purpose of these institutions is: (i) to bring to 
justice persons allegedly responsible for the violation of international 
humanitarian law, (ii) to render justice to the victims, (iii) to deter future crimes 
and (iv) to restore peace by ending impunity.190 It is certain that these goals of 
international criminal institutions are part of the larger universalising mission of 
international law that was discussed in the previous section.  
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1.4.1 The Costs of Justice: International Criminal Tribunal for former 
Yugoslavia as a Case Study 
The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in 1993 
was a pivotal moment for the international community: the violation of inalienable 
human rights reached traumatic levels in specific regions of the country and thus 
the international community decided to intervene. 191  But as early as 1997, 
commentators and member states of the United Nations started to raise 
concerns about the efficiency and the costs associated with the Tribunal.192 
Some writers argue that these concerns originated from within the Tribunal and 
as a response to the 1997 annual report of ICTY. 193  As the growing 
dissatisfaction with the efficiency of ICTY germinated, the members of the 
Security Council were concerned because of the costs associated with 
prosecuting war criminals.194 There were several flaws in the very design of the 
Tribunal that precipitated these criticisms.195 Concerns over efficiency and costs 
associated with the Tribunals day-to-day operations gave rise to significant 
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results. These outcomes serve to illustrate how the mandate of this institution 
quickly morphed from ending impunity to ending impunity quickly and cheaply.  
 
While on the surface, the descriptive and normative elements of this international 
criminal institution may signal the concretisation of a constitutional moment196, 
the reality is different. The internal dynamics of the Tribunal are plagued with 
contradictions. This is not surprising, given what we know from the history of 
international law and its institutions discussed earlier in this dissertation. The 
central purpose of the Tribunal is purportedly to deliver justice to the victims and 
bring the perpetrators to justice. However financial constraints necessitated a 
different ethos, one where corners were cut as a means to ensure expedient and 
efficient trials. In laying the foundation for this argument, it is appropriate to 
examine the powers of the judges to create and amend the rules of evidence and 
procedure. Judges of both ad hoc Tribunals have this power, but in this section I 
will focus on the ICTY. Article 15 of the ICTY Statute states:  
The judges of the International Tribunal shall adopt rules of 
procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the 
proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the 
protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate 
matters.197 
 
This significant legislative power granted to judges has enabled approximately 
40 amendments to the Rules after its initial drafting. Ultimately, the Rules are 
there to fill in the gaps of the Statute. They consist of ten sections, with 127 
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provisions. The Rules cover every aspect of the Tribunal’s work from 
investigations, trials to appeals and thus form the background operating system 
of the Tribunal as a whole. The powers of the judges of this particular Tribunal to 
legislate exceed those of domestic and International Criminal Court judges in 
drafting and amending the rules of evidence and procedure.198  
 
For example, the separation of powers within national jurisdictions is defined by 
the various domestic constitutional arrangements. The arrangements prohibit 
violations of fundamental rights enshrined therein by state agencies or 
governmental omission and any such violations are deemed justiciable.199 There 
are constitutional orders that vary in how they envision the role of their judges. 
What is certain however is that the judges cannot make laws or amend laws 
explicitly in these jurisdictions. Yet this is the standard practice at the ICTY.200  
 
From the perspective of the accused, the Statute along with the Rules do not 
include specific provisions to challenge changes to the rules in the judicial review 
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sense.201 Once a rule has been amended, no matter the effects on the rights of 
accused, there is no way to challenge the rules application. However, there are 
possibilities to review particular decisions using the regulations and directives of 
the Tribunal.202  
 
There is an appeal procedure, as set out by the Statute to challenge judicial 
decisions based on the standards of review. On the surface, as set out in the 
enabling ICTY Statute, there are no implicit methods to challenge the decisions  
of the Tribunal, unless it relates to a matter of fact, law or procedural error 
(encapsulated within the appeals provisions). There is no other possibility to 
challenge any decisions before any other competent international body either.203  
 
The legislative powers of the judges to amend the rules do have significant 
consequences on the manner in which the Tribunal functions. I will provide three 
illustrative examples that have resulted in law-making by the judges. These 
amendments have resulted in the judges legislating. These three illustrations, 
from the accused’s perspective demonstrate that a singular and universal 
narrative of human rights is only applicable to some and not all. That is, even 
though the Tribunal is bound to protect the fair trial rights of the accused, it does 
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not do so for a whole host of reasons. Anghie’s dynamic of difference in 
particular helps us understand this more explicitly. 
1.4.1.1 Repealing Judicial Decisions & Judicial Law-making 
There are instances in which the judges have amended the Rules in order to 
overrule the decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber.204 The most significant 
example is the Appeals Chamber’s decision to overturn the Trial Chamber’s 
decision to proceed without the third member of its panel in Prosecutor v. Zoran 
Kupreskic et al. During the trial proceedings in February 1999, the presiding 
judge informed the parties that one of their judicial colleagues was ill and was 
“unlikely to be able to attend the hearings during the remainder of the week”.205 
In light of these circumstances and for effective time management purposes, the 
presiding judge enquired whether the parties were prepared to “request that 
depositions pursuant to Rule 71 be taken from the defence witnesses scheduled 
to be heard during this time-period”.206 The prosecutor made such an application 
against the wishes of the accused. The remaining members of the panel went 
ahead with the deposition. 207  The witness’ evidence was taken by way of 
deposition with the two judges present, acting as presiding officers.  
 
                                            
204 Boas et al, ICP supra note 202 at 33. 
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The accused appealed this decision to include the testimony. The Appeal 
Chamber agreed with the accused, noting that “[G]iven the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the latter provision, a Trial Chamber is only competent to act as a 
Trial Chamber per se if it comprises three Judges”.208  
 
Four months later, the judges, acting in plenary, amended Rules 15 and 71 and 
created Rule 15 bis. This new rule overturned the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s five-
member panel decision in Kupreskic. The new rule allowed the judges, in the 
event that one of their panel members is ill or unable to attend the hearing, to 
order “the hearing in the case continue in the absence of that judge”.209 This 
amendment’s direct effect was to overturn the ICTY Appeal Chamber’s decision 
in Kupreskic. There are other examples in which the judges acting in plenary 
have sought to overturn decisions. Gideon Boas suggest that judges have 
overturned the chambers decisions in “core areas of the law, including the 
procedure for the delivery of discrete sentences for each finding of guilt by a trial 
chamber; amending the provisions on the right of appeal […]”.210  
 
In the example of Kupreskic, the accused’s right to a fair trial, as set out by the 
Statute, is irrelevant. The judicial practice to amend the rules211 demonstrates 
what matters most: the expediency and efficiency of the ICTY. The universalist 
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arguments in favour of ending impunity takes over, where the judges palpably 
ignore the rights of the accused set out in the Statute. Getting the job done 
(prosecution), spending less money and moving on to the next case are the 
ultimate goal. The judges, and other participants of the Tribunal are able to forgo 
the rights of the accused based on the alleged barbaric acts perpetrated against 
the victims.212 By deeming the perpetrators uncivilised, the Tribunal is able to 
transcend its human rights requirements.  
 
Anghie’s dynamic of difference thus helps us understand how the desire to end 
impunity trumps the fundamental rights of the accused. The central goal of the 
Tribunal was to deliver justice to the victims and bring the perpetrators to justice. 
As noted earlier, the conflict was precipitated by the collapse of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and the collapse of Communist Yugoslavia.  In one of 
its first decisions, Prosecutor v. Tadić, the Tribunal, after having detailed the 
colonial history of the region, notes the following: 
The years from 1945 to 1990 had no tales of ethnic atrocities to tell.   
Marshal Tito and his communist regime took stern measures to 
suppress and keep suppressed all nationalist tendencies. Under its 
Constitution of 1946, the country was to be composed of six 
Republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, and Montenegro and two autonomous regions, 
Vojvodina and Kosovo, these two being closely associated with 
Serbia. The peoples of the Republics other than Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were regarded as distinct nations of federal 
Yugoslavia. The situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was unique; 
although it was one of the six Republics, it, unlike the others, 
possessed no one single majority ethnic grouping and thus there 
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was no recognition of a distinct Bosnian nation.  However, by 1974 
the Muslims were considered to be one of the nations or peoples of 
federal Yugoslavia.213 
 
As noted by the Tribunal, the Balkan region has a unique cultural history that is 
rooted in the colonial history of the Ottoman Empire.214 In creating the Tribunal 
well before the end of the conflict in 1995215, the Security Council dictated the 
process by which justice was to be rendered. The Security Council believed that 
the new breakaway sovereign states (or the former republics under the 
Communist Constitution) could not handle their own sovereign affairs.216 The 
decision to create the Tribunal as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and 
not a treaty-based body is illustrative of the dynamic of difference. There was a 
fear amongst those pushing for the creation of the tribunal that the new 
sovereign states of the former Yugoslavia would not ratify the treaty.217 The 
Secretary General in his report to the Security Council thus states:  
20. As has been pointed out in many of the comments received, the 
treaty approach incurs the disadvantage of requiring considerable 
time to establish an instrument and then to achieve the required 
number of ratifications for entry into force. Even then, there could be 
no guarantee that ratification will be received from those states 
which should be parties to the treaty if it is to be truly effective.  
 
[...]  
 
22. In light of the disadvantage of the treaty approach in this 
particular case and of the need indicated in resolution 808 (1993) 
for an effective and expeditious implementation of the decision to 
establish an international tribunal, the Secretary-General believes 
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that the International Tribunal should be established by a decision of 
the Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations. Such a decision would constitute a measure to 
maintain or restore international peace and security, following the 
requisite determination of the existence of a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression.218 
 
The Security Council therefore created the Tribunal. In doing so, it grants the 
judges, similar to the NIMT, the power to amend their rules of evidence and 
procedure. Two cultures are present in this context. One is deemed superior and 
universal and the other is seen as unable to handle their domestic affairs and 
render justice to the victims and bring the perpetrators to justice. Thus the 
Security Council bridges this gap by creating the Tribunal. It does so as a means 
to ensure that the Tribunal implements the superior culture’s standards and 
renders justice to the victims by prosecuting those responsible for the violation of 
the laws of war.219  
 
In the Kupreskic example, the alleged perpetrators are before the Tribunal facing 
charges of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity as part of that 
goal of rending justice. But simultaneously, because of costs, their fundamental 
right to a fair trial, as set out by the Statute (drafted and implemented by the UN 
Security Council), is ignored through the law-making capacity of the judges. The 
judges of the Tribunal were granted the power to amend the rules as they saw fit 
in fulfilling their goal of ending impunity. In this instance they choose to do so at 
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the expense of the accuseds’ right to a fair trial. Viewed from this perspective, 
the accused, given their alleged complicity in the most heinous crimes are not 
worthy of having their rights guaranteed. This takes us back to Justice Pal’s 
concerns over the changes in the rules in IMTE.220 
1.4.1.2 Significant Trial Delays and the Completion Strategy 
The desire to control the exponential growth of the budgets commenced after 
both ad hoc tribunals began their important task of prosecuting those responsible 
for the most serious crimes in the former Yugoslavia.221 With the then President 
Cassese’s alarming annual report222, the UN General Assembly requested the 
Secretary General to assemble a group of experts to conduct a review of the 
operations of ICTY and ICTR. In November 1999, the expert group delivered its 
report to the Secretary General with over 40 substantive recommendations, most 
of which were adopted by both institutions to curb their expenses.223 As a result, 
in April 2000, Judge Jorda presented a report to the United Nations General 
Assembly that sought to limit the trials to 16 years. Moreover he asked to change 
both ICTR and ICTY’s jurisdiction to only cover senior leaders accused of 
committing grave crimes. This was the starting point of the completion strategy, 
as set out by the United Nations Security Council. 
 
After numerous consultations and reports from the Tribunal’s President and the 
ICTY prosecutor, UNSC Resolution 1503 ended the temporal jurisdiction of both 
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tribunals and called for both institutions to complete their cases by 2010.224 
UNSC Resolution 1534 reaffirmed previous commitments and required both 
tribunals to “take all necessary measures” to achieve the completion strategy.225  
 
The underlying factors pushing the United Nations Security Council and the 
United Nations General Assembly to limit the activities of the tribunals were 
financial. Even though we may view ascribing monetary value to international 
justice as vulgar,226 the reality is that international institutions are governed by 
how much they spend. In 2011, it was forecasted that the cost of international 
criminal justice will reach close to $6.5 billion by 2015.227 The costs associated 
with ICTY alone are staggering. The ICTY has managed to indict 161 accused 
(141 concluded proceedings, excluding potential review proceedings and 
contempt proceedings). In the fiscal year of 2010, ICTY spent $301,895,900. On 
average, the ICTY has spent close to $18M on each accused.228  
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In 1997, ICTY President Cassese noted in the annual report that: “[T]he Tribunal 
must find new ways of working that will enable it to try all of the accused within a 
reasonable time.”229 By 1998, ICTY had over 28 accused in custody but had only 
managed to deliver two judgments.230 Thus questions about efficiency turned to 
whether the rules, favouring the adversarial model, could be amended to make 
way for new, more efficient trial proceedings. Such proceedings needed the 
judges to have more of a managerial role. The turn to managerialism coincides 
with a civilist judge taking control of the presidency of the tribunal in 1999.231 
 
The United Nations Security Council’s reaction to the exorbitant costs of 
international justice forced ICTY (and ICTR) to find feasible alternatives to how 
they conduct their trials. To prevent pre-trial and trial delays, precipitated by both 
the prosecution and the defence, judges introduced reforms that would allow 
increased judicial access to information about the parties’ cases. Simultaneously, 
the reforms to the rules provided the judges with new powers to set deadlines 
and work-plans, thereby limiting the number of witnesses and legal issues. The 
changes therefore “would reduce the length of both pre[-]trial[s] and trial[s]”.232  
 
                                            
229 Seventh Annual Report of the ICTY, UNSCOR (7 August 2000), A/55/273–S/2000/777 at 
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231 Daryl A. Mundis “New Mechanisms/or the Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law”, 
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In fact, the move to managerial judging at the ICTY did not lead to more efficient 
trials.233 To the contrary, the changes to the rules, with the added new steps, 
prolonged the duration of the trials and thus lead to the following conclusion: 
“[T]he results of these regressions reveal that the managerial judging reforms did 
not deliver any of their promised outcomes”.234 The rationale for this assertion is 
that the judges lacked specific information about their cases. Furthermore the 
prosecution and defence counsel resented and resisted their diminished roles.  
 
Based on the available data, an accused before ICTY can be incarcerated for 
close to six years from the pre-trial to the conclusion of the appeal process.235 In 
this instance, even though there are significant trial delays, the accused can 
mount a challenge within the tribunal structure, utilising the enabling Statute and 
the respective rules as a means to challenge the delays. Nonetheless, it is the 
same judges that amended the rules who then decide if their changes resulted in 
the violation of fundamental rights guarantees afforded to the accused. The 
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judgment of the appeals chamber”. 
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accused is left in a precarious position of challenging the law-making function of 
the judges.  
 
From a cursory and uncritical domestic criminal law perspective, the fundamental 
rights guarantees afforded to the accused are a central tenet of the national 
codifications of criminal procedure and constitutional protections. Constitutional 
provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms have been 
interpreted by the Canadian courts as prohibiting any erosion of the rights of the 
accused.236 In the Canadian jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has focused on 
the whether the delay is reasonable.237 The jurisprudence balances the interests 
of the public, the accused and administration of justice. In the United States, the 
Supreme Court and the Constitution are highly protective of the rights of the 
accused.238 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has developed an 
expansive jurisprudence protecting the rights of the accused in criminal 
matters.239 Meanwhile, there is a long tradition of affording fundamental rights 
protection in international human rights law.240 However, the customary nature of 
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the right to a fair trial, which includes the rights of the accused, is still 
debateable.241  
 
The fundamental guarantees afforded to the accused, therefore, embody a 
central organising feature of how the international criminal regime is 
conceptualised within the Statute and other international human rights standards 
established in the Post-War period. Within the context of ICTY however, there is 
a certain level of relaxation of these fundamental tenets that adversely affect the 
rights of the accused. Arguably, the relaxation of the rights of the accused stems 
from the behaviour of judges as they legislate using their powers to amend the 
Rules. The decision of the judges to regularly tamper with the Rules – 
sometimes in response to political pressure from the Security Council - has had 
a significant effect on the rights of the accused in terms of trial delays.242  
 
Similar to the earlier example, the significant trial delay has a serious effect on 
the rights of the accused. The Tribunal was set up by the Security Council as a 
means to bridge the divide between the Western superior culture and the 
barbarism of Balkan conflict. Nonetheless, the universal attempts to prosecute 
war criminals through the ICTY tests the international communities commitment 
to international justice and the desire to end impunity. The serious work of 
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prosecuting international war criminals challenges both the international 
community to fund the Tribunal and maintain its support for these efforts. This 
tension between costs and justice operationalises the dynamic of difference even 
further by denying the accused, their basic fundamental rights guaranteed by 
law. What we can learn from this example is how the dynamic of difference is 
embedded in international law and its institutions. These conclusions have 
significant effects on the manner in which we choose to theorise global 
governance, in particular global constitutionalism.  
1.4.1.3 Rights of the Accused & New Convictions on Appeal  
Christoph Safferling identifies trial fairness as one of the main problems of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East.243 Trial fairness is exemplified through new convictions 
and sentences on appeal before the ICTY. In certain instances, the new 
convictions arise through the production of new evidence facilitated through the 
changes to the rules. Rule 115 of the ICTY Rule of Evidence and Procedure 
allows a party to present, with the permission of the ICTY Appeals Chamber, 
new additional relevant evidence on appeal.244 This rule was amended twice. In 
conjunction with the interpretation of the appeals provisions, this rule has 
precipitated a fierce debate amongst the judges of the ICTY Appeals Chamber. 
The judges debated whether or not they are allowed to impose a new conviction 
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on appeal.245 There are exceptions; for example in Tadić, the Appeals Chamber 
quashed acquittals by the Trial Chamber and entered a new conviction on 
appeal but the Appeals Chamber remitted the matter of sentencing back to the 
Trial Chamber. 246  The general practice however is clearly contrary to 
contemporary international human rights norms to admit new evidence on 
appeal. The International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute is different.247 
 
Justice Pal’s powerful dissent from the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East focused on the haphazard nature of trial fairness as a result of allowing the 
judges to draft and amend the rules.248 The Tokyo Tribunal faced a similar 
situation as the ICTY in which the sitting judges were able to amend the rules of 
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procedure. In his dissent, Justice Pal states: “[T]hough the Charter sought to 
makes us independent of all artificial rules of procedure, we could not disregard 
these rules altogether. The practical conditions of the trials necessitated certain 
restrictions. This however might not have yield[ed] happy results”. 249  The 
unhappy results that Justice Pal refers to is the burden placed on the accused 
and its significance to trial fairness. Arguably the baseline requirement for trial 
fairness for war crimes prosecution is greater given the significance to the 
victims and the community that has experienced severe trauma. 
 
In all three ICTY examples, the dynamic of difference is front and centre. It a 
process by which a gap is created between two cultures.250 In the instance of 
ICTY, the Security Council and the former Yugoslavian states are presented as 
the embodiment of two different cultures. The West is often presented as the 
universal while the Yugoslavian states, and the respective officials are presented 
as the barbarians that committed the mass atrocities against their own people.251 
The only means to bridge the gap between the two is to prosecute those 
responsible for the mass human rights violations using the universalism of 
international law (and international criminal law) through the Tribunal. But 
simultaneously, in this example, we know that these war criminals committed the 
mass atrocities and thus there is really no need to extend the rights that are 
guaranteed in the Statute.  
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The recognition of these modalities should not be surprising. It serves to illustrate 
the manner in which universalist claims operate in international law. In the 
example of new evidence on appeal, prosecutor of the Tribunal can present new 
evidence on appeal against the accused. It is ultimately, the prosecutor’s second 
attempt to prosecute a convicted war criminal. Much more importantly, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber is asked to act as a second trier of fact, without the ability to 
test the evidence that was proffered at first instance. Ultimately, the accused is 
left in the precarious hands of the judges.  
1.4.2 Locating the Cultural Local in Rwanda: Case Study of Witness 
Testimony in Administering Justice before the ICTR 
The ICTR’s mandate, as set out in the respective United Nations Security 
Council Resolution,252 sought to bring to justice persons responsible for the 
violation of international humanitarian law, to render justice to the victims, to 
deter future crimes, and to restore peace by ending impunity in the region.253 The 
respective statutes of the both ad hoc tribunals require the judges to draft and 
adopt Rules of Evidence and Procedure.254 Focusing on the issue of witness 
testimony, the Rules Committee has, on numerous occasions, amended and 
revised the rules relating to the standard of admitting evidence and witness 
testimony.  
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Empirical evidence from the ICTR suggests that the changes to the rules have 
not been successful. The changes have not been successful in terms of flexibility 
for the benefit of the two opposing parties, expeditious trials or more importantly 
in protecting the rights of the accused.255 Rather, the anomalies reported by 
these interdisciplinary insights may be attributable to the flexible nature of the 
rules and the role of the judges.256 In the discussion that follows, I focus on the 
role of witness testimony and the experts as a means to demonstrate the 
perpetuation of the singular western narrative as the universal. This particular 
drive to use a western form of adjudication has had a decisively negative impact 
on the manner in which ICTR conducts its trials and taints the jurisprudence and 
the entire perusal of justice, especially as it relates to the rights of the accused. 
 
In the first section, I explore the faulty witness testimony before the ICTR. By 
describing the witness testimony, it is illustrative that the Tribunal’s use of 
western form of adjudication is incompatible with the manner in which the 
witnesses experienced the horrific events during the Rwandan genocide. 
Moreover, the use of the witness testimony by the experts of the tribunals further 
substantiates the perpetuation of Anghie’s dynamic of difference. The western 
adjudicatory model is the prevalent universal tool that is used in all of these 
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institutions. In the examples below, I chronicle how the Tribunal must contend 
with faulty witness testimony but nonetheless convict the alleged perpetrators.  
1.4.2.1 Locating the Cultural Local: Witness Testimony In 
Administering Justice 
There are various empirical studies that explore the diverse ways in which 
international criminal tribunals function.257 A witness’ ability to narrate who did 
what to whom is a fundamental tenet of any justice system. Moreover, this is one 
of the central components of the ICTR’s mandate as encapsulated within the 
goal of delivering justice to the victims. ICTR has struggled with witness 
testimony and this struggle stems from the specific culture of Rwanda and its 
colonial past.258 By using the adjudicatory process, there is an imposition of 
western understandings of how to conduct investigations, trials and elicit witness 
testimony, which may diverge from the local customs.259  My assertions are 
premised on the culture and context in which the ICTR operates and my central 
concern is the inability of witnesses to accurately convey their stories to the trier 
of fact. 
 
A number of scholars have examined witness testimony before the two ad hoc 
tribunals. Already in 1999, scholars worried about perjury before the international 
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criminal tribunals.260 For example, Alexander Zahar has recorded the role of 
perjury in the 2006 Rwamakuba decision by the ICTR Trial Chamber. Moreover, 
he suggests that the Trial Chamber in Rwamakuba did opt for the relaxed 
approach to witness testimony by taking stock of “time elapsed, translation 
discrepancies, the manner in which the prior statements were taken or the 
impact of trauma inflicted upon the witnesses”.261 This is one of the ways in 
which the Tribunal has generally dealt with the faulty witness testimony due to a 
number of practical constraints brought about because of the witnesses’ fading 
memory resulting from the passage of time and witness trauma due to the 
horrific nature of the events. 
 
Nancy Combs reviewed the transcripts of witness testimony from the ICTR.262 
She points to a systematic hurdle that has plagued the institution: how to grapple 
with local witnesses? More relevantly, she demonstrates that there is a direct 
disjuncture between evidence that is provided by witnesses and the adjudicatory 
process. She states: “[I]n sum, Trial Chambers often seem content to base 
convictions on highly problematic witness testimony.” 263  As a result, the 
Chambers fails to find “reasonable doubt in some of the most doubtful instances 
and as a consequence, convict just about every defendant who comes before 
                                            
260 Alexander Zahar “The Problem of False Testimony at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda in André Klip and Göran Sluiter, eds, Annotated Leading Cases Of International Criminal 
Tribunals, Vol. 25 International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda, 2006-2007, (Cambridge: 
Intersentia, 2010) at 515. 
261 Ibid at 515. 
262 Combs, Fact-Finding supra note 212 at 4. 
263 Ibid at 222. 
 91 
them”.264 By reviewing trial transcripts, Combs concludes that witnesses are 
often unable to provide detailed accounts of the dates, times, and specific 
location of the events or, more importantly, they are unable to place the 
perpetrator accurately at the scene of the crime. This is a necessary requirement 
of any criminal adjudication. Combs notes that these discrepancies are a result 
of educational, cultural and translation related factors.  
 
In jurisdictions where witnesses are called in testify, they are expected to provide 
a detailed account of who did what to whom. However, scholars working in 
domestic criminal law jurisdictions have pointed out that witness testimony is 
deeply flawed based on insights from race, gender and feminism, and mental 
health angles. 265  Cursory review of American and Canadian criminal law 
suggests that these national jurisdictions are heavily protective of the rights of 
the accused. Americans prohibit the use of the death penalty in cases that rely 
solely on eyewitness testimony.266 Examples from specific jurisdictions in the 
United States illustrate that each prosecuting state must produce DNA evidence, 
which can be buttressed by witness testimony in order to utilise the death 
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penalty.267 These types of insights about the unreliability of witness testimony 
have yet to find their way into international criminal law.268  
 
The primary focus within international criminal law debates has been on the 
substantive legality of international criminal adjudication. The literature thus far 
has concentrated on setting out and developing specific areas of substantive 
international criminal law. 269  There are numerous accounts of problematic 
features of institutional practices from defence counsel270 and academics with 
specific institutional knowledge of international mechanisms, 271  and 
interdisciplinary insights from political scientists and anthropologists. 272  The 
focus on the mechanics of the institutions, especially as they relate to 
international criminal procedure is minimal. 273  There are various calls to 
incorporate diversity into the existing framework 274  or criticisms of the 
problematic nature of admitting faulty evidence. 275  Nonetheless, very little 
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attention is paid to the critical insights emerging from domestic criminal 
jurisdictions with regard to witness testimony.  
 
The rationale behind the absence of interdisciplinary and other critical analysis in 
international criminal law is twofold. First, unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal 
prosecutors who relied entirely on documents prepared by Nazi officials to 
establish guilt, the ICTR prosecutors rely exclusively on witness testimony.276 
Combs suggests that the prosecutor of NIMT did not have to rely on witness 
testimony as their perpetrators had meticulously detailed all of their criminal 
actions in their records. The onerous task presented to the NIMT was to sieve 
through the thousands of documents. Modern day international criminals, 
especially those indicted by the ICTR, did not leave a trail of documentary 
evidence that could be used by the prosecution. The prosecutors had to rely on 
witness testimony. Secondly, the rules of the ad hoc tribunals were drafted and 
amended by the judges, prosecutors, and other officials of the tribunals. The 
debates have therefore focused on the institutional and meritorious aspects of 
the rules and the degree to which common law and civil law traditions have 
influenced the development of these rules.277 Ultimately the exclusion of critical 
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insights from the domestic context, which questions the viability of using witness 
testimony, were omitted or ignored.  
 
The role of experts in this omission is significant. The prosecutors and most 
international staff conducting the investigations, trials and legal research are 
western.278 Based on my own experience of working in the Appeals Chamber of 
ICTY and ICTR, most of the staff that populated the Tribunals in The Hague 
hailed from Europe or North America. Other similar accounts point to an 
overrepresentation of staff members from Europe and North America.279 This is 
relevant when the prosecution prepares the witnesses for testimony.280 All of 
these arguments point to the fact that there is a strong tendency to rely on 
western adjudicatory models.  
 
Even though the ICTR witnesses understood that the Rwandan President’s 
plane was shot down on 6 April 1994, precipitating the genocide (this is the most 
significant date for the Tribunal), the witnesses are not able to place the 
perpetrators at the scene of the crime on a specific date. The reason why the 
witnesses are unable to situate the perpetrator at the scene of the crime is 
simply cultural. Some witnesses cannot recount events based on the western 
calendar, or they lack the formal western-style education needed to respond to 
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questions about specific dates and times put to them by the parties to the 
adjudicatory process.  
 
For example, in the Nahimana proceedings, a trial witness testified that Colonel 
Rwendeye had attended two death-squad meetings in 1993-4. When the witness 
was confronted with evidence that the Colonel had in fact died in 1990, the 
witness rejected the evidence and maintained that the Colonel had in fact died in 
1992. ‘When it was pointed out that the [witness’s] revision nonetheless made 
[the Colonel] the only dead man at the meetings, [the witness] claimed that he 
had testified that the meetings had taken place at the end of 1992 and 1993.’281  
 
More significantly, Rwandan witnesses often use cultural practices to identify 
events. Witnesses rely on the seasons to determine the time of the year and 
then subsequently place the perpetrator at the scene of the crime based on the 
time of the year. These types of practices are culturally specific and culturally 
contingent. Similarly, the notion of temporality or temporal sequences of events 
is another issue of contention, where witnesses are unable to provide the exact 
timeline in which an alleged incitement to genocide may have occurred.  
 
The judges of the Tribunal have proceeded to accept faulty witness testimonies 
for compelling reasons. The accused Hutu perpetrators were clearly involved in 
the Rwandan genocide given their political affiliations, which is the central basis 
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for conviction. The judges rely on these factors to credit witness testimonies. 
There is an 85 per cent conviction rate in the ICTR, which corroborates Combs’ 
claims that the judges have a pro-conviction bias. Even when there are glaring 
inconsistencies in testimonies, Combs notes that the “[T]rial Chambers explain  
these [inconsistencies] away as products of the passage of time, the frailty of 
memory and errors introduced by investigators and interpreters.282  
 
From a broader perspective, the adjudicatory process envisioned by these 
tribunals is predicated on the traditions of western adversarial common law and 
inquisitorial civil law.283 Both these traditions rely heavily on witness testimony. 
The judges, and the Tribunal as a whole, have adopted these traditions as the 
modus operandi. Thus, by using the western trial form, “international criminal 
proceedings cloak themselves in the form’s garb of fact-finding competence, but 
it is only a cloak, for many of the key assumptions that underlie the [W]estern 
trial form do not exist in the international context”.284  
 
As noted earlier, the UN Security Council granted the judges of the two ad hoc 
tribunals the power to draft (and amend) their own respective rules of evidence 
and procedure, which may have provided the perfect tool to rectify these 
anomalies.285 Moreover, the very design of the trial process, and even pre-trial 
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investigation, was left to the judges of the two tribunals to determine as they saw 
fit. Given these conclusions, what we have is a lack of connection between the 
substantive evidence (based on witness testimonies) and the mandate of the 
tribunals to prosecute those with the gravest responsibility for the mass 
atrocities, whilst respecting the rights of the accused to due process.  
 
The changes to the rules are predicated on efficiency and expeditious trials that 
would not run up the costs of international justice. This disconnect is based on 
the bias of the judges and the tribunals.286 The pro-conviction partiality of the 
judges may possibly stem from their personal background and their expertise. 
Within the Rwandan context, political and ethnic affiliations signal to the Tribunal 
the potential culpability of the accused. These factors ultimately lend support to 
the belief that the accused participated in the genocide, even without the 
‘beyond-reasonable-doubt’ threshold given the faulty witness testimonies.  
 
As I noted earlier, the Tutsi-led Rwandese government supported the creation of 
a tribunal once the conflict had ended. During the conflict, RPF proposed the 
creation of a tribunal as early as September 1994 for a number of reasons.287 
The end of the conflict, Tutsi-led Rwandese government favoured international 
prosecutions to avoid victors’ justice, the international recognition of the 
prohibition of genocide and to end impunity as a means to build a better 
                                            
286 Combs, Fact-Finding supra note 212 at 167–88 & 221.  
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future.288 But ultimately, the Rwandese government voted against UN Security 
Council Resolution 955 for two reasons: largely because of the erosion of 
Rwandan sovereignty289 and the potential, given the Tribunal’s structure to only 
appease “the conscience of the international community rather than respond to 
the expectations of the Rwandese people and of the victims of the genocide 
[…]”.290 As the above analysis demonstrates, Rwandan government’s fears have 
now become a reality. 
 
Once again, we observe the influence of Anghie’s dynamic of difference. The 
manner in which the UN Security Council created the Tribunal serves as the 
starting point. At the outset, there was reluctance to even set up the tribunal 
given the costs associated with such an exercise.291 Moreover, there was a 
sense of Western guilt over the creation of the ICTY. Some commentators have 
highlighted that the creation of the ICTY would be seen as a “disproportionate 
attention paid to the problems of Europe vis-à-vis the developing world”.292 
Nonetheless, the Security Council went ahead to bridge the cap between the 
superior western culture and uncivilised, backward Rwandans by creating the 
Tribunal to render justice. In doing so, they adopted, as in the case of the ICTY, 
a western adjudicatory model premised on the Nuremberg Charter. 
 
                                            
288 Ibid at 504. 
289 Ibid at 505. 
290 Ibid at 506. 
291 Morris & Scharf, ICTR V1 supra note 175 at 64. 
292Cassese, ICL supra note 131 at 327; for a similar assertion, Akhavan, “ICTR: The Politics” 
supra note 178 at footnote 12. 
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The western adjudicatory model is used as the universal truth mechanism that 
would deliver justice to the victims and bring the perpetrators to justice. But 
fundamentally, the universal model is unable to understand and incorporate the 
local within its own binaries. The forces that drive the universal model are 
incapable of communicating with the local as they are both literally speaking two 
different languages. Superficially, the Tribunal is able to receive the witness 
testimony. This information nonetheless has to be managed by taking stock of 
extraneous factors such as passage of time and trauma.  
 
The Tribunal relies on its specific and singular understanding of the conflict as a 
means to navigate and contend with what may seem like faulty witness 
testimony. The next section will take a look at the role of experts in perpetuating 
the dynamic of difference. 
1.4.2.2 International Expert Class and Understanding the Local?  
The employees of these ad hoc tribunals are central to the pro-conviction bias 
dealt within the earlier section and the central reason why faulty witness 
statements are accepted. The staff members of the ad hoc tribunals are United 
Nations employees. They range from legal associates and prosecutors to in-
house translators. From this cohort, there has emerged a class of international 
employees who work on post-conflict justice issues and who maintain an 
itinerant lifestyle in pursuit of that work, moving from one conflict hotspot to 
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another within these tribunals.293 The judges of the tribunals are also part of this 
cohort. Judges are elected by the United Nations General Assembly.294 The 
United Nations Security Council provides the United Nations General Assembly 
with a list of shortlisted candidates prior to their election. Most judges move from 
one tribunal to another given the scarcity of expertise in international criminal 
law.295  
 
Expertise is the subject of intense theory generation. In particular, legal 
anthropologists have chronicled the role of experts in various domains from the 
World Bank to over-the-counter derivative markets. With specific reference to 
international organisations, Galit Sarfaty has suggested that ethnographic 
research can illuminate the rationale for specific policy choices. For example, the 
question of the World Bank’s human rights policy therefore is not contingent on 
the role of the member states; rather it is about the internal dynamics of the 
Bank.296 Sarfaty provides the following insights: 
The World Bank typifies the multiple-principals problem, where 
member governments serve as principals that collectively form the 
Board of Executive Directors.  The board is composed of twenty-
four executive directors who represent countries or country groups.  
Under the Bank's Articles of Agreement, the board serves as the 
institution's policymaking organ, while the president and senior 
management are responsible for operational, administrative, and 
organizational issues. The executive directors thus serve as 
principals that delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to agency 
                                            
293 Baylis, “Tribunal-Hopping” supra note 278 at 364; Thomas Skouteris “The New Tribunalism: 
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294 Article 13 bis ICTY Statute supra note 174; Article 12 bis, ICTR Statute supra note 180 
295 Baylis, “Tribunal-Hopping” supra note 278 at 361–89. 
296 Galit Sarfaty, “Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The Marginality of Human 
Rights at the World Bank" (2009) 1033:4 AJIL647 at 649-650 [Sarfaty, “Culture Matters”]. 
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officials. When member countries hold competing preferences and 
cannot achieve consensus on a policy, bureaucratic drift may 
ensue. In view of their difficulty in exerting oversight, the member 
countries are forced to delegate authority to the agency officials. My 
study of the Bank's internal decision-making process confirmed 
these dynamics, showing that employees operate quite 
independently of the board. They carry out certain sensitive 
management issues without board approval or involvement.297 
 
Elena Baylis’ interventions in the context of international criminal institutions 
allude to a similar significance of the role of the experts from a socio-legal 
perspective. Baylis chronicles young aspiring activists and advocates trying to 
make a difference by transferring their social activist legal training from western 
institutions to conflict-ridden places and international criminal institutions. These 
good intentions, however, are clouded by what Baylis demonstrates as the 
known unknowns.298 These known unknowns are characterised as a “lack of 
local knowledge of post-conflict settings, whether that is knowledge of the local 
legal system, local facts, local culture or any other relevant information”.299 
Furthermore, Baylis argues that these known unknowns are notoriously 
challenging to deal with because there are issues of lack of timing, false 
expertise, complexity, and size of the local context.  
 
False expertise stems from the very nature of the work that is undertaken by 
these experts and their ability to transfer these skills to other hotspots. For 
                                            
297 Ibid at 655. 
298Baylis, “Tribunal-Hopping” supra note 278 at 383; Sujith Xavier “Looking for ‘Justice’ in all the 
Wrong Places: An International Mechanism or Multidimensional Domestic Strategy for Mass 
Human Rights Violations in Sri Lanka?” in Amarnath Amarasingam & Daniel Bass, eds, Post-War 
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example, Tribunal staff members may work as Associate Legal Officers in the 
ICTR for two years and then they may move to another tribunal adjudicating 
similar crimes in a different location such as Freetown in Sierra Leone (Sierra 
Leone Special Court). The substantive law may be similar but the nature of the 
conflict and the associated history of the regions are vastly different. These 
international experts spend no more than two to three years at each tribunal as 
they follow the spread of international criminal justice.  
 
The role of experts within networks is not neutral similar to Sarfaty’s World Bank 
employees. 300  Their roles are deeply political, embedded with a particular 
universalistic ethos of ending impunity for mass human rights violations. David 
Kennedy’s insights suggest that the background norms of international 
institutions are more important than we had originally thought.301 The political 
values of experts within the tribunals in effect shape the outcome of the process. 
The process nonetheless is supposed to be objective enough to ensure that the 
accused are given a fair trial. These experts within the Tribunal however manage 
the background norms that permeate the value-structure of the tribunals. As 
Kennedy has highlighted, what really matters at the global institutional level is 
not what is in the foreground (the tribunals) or the context (Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia). Rather, 
[t]he work of the background has colonized the foreground and the 
context. The foreground increasingly seems a mere spectacle—a 
                                            
300 Sarfaty, “Culture Matters” supra note 296. 
301 David Kennedy “Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global governance” (2005) 27 
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performance to which we attribute agency, interest and ideology. At 
the same time, it is difficult to locate elements of context, which are 
not constructed by people managing background norms and 
institutions. Indeed, the foreground and the context may well turn 
out to be effects of background practices.302  
 
The judges and their experts (Associate Legal Officers and Interns) have a pro-
conviction bias, which may be rooted inherently in the way international law is 
constructed, as part of the civilising mission and the dynamic of difference.303 
Lack of training and cultural competencies with regard to the local context has a 
significant influence on outcomes. What are the interests that are driving the 
jurisprudence of the ICTR? Are the judges and the Tribunal staff biased? Have 
the accused been afforded sufficient substantive and procedural rights 
protections? These questions are important indicators in calibrating the calculus 
of accountability and legitimacy production.  
 
Much more importantly, the role of the experts in driving the pro-conviction bias 
further illustrates my point about the operation of the dynamic of difference within 
international criminal law. The creation of the Tribunal by the Security Council is 
the first step in bridging the gap between two distinct cultures. Then by 
institutionalising the appointment of judges and their experts through the 
Chambers, the Security Council has ensured that the logic of western 
universalism is entrenched deep within the institutions structure. The experts are 
an essential feature of the western adjudicatory model as it furthers the search 
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for the truth and justice. But again, this model is unable to understand and 
incorporate the specific local context.  
 
1.5. Universal Prosecutions? Case Study of the International Criminal 
Court and Prosecutorial Selectivity  
The international criminal justice regime has rapidly evolved over the past 20 
years and culminated in the adoption of the ICC through the 1998 Rome Statute. 
The road to the creation of the International Criminal Court however started 
much earlier. As discussed earlier in this dissertation, the desire for an 
international court to prosecute war criminals from WWI and WWII is clearly 
documented.304 This desire was not possible until the end of the Cold War. The 
idea of an international criminal court was brought back to life, after a long 
hiatus, by Trinidad and Tobago.305  They made this request as a means to 
address concerns over drug trafficking. The UN General Assembly requested the 
UN International Law Commission to “address the question of establishing an 
international criminal court in 1989”. 306  By the time the International Law 
Commission had completed the draft statute in 1994, there were signs that the 
international community would be receptive to the idea of an International 
Criminal Court. Cryer suggests that the Commissions’ draft arrived at a fortunate 
time for the following reasons: 
                                            
304 Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes” (1944) 21 Bri 
YB Intl L 58; Sellers, “Trying the Kaiser” supra note 73. 
305Cassese, ICL supra note 131 at 328; Cryer, An Introduction to ICL supra note 71 at 146-148. 
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Cold War divisions had thawed, there was enthusiasm for 
international criminal tribunals, and the international community had 
embarked on several treaty-based initiatives strengthening human 
rights and humanitarian law. Scepticism about the prospects of a 
permanent international criminal court was diminishing.307 
 
In this context, UN General Assembly established an ad hoc committee to 
examine the issue further. Within a year, there was sufficient support to create a 
Preparatory Committee to draft the treaty. Based on the Law Commissions’ draft, 
the Preparatory Committee was able to create a new statute that “served as the 
basis for negotiation at the World Conference held in Rome in 1998”.308 The aim 
of the five-week conference was to create consensus amongst states and to iron 
out controversies within Preparatory Committee’s draft statute. A mix of states, 
non-governmental organisations, international governmental organisations in 
conjunction with the United Nations, helped draft the International Criminal 
Court’s Statute.309 Most of the negotiations were carried out in small committees 
composed of states and their delegations.310 There were significant issues of 
contention at the conference. Some of these issues for example included the role 
of the UN Security Council311, the breadth and scope of the various crimes and 
the role of gender.312  
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The states gathered at the conference adopted the draft text and the Rome 
Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002. The Rome Statute, with over 128 
provisions, delineates the four international crimes over which the Court has 
jurisdiction. The Statute doubles as a multilateral treaty. The Rome Statute is the 
result of years of efforts by human rights activists and policy makers to curtail 
impunity enjoyed by state actors and non-state actors in the commission of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and the international crime of 
aggression.313  
 
As of 5 August 2015, there are 123 states party to the Statute. It has a special 
but at times tense relationship with the United Nations Security Council.314 The 
permanent International Criminal Court, for its part, is a tribunal of last resort in 
the cases of states that are party to its Statute. The ICC’s complementarity 
provision allows the Court to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes if the 
State party is unwilling or unable to do so.315  
 
There are essentially three ways by which the Court’s jurisdiction can be 
triggered so that it can exercise its territorial or personal jurisdiction over alleged 
international crimes. The Court, through the Office of the Prosecutor can receive 
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referrals about a situation (as opposed to a case316) of grave concern by a state 
party to the Rome Statute.317 United Nations Security Council can similarly refer 
a situation.318 In the third method, the prosecutor (currently Fatou Bensouda) can 
commence investigations proprio motu (on her own initiative) based on 
communications submitted by states, non-governmental organisations and 
concerned individuals.319 All three mechanisms automatically trigger the powers 
of the prosecutor but to different degrees.  
 
If the prosecutor receives state or Security Council referral, the Statute requires 
a preliminary investigation. Here, the prosecutor must first conduct an analysis of 
information in order to determine whether the statutory threshold to start an 
investigation is met (art.53). When the prosecutor receives a communication for 
the purposes of the proprio motu trigger, the standard is the same but the 
starting point is reversed: the prosecutor shall not seek to initiate an investigation 
unless she first concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed, which is 
supervised by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC. Once a decision to initiate an 
investigation is made, all of the parties concerned (including those that submitted 
                                            
316 The Statute allows for referrals of situations as opposed to cases. It was believed by the 
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the initial communication) are promptly informed of the decision, with supporting 
reasons for the decision.320  
 
There is an embedded hierarchy in the Statute’s procedures to trigger 
jurisdiction. At the top of this hierarchy are Security Council referrals. With this 
type of referral, the Statute makes the preconditions of jurisdiction, based on 
nationality or territoriality, inapplicable (art.12). The drafters of the Statute placed 
the Security Council at the apex of the Court referral mechanism because of its 
powers stemming from Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These referrals are 
considered to be the most authoritative. In this instance, the Statute does not 
require approval by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court.321  
 
The second trigger mechanism arises from state referrals under Article 14 of the 
Statute. There is no need to seek Pre-Trial Chamber approval to commence a 
preliminary investigation as such, but there is the possibility that a State referral 
can be found to have no reasonable basis to proceed.  
 
The third trigger mechanism arises from communications received from any 
other source (for example non-governmental organisations) or on the initiative of 
the prosecutor through her vested proprio motu powers in the Statute.322 This 
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mechanism requires the Pre-Trial Chamber’s approval prior to deciding whether 
to investigate based on the preliminary evidentiary findings. It is a weaker basis 
for prosecution than state party or Security Council referrals, subject to two 
different types of review mechanism under Article 53 of the Statute.  
 
The Court has been actively seized of nine situations in which investigations or 
prosecutions are underway, and is adjudicating close to 21 cases, all of which 
involve African states.323 Of the nine situations, the state party referral by the 
Union of the Comoros against Israel (a non state party) is an anomaly. Comoros 
made the referral on the basis of alleged crimes committed on vessels registered 
in Comoros and other state parties. On 5 July 2013, the Presidency of the 
International Criminal Court assigned “the Situation on Registered Vessels of the 
Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia” to 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, but the Court stressed that this “is a procedural matter only, 
and is not the beginning of an investigation”.324 On 06 November of 2014 ICC 
prosecutor, based on the available information, declined to proceed with an 
investigation. Even though her office determined that the Israeli Defence Force 
may have committed war crimes on Mavi Marmara. 325 The prosecutor however 
did not believe that a potential case would emerge from this investigation. The 
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acts of violence perpetrated by the Israeli Defence Force were not of sufficient 
gravity “to justify further action by the court”.326   
 
Within the formal structures set up within the Statute, a highly contingent process 
exists in which some situations are selected for investigation and prosecution, 
while others are not.  With reference to the nine situations before the Court; by 
honing in on what has been included and excluded from those situations, I 
pursue the dynamic of difference as it relates to how the ICC functions.327 In the 
ensuing discussion, I will hone in on the manner in which cases are selected to 
demonstrate how Anghie’s dynamic of difference continues to operate. In doing 
so, I will focus on the manner in which the UN Security Council is deploying its 
powers similar to what it did with the ICTR and ICTY.       
 
1.5.1 Politics of Selection: ICC’s Prosecutorial Policy 
Six of the situations before the Court involve state parties to the Statute who 
were deemed by themselves, or the prosecutor, as unable to take charge of 
prosecuting those alleged to have committed war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, or genocide within their respective territories. Of these, the Central 
African Republic, Uganda and Mali involved self-referrals. With reference to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the prosecutor was in the process of initiating an 
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investigation proprio motu when the country’s President, Joseph Kabila, referred 
the situation to the Court in April 2004. The prosecutor has subsequently initiated 
two proprio motu investigations in relation to post-electoral violence in Cote 
d'Ivoire and Kenya.328 There are, however, numerous other areas where the 
Office of the prosecutor has been asked to initiate a proprio motu investigation: 
Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Colombia, Honduras, Korea and Nigeria.329  
 
In addition to the six state party situations, Libya and Sudan are not state parties 
but have been referred to the Court by the UN Security Council. The Security 
Council referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the prosecutor through 
Resolution 1593 on 31 March 2005.330 This culminated in the issuance of the 
arrest warrant in 2007 against Ahmad Muhammad Harun, Minister of State for 
Humanitarian Affairs (since 2006) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (the 
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alleged leader of the Militia, Janjaweed).331 In 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the 
Court issued the first ever arrest warrant against a head of State: Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir.332  
 
The international politics of the Security Council referral started in 2004 with the 
creation of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, headed by Antonio 
Cassese. Acting under its Chapter VII powers, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1564 asking the UN Secretary General to establish a commission of 
inquiry to investigate the violation of human rights, violation of international 
humanitarian law and to determine whether acts of genocide were perpetrated 
by the parties to the conflict.333 The Darfur Commission, in its final report, found 
that there were serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law. It did not however find that Sudan had committed acts of genocide. 
Nonetheless, the Commission strongly recommended that the “Security Council 
immediately refer the situation of Darfur to the International Criminal Court, 
pursuant to article 13(b) of the ICC Statute”.334 On 31 March 2005, the Security 
Council passed Resolution 1593 referring the situation in Darfur to the 
prosecutor335 by a vote of 11 in favour to none against, with four abstentions.336 
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On 12 December 2014, ICC Prosecutor Bensouda announced that she would 
halt the investigations into the Sudanese President Bashir because of the lack of 
cooperation by the United Nations Security Council, states party and other 
international organisations. 
 
The civil unrest that started in several Middle Eastern and North African 
countries in late 2010 spread into Libya in early 2011. The Gaddafi regime in turn 
pursued a policy of brutal crackdown on protesters. The civil war that followed 
triggered a UN authorised air and naval intervention by the international 
community based on the responsibility to protect doctrine. The Gaddafi regime 
was overthrown in 2011. In the midst of this acute crisis, the UNSC in Resolution 
1970 referred the situation in Libya to the Court.337  
 
On 27 June 2011, the Trial Chamber I of the Court issued three arrests warrants 
for Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, and 
Abdullah Al-Senussi for crimes against humanity (murder and persecution) 
allegedly committed across Libya from 15 February 2011 until at least 28 
February 2011, through the Libyan state apparatus and security forces. The 
Chamber terminated the case against Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar 
Gaddafi in November 2012 due to his death. The Chamber further found that 
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Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi as Muammar Gaddafi’s “unspoken successor and the most 
influential person within his inner circle and, as such, he exercised control over 
crucial parts of the State apparatus, including finances and logistics and had the 
powers of a de facto Prime Minister”.338  
 
Libya challenged the admissibility of the case against Al-Senussi before the ICC. 
The Court decided that since Libya is able and willing to carry out the 
investigation against the accused, the “case is inadmissible before the Court, in 
accordance with the principle of complementarity enshrined in the Rome Statute, 
founding treaty of the ICC”.339  
 
By focusing on the two United Nations Security Council referrals (Darfur and 
Libya), what becomes visible is the potential power of the ending impunity 
narrative made visible in the discussions about the ICTY and ICTR. This 
narrative, as encapsulated within the power of the United Nations Security 
Council’s referral powers is particularly useful in demonstrating how the dynamic 
of difference operates within the ICC. This is even more important given the 
prominence of the UN Security Council in ICC referrals. The atrocious acts 
perpetrated by the Libyan and Sudanese leaders are deemed sufficiently 
barbaric that the United Nations Security Council has to act to bridge the gap 
between the deplorable actions of these outlier states and the international 
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community. The Court is used as the means to control the behaviour of these 
states and bring the perpetrators to justice.  
 
The referral of Sudan and the Bashir arrest warrant are an indication of a double 
standard. In light of this double standard, the African Union is in the process of 
creating a specialised human rights court to sidestep the ICC’s selectivity of 
cases.340 The selectivity of referral of Sudan and Libya, and not other situations 
in places like Palestine and Sri Lanka is too significant to ignore. This is even 
more relevant when there are two international fact-finding investigations that 
demonstrate mass human rights violations and international crimes in Palestine 
and Sri Lanka, similar to Darfur that should invite a quick response by the United 
Nations Security Council.  
 
The Goldstone Report of September 2009, commissioned by the UN Human 
Rights Council, alleges that Israeli soldiers targeted civilians and specifically 
destroyed non-targetable infrastructure during Operation Cast Lead and the 
Israeli war on Gaza between December 2008 and January 2009. 341  The 
Goldstone Report recommended that the United Nations Security Council refer 
the case to the ICC using its universal jurisdiction powers set out in the Statute. 
The recent Israeli attacks on Gaza in July 2014 have precipitated another 
international inquiry with yet another report detailing the commission of war 
                                            
340 Okafor & Ngwaba, “ICC and TJ” supra note 323 at 103. 
341 Report of the Independent Fact Finding Commission on Gaza, No Safe Place, presented to 
the League of Arab States, 30 April 2009. 
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crimes by both parties to the conflict. What is noteworthy however is the 
analogous nature of the investigation undertaken by the Goldstone Commission 
to Darfur Commission and the commissions of inquiry that called for the creation 
of two ad hoc international criminal institutions. This illustrates the selectivity in 
creating ad hoc tribunals and referring cases to the ICC. I am not suggesting that 
the ICC should launch investigations immediately in Palestine or Sri Lanka as it 
would perpetuate western universalism that I am critiquing. Rather the example 
of Palestine and Sri Lanka serves to demonstrate the double standard in 
prosecuting international crimes. 
 
With the termination of hostilities in the Gaza Strip in 2009,342 the Palestinian 
Authority’s Minister of Justice, Dr. Khashan, lodged a declaration pursuant to 
article 12 (3) 343  of the Rome Statute. 344  Article 4 (1) of the Rome Statute 
establishes the legal personality of the Court and the second limb of this 
provision delineates the applicability of the Statute to states party.345 The ICC 
and its Statute must be ratified by a state in order for the Court to have the 
requisite jurisdiction through either state referral or through the initiative of the 
prosecutor.346 The ICC Prosecutor conducted the pre-investigative analysis to 
determine if the Palestinian Authority has the requisite ability to transfer 
                                            
342  Al-Haq, “Operation Cast Lead': A Statistical Analysis” (August 2009) online: 
<http://www.alhaq.org/pdfs/gaza-operation-cast-Lead-statistical-analysis%20.pdf>. 
343Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3; Pursuant to 
rule 44, sub‐rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3.  
344 International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, “Declarations Art. 12(3)” online: < 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Registry/Declarations.htm, accessed on 
May 30, 2009>. 
345Rome Statute supra note 203. 
346 Ibid 
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jurisdiction to the Court, invoke the Rome Statute and prosecute those 
responsible for the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed 
during Operation Cast Lead. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the former ICC Prosecutor 
rejected this request as he did not want to determine if Palestine was a state for 
the purpose of the Statute.347  
 
In December 2014, the Palestinian Authority attempted to gain statehood with 
United Nations Security Council resolution. This resolution was intended to 
upgrade Palestine’s status before the United Nations. The failure to pass this 
resolution precipitated the Palestinian Authority to ratify the Court’s Rome 
Statute and submit a declaration under Article 12 (3) to accept the jurisdiction of 
the Court.348 The Court can only exercise its jurisdiction once a state is party to 
the Statute and thus the Palestinian Authority made the declaration as a means 
to ensure that the Court can have jurisdiction to investigate the events during 
Operation Protective Edge in July 2014.349 Palestine was accepted as a state 
party on 01 April 2015.     
 
The Sri Lankan government defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE or Tamil Tigers) in May 2009. During the lead up to the defeat of the Tamil 
Tigers, there were approximately 70,000-100,000 civilian causalities. The 
                                            
347 International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Palestine (Update) April 
2012 online: <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9-
836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf>.  
348  Daphné Richemond-Barak, "Double Duty at the ICC" (2015) EJIL Talk! online: 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/double-duty-at-the-icc/. 
349  Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict,: 
387/SituationinPaleSupp No 52, UN Doc A/HRC/29/52 (2015). 
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Secretary General and the former President, His Excellency Mahinda Rajapaksa, 
agreed to a commitment to human rights and accountability.350 Subsequently, 
the United Nations Secretary General appointed a Panel of Experts to advise 
him on accountability for the violation of international human rights and 
humanitarian law during the final phrase of the war in 2011.  
 
The Panel’s recommendation calls for the establishment of an independent 
international mechanism to monitor the Sri Lankan Government’s initiation of 
accountability proceedings to investigate the alleged violations and to collect 
evidence of past crimes. The international community, especially non-
governmental organisations 351  and the Tamil diaspora 352  are eager for the 
prospects of delivering justice and ending impunity in Sri Lanka.353 On 27 March 
                                            
350  UN Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, Report UN 
Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, UNSGOR, September 
2011, SG/SM/13791 HR/5072. SG/SM/13791 HR/5072. 
351 Amnesty International, “Sri Lanka: Reconciliation at a crossroads: Continuing impunity, 
arbitrary detentions, torture and enforced disappearances: Amnesty International Submission to 
the UN Universal Periodic Review”, 1 April 2012; Amnesty International, No Real Will to Account: 
Shortcomings in Sri Lanka’s National Plan of Action to implement the recommendations of the 
LLRC, 30 August 2012, ASA 37/010/2012; International Crisis Group (ICG), Sri Lanka’s 
Authoritarian Turn: The Need for International Action, 20 February 2013, Asia Report N°243, 
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/5124deb32.html; Human Rights Watch, "We Will 
Teach You a Lesson" - Sexual Violence against Tamils by Sri Lankan Security Forces, 26 
February 2013, ISBN: 1-56432-993-3, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/5130850f2.html. 
352  For example see Kubes Navaratnam, “Post-conflict Sri Lanka needs Canadian R2P”, 
Embassy (28, 03, 2012); Vani Selvarajah, “Sri Lanka on notice: Where do we go from here?” 
(2013) Toronto Star; Harini Sivalingam,  "Canada can help Sri Lanka" The Sun (Jan 17, 2013); 
CTC, Statement at the Press Conference held at the Canadian Parliament on November 15, 
2012, online < http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/article.php?lan=eng&cat=pr&id=74>; See 
also Center for War Victims and Human Rights, “War Victim Documentation” Project, online< 
http://www.cwvhr.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=68&Itemid=55>.  
353 Sujith Xavier “Looking for ‘Justice’ in all the Wrong Places: An International Mechanism or 
Multidimensional Domestic Strategy for Mass Human Rights Violations in Sri Lanka?” in 
Amarnath Amarasingam & Daniel Bass, eds, Post-War Sri Lanka: Problems and Prospects 
(Forthcoming New York:Hurst University Press, 2015). 
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2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a resolution calling for 
accountability. This Resolution tasks the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights with conducting another investigation into the alleged international 
crimes. The High Commissioner has yet to conclude the investigation and will 
most likely have more success than the Panel in getting the newly elected Sri 
Lankan government to cooperate.   
 
Even though there was clear and demonstrable evidence from the 2011 Panel’s 
report of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the parties to the conflict, 
the United Nations Security Council was silent. In the lead up to the end of the 
civil war in May 2009, the Security Council could only muster a weak statement; 
first demanding that the LTTE surrender. Second, that the Security Council 
expressed “deep concern at the reports of continued use of heavy calibre 
weapons in areas with high concentrations of civilians, and expect the 
Government of Sri Lanka to fulfil its commitment in this regard”.354    
  
Ultimately, what these case studies reveal is that there are only certain instances 
in which the United Nations Security Council is willing to utilise its powers of 
referral and bring a situation before the ICC. This vague, ambiguous, and highly 
selective decisions making process is fraught with politics. The politics is often 
fuelled by the self-interest of the Security Council’s permanent members. In the 
Sudanese and Libyan examples, the Council was compelled to act as part of its 
                                            
354  UN Security Council, Press Statement on Sri Lanka (09 May 2009) online: < 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9659.doc.htm>. 
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role to maintain peace and order. But simultaneously, it is unwilling to use its 
powers when it concerns one of the longest conflicts and enduring illegal 
occupation in modern international law (Palestine355) and one of the bloodiest 
recent civil wars (Sri Lanka).  
 
This highly selective process in determining who is referred to the Court, and 
who is not, clearly illustrates Anghie’s dynamic of difference.  There two cultures 
present: the cultures of those that are allies and the cultures of those that are 
not. With reference countries in Africa, they have very little political influence in 
the eyes of the Security Council. In Libya’s case, it is of little utility and thus, the 
Security Council is willing to bridge the cultural difference through the ICC and 
prosecute those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. But in 
the case of Sri Lanka, a geo-political ally of China, India and Iran, the Security 
Council is unwilling to act. Similarly with Israel, the western members of the 
Security Council are unwilling to act against one of their strongest allies in the 
Middle East.  
1.6 Conclusion  
This chapter provides the empirical backdrop to my arguments in challenging 
current theorising of global governance institutions through global 
constitutionalism and global administrative law. I traced the evolution of 
international law and international institutions. I relied on international lawyers 
                                            
355 Victor Kattan From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict 1891-1949 (London: Pluto Press, 2009). 
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and international law scholars to set out the evolution of international law and its 
institutions from the 17th to the 20th century. In doing so, I presented the standard 
historical account and then posited insights that reveal a divergent narrative. In 
taking of stock of the different perspectives, the discussion focused on how 
international law and its institutions developed as part of colonialism and 
imperialism of the European colonial settlers in the new world. The encounter 
between the European sovereigns and the local inhabitants engendered a 
relationship that was regulated by international law. This particular regulatory 
framework then became a central feature in the development of international law 
and subsequently was embedded within the respective international institutions. 
The development of our current global order, in particular international 
institutions thus embody a western universalism. I then traced the continuation of 
this phenomenon in practice by examining one of the fastest growing 
contemporary fields of international law; international criminal justice regimes. 
Setting out the continuation of international law’s universalism provides the 
historical background and contemporary empirical evidence to support my 
central arguments that I will unfold in the forthcoming chapters: contemporary 
theories of global governance, such as global constitutionalism and global 
administrative law ignore and obscure international law and its institutions’ past.   
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Chapter 2: Globalisation and Fragmentation of International Law 
2.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I will focus on globalisation and fragmentation of international 
law. They are twin concepts that must be studied in conjunction to better 
understand the manner in which international lawyers and international law 
scholars are theorising global governance. In the previous chapter, I traced the 
evolution of international law and its institutions. I was able to locate, based on 
historical accounts, the colonial past of international law and its institutions. By 
taking international criminal law and its institutions as case studies, I 
demonstrated how international law and its institutions function using a 
universalist register through Anghie’s dynamic of difference. 1  Moreover the 
discussion in the previous chapter examined how this past continues to affect the 
manner in which international law and its institutions perform their duties today.  
 
I first looked at the origins of international law, starting with the Treaty of 
Westphalia and other developments in international law and its institutions by 
focusing on the evolution of specific doctrines and institutions. The central theme 
of the previous chapter is the capacity of international law and its institutions’ to 
make the particular western narrative into a universalism that is applicable to all.  
 
                                            
1 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 4 [Anghie, Imperialism]. 
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I then turned to one of the fastest growing fields of international law as my case 
study: international criminal law. The case studies illustrate how international law 
is haunted by its tendencies to perpetuate universalism. I focused on the field of 
international criminal law, its three recently created institutions and how these 
institutions embody the dynamic of difference in how they function. The anatomy 
of this process is to create a universal narrative that becomes applicable to all 
cultures.  
 
The early 18th century move to institutions is celebrated in traditional public 
international law scholarship. It is seen as a pivotal moment in creating dispute 
resolution mechanisms that foster peace through the institutionalisation of 
conflict resolution.2 The international community also celebrates the creation of 
the international criminal institutions as a tremendous achievement.  But the 
creation of the NIMT and IMTFE at the end of WWII did not prompt an expansion 
of international criminal law. Rather, during the Post-War period, the Cold War 
between the two superpowers limited any prospects of ending impunity and 
prosecuting international crimes. Ending impunity however was one of the 
central rallying cries of the international human rights movement in the Post-War 
period. The international human rights movement evolved as part and parcel of 
the various United Nations bodies created at the end of WWII.3  
 
                                            
2 Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1947). 
3 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
2012). 
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The expansion the UN international human rights treaties and their respective 
monitoring bodies were part of a broader trend in international law and 
international relations to create institutions to resolve disputes. The rapid 
expansion in various international institutions in the Post-War era, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, has captured the imagination of many 
scholars. On the one hand, the proliferation of international institutions and their 
respective legislative, administrative and judicial powers has enabled the 
development of highly specialised areas of international law. On the other hand, 
the subfields, or what scholars have aptly coined as the self-contained units, are 
so highly specialised that their various adjudicatory decisions either corroborate 
or contradict existing understanding of international law and its principles.4   
 
Globalisation and the fragmentation of international law have,5 for international 
lawyers and international law scholars, accelerated the search for public 
authority, legitimacy, and accountability in international law and its institutions.6 
The concept of globalisation was coined in the 1970s, and in the same period as 
global governance.7 It is an amorphous term with multiple and often contested 
                                            
4 Bruno Simma “Self-Contained Regimes” (1985) 18 Netherlands YB112. 
5 Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties”, 
(2002) 15 Leiden J Intl L 553 [Koskenniemi & Leino, “Fragmentation”]. 
6Antje Wiener, Anthony F. Lang, James Tully et al. “Global constitutionalism: Human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law” (2012) 1:1 Global Constitutionalism 1 at 8.  
7  Henk Overbeek, “Global Governance: From Radical Transformation to Neo-Liberal 
Management” in Henk Overbeek et al, “Forum: Global Governance: Decline or Maturation of an 
Academic Concept?” (2010) 12 Intl Studies Rev  696; The 1995 Commission on Global 
Governance (CGG) report defined global governance as: “Governance is the sum of the many 
ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a 
continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-
operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce 
compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to 
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meanings. In short, the term globalisation is used to describe the changes our 
global society has witnessed, and continues to experience. More specifically, 
globalisation is considered to be the process of transformation that stretches 
over several centuries.8 Globalisation describes changes in our social reality 
precipitated by the relocation of different actors, from local, to regional to 
international spaces. Furthermore, it describes a destabilisation of the 
public/private distinctions and the evolution of actors and norms beyond the 
reach of the traditional nation state.  
 
One of the consequences of the social, economic, legal and political interaction 
fostered by the nation state9 is the hyper-specialisation in specific areas of 
international law. 10  As the social, economic, legal and political interaction 
expands at all levels of our global society, the nation state agrees to delegate 
some of its core functions to international organisations and other non-state 
actors. Globalisation helps us understand the role of international institutions and 
                                                                                                                                 
or perceive to be in their interest”; The Commission on Global Governance, Our Global 
Neighbourhood (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 2; The term is a both a 
heuristic device that captures and describes the fast-paced development of our international 
system and a normative concept that details how societies should address global problems; 
Klaus Dingwerth & Phillip Pattberg “Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics” 
(2006) 12 Global Governance 185 at 191 & 193; Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, 
Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 3-18; Lawrence 
Finkelstein, “What Is Global Governance?” 1 (3) (1995) Global Governance 368; James N. 
Rosenau “Governance in the Twenty-first Century” (1995) 1:1 Global Governance 14. 
8 William Twining, Globalization and Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000) at 6. 
9 Saskia Sassen, “The State and Globalization” in Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker, 
eds, The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 91 [Sassen, “State and Globalization”]; Saskia Sassen, “The Emergence 
of Electronic Markets: The Case of Global Capital Markets” in Karin Knorr Cetina & Alex Preda, 
eds, The Sociology of Financial Markets (Oxford University Press, 2005) 27 [Sassen “The 
Emergence of Electronic Markets”]. 
10Frédéric Mégret, “Globalization and International Law” in R. Wolfrum ed, The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, online edition). 
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international law in facilitating the growth of global governance. Much more 
importantly, as the scale of global interactions stretches, we are witnessing a 
change in how we are regulated. There is a shift in how legislative, 
administrative, and judicial decisions are made at the global level. In fact, there is 
a transformation of governance at the global level. In the international sphere, 
there is no state-like sovereign, given the very nature of international law.  This 
realisation has led scholars to turn their attention to creating accountability and 
legitimacy through for example global constitutionalism and global administrative 
law in global governance. 
 
Simultaneously, as we encounter greater connectivity between places through 
economic and social exchanges, we are witnessing a bifurcation of international 
norms by different adjudicatory bodies in our expanding global space. Scholars 
worry that the various international adjudicatory bodies are rendering different 
and contradictory decisions. Coined as a postmodern anxiety, 11  the 
fragmentation of international law has prompted scholars to search for ways in 
which accountability and legitimacy can be included in the dynamics of 
international law and its functionaries. Global constitutionalism and global 
administrative law are two such attempts to theorise global governance.  
 
In what follows, I will describe globalisation and fragmentation of international 
law and engage with the theoretical discussions that seek to comprehend the 
                                            
11 Koskenniemi & Leino, “Fragmentation” supra note 5. 
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rapid expansion of global governance.  I will first present the orthodox 
understandings of globalisation and then I will challenge these claims using the 
scholarship of Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Saskia Sassen. In the following 
section, I will examine fragmentation of international law. Globalisation and 
fragmentation of international law are used as the rationale to theorise global 
governance from a constitutional law or administrative law perspective. The 
ensuing discussion will first introduce these important concepts of globalisation 
and fragmentation. Simultaneously, the following analysis will also seek to 
challenge some of the basic assumptions embedded in these discussions as 
means to open up a space to challenge global constitutionalism and global 
administrative law in the following chapters.  
2.2 Globalisation and the Turn to International Institutions  
There are multiple understandings of the contents of the term globalisation. 
Fundamentally, the term seeks to capture the changes in our every day modern 
life. It speaks to the deterioration of public/private distinctions and the evolution 
of actors and norms. It involves a process of interconnectedness that is far 
beyond what is achieved through technological or economic progress.  
 
Scholars from law, sociology, politics and other disciplines, use varying 
approaches to understand this concept. There is agreement amongst these 
scholars that globalisation is a recent phenomenon that has managed to alter our 
daily experiences. But there is no agreement on “which dimensions contain the 
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essence of globalisation”.12 The exact contours of the processes of globalisation 
are the subject of major disciplinary battles. This frustration over globalisation 
has spilled into the streets of Geneva, Rio, Cancun, Seattle, London and Toronto 
as well.13 The continuously expanding markets and capital has pushed national 
citizens affected by these changes on to the streets. The frustration over 
globalisation reflects its real life significance on individuals from various regions 
and cities that are directly affected by its consequences, which then precipitates 
the above referenced protests. Yet there are those that remain steadfastly 
unconvinced by such claims. They suggest that arguments about the extension 
of interdependence are dangerously overblown.14  
 
A description of the significance of globalisation for scholars writing in various 
fields will be provided below. This will be positioned as the mainstream 
description of globalisation. Upon establishing this context, focus will then turn to 
the writings of Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Saskia Sassen as a means to 
                                            
12 Manfred B. Steger, Globalization, A short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
at 11 [Steger, A Short Introduction]. 
13  David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington 
Consensus (London: Polity Press, 2004 & 2013) at 2. 
14  Specifically, they argue that: “the present highly internationalized economy is not 
unprecedented; genuinely transnational companies appear to be relatively rare (most are 
multinationals imbricated in their home countries’ political economies); contemporary capital 
mobility is not producing a massive shift of investment and employment from the advanced to the 
developing countries; foreign direct investment is actually highly concentrated among the 
advanced countries and the Third World remains marginal in both investment and trade; the 
world economy, far from being genuinely global, concentrates investment and trade flows within 
the economies of the core; and perhaps most importantly, global markets are by no means 
beyond societal capacity to regulate transnational capital, instead it is elite preferences and 
power which prevent such measures. They do not deny trends towards increased 
internationalism, nor that there are important constraints on nationalist industrial policy; their 
claim is rather that there is still a major role for nation–state level policy measures”; William K. 
Tabb “Questioning Globalization”, online: (2001) 53:5 Monthly Review 
<http://monthlyreview.org/2001/10/01/questioning-globalization/>; Paul Hirst & Grahame 
Thompson, Globalization in Question (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996). 
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interrupt this mainstream account. By presenting the writings of both Santos and 
Sassen, I seek to challenge the assumptions about the very nature of 
globalisation in international law scholarship. Broadly, this particular discussion 
about globalisation leads to the rationale of the search for public authority, 
legitimacy and accountability that is encapsulated with various theories of global 
governance. 
 
For some scholars, globalisation signifies that we now live in one world.15 The 
argument is that “not only is globali[s]ation very real, but its consequences can 
be felt everywhere”. More importantly, “[N]ations have lost their sovereignty they 
once had and politicians have lost most of their capability to influence events”.16 
Similarly David Held and Anthony McGrew posit that “simply put, [globalization] 
denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening 
impact of interregional flows and patterns of social interaction”.17 There is a shift 
in the scale of human social organisation that links distant communities together. 
This shift further expands the reach of power relations across the world’s major 
regions and continents.18 For others, this type of interpretation of globalisation 
simply ignores the very essence of the unequal manner in which it operates. In 
this context, globalisation is seen as a set of social processes that transforms 
current social conditions. It is exemplified by “weakening nationality into one of 
                                            
15 Anthony Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives  
(New York: Rutledge, 2003) at 6. 
16 Ibid at 8. 
17 David Held & Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide, 1st 
Edition (London: Polity Press, 2002) at 4.  
18 David Held & Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide, 1st 
Edition (London, Polity Press, 2002) at 4.  
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globality”. 19 At the centre of this claim is idea that globalisation is about “shifting 
forms of human contact”.20  
 
Globalisation thus is envisioned as a force that has somehow changed the 
manner in which states operate based on economics. For instance, the claim 
that states have lost their sovereignty is premised on a limited conception of 
state behaviour. The various scholars writing under the descriptive camp of 
global constitutionalism suggest that international law has been developing in 
various regional and functional pockets in an amorphous and non-hierarchical 
system.21 These same scholars suggest that economic, social and cultural forces 
of globalisation motivate international law and its institutions. 22  Global 
administrative lawyers also adopt such a vision of globalisation that underpins 
their move to global governance as administration.23 
 
This conventional account of globalisation presented above is simply not true, 
especially in a post-911 world.24 The terrorist attacks on New York City in the 
United States on 11 September 2001 ushered in a new regulatory era.  
Governments are reconceptualising a number of different policies in their 
territories and abroad. In particular, there has been merger of domestic criminal 
                                            
19Steger, A Short Introduction supra note 12 at 9.  
20Ibid.  
21 Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, eds, Ruling the World; Constitutionalism, international 
law, and Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
22 Ibid. 
23 See chapter 4, False Universalism of Global Administrative Law. 
24 I have elaborated on this point in: Shanthi Senthe and Sujith Xavier, “Re-Igniting Critical Race 
in Canadian Legal Spaces: Introduction to the Special Symposium Issue of Contemporary 
Accounts of Racialization in Canada” (Forthcoming) (2015) Windsor YB Access Just.  
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law, immigration and administrative law that regulates foreign nationals through 
such schemes as national security certificates. Yet what is accurate about this 
conventional account is that there is a large-scale expansion of social interaction 
at the global level. This expansion is made possible by both existing and new 
infrastructures though global governance regimes.  
 
Sassen rightly rejects the idea that the nation state is losing its sovereignty.25 For 
Sassen, the globalisation debate incorrectly centres on a duality between the 
national and global state. 26  She points to key contemporary government 
institutions, for example the ministry of finance and banks, and other types of 
institutions that do not fit well into this picture.27 For Sassen, this is an impetus to 
reimagine the globalisation debate. She contends that her “position is not 
comfortably subsumed under the proposition that nothing has changed in terms 
of state power nor under the proposition of the declining significance of the 
state”.28  
 
The continuous participation of states within the global economic system has 
ensured that they have undergone a “significant transformation”.29 The state is 
the guarantor of the rights of global capital, but its role has been relegated to the 
background. Sassen argues that this is indicative of the state’s technical and 
                                            
25 Sassen, “State and Globalization” supra note 9. 
26Ibid. 
27Ibid at 104. 
28Ibid at 106. 
29Ibid at 93. 
 132 
administrative role, and this role cannot be mimicked or performed by any other 
institution. More importantly, this capacity, as Sassen points out, is backed by 
military and global power for most states. 30  
 
For scholars writing on the global South, globalisation is directly related to 
imperialism. Bhupinder Chimni suggests that the “[t]he threat of recolonisation is 
haunting the world… The process of globali[z]ation has had deleterious effect on 
the welfare of third world peoples”.31 International law and its institutions facilitate 
this process of recolonisation. Through such mechanisms as good governance, 
international law and its institutions furthered the flow of globalisation.32  
 
Santos, writing in the same vein, defines globalisation by taking it outside the 
sole arena of economics. He notes “the process of globali[z]ation is […] 
selective, uneven and fraught with tensions and contradictions. But it is not 
anarchic”.33 For Santos, globalisation is “the process by which a given local 
condition or entity succeeds in extending its reach over the globe and, by doing 
so, develops the capacity to designate a rival condition or entity as local”.34 
There are two specific methods in which globalisation is produced.  
 
                                            
30 Ibid. 
31  B.S Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto”, (2006) 8 Intl 
Community L Rev3 at 3. 
32Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 246. 
33Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and 
Emancipation (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002) at 179 [Santos, New Legal Common 
Sense].  
34Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Globalizations” (2006) 23 Theory Culture Society 393 at 396 
[Santos, “Globalizations”]. 
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The first mode of production are: globalised localism and localised globalism. 
Globalised localism depicts the process by which a given local phenomenon is 
successfully globalised. The latter “depicts the specific impact of transnational 
practices and imperatives on local conditions that are thereby altered”.35 These 
two processes operate in tandem to constitute the hegemonic neoliberal and top-
down globalisation. Law generally, and international law and its many institutions 
in particular, is an example that fit nicely in the first mode. Criminal law is 
exemplary in this manner.  
 
The second mode of production of globalisation is insurgent cosmopolitanism.36 
It includes “transnationally organised resistance against the unequal exchanges 
produced or intensified by globalised localisms and localised globalisms”.37 The 
resistance is organised through local and global linkages between social 
organisations and movements representing those classes and social groups 
victimised by hegemonic globalisation. A good illustration is the protests around 
the world against the expanding markets and capital. Various social movements 
are united in concrete struggles against “exclusion, subordinate inclusion, 
destruction of livelihoods and ecological destruction, political oppression, or 
cultural suppression, et cetera”.38 In this analysis, the core countries produce and 
                                            
35Ibid at 396; Santos, New Legal Common Sense supra note 33 at 262-263. 
36Santos, “Globalizations” supra note 34 at 396; Santos Santos, New Legal Common Sense 
supra note 33 at 263. 
37Santos “Globalizations” supra note 34 at 397 Santos Santos, New Legal Common Sense supra 
note 33 at 263-265. 
38Santos, “Globalizations” supra note 34 at 397. 
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market globalised localism. Countries on the periphery are forced to receive 
these localised globalisms.39  
 
Santos’ description of globalisation situates the different forces that are involved 
in the creation of this particular social condition. His analysis closely traces the 
diverse and unequal distribution of wealth and power between the global North 
and the global South. By characterising the effects of globalisation as both cause 
and effect of the distribution of unequal wealth and power, Santos offers a much 
more nuanced perspective of how recent social interactions and the rapid 
expansion of international law and its institutions can be understood. Much more 
importantly, he captures a particular unequal tendency to delegate legislative, 
administrative and judicial functions to international organisations and the 
ensuing dynamic of difference that follows. Ultimately, Santos’ theoretical 
construction allows us to understand the multifaceted nature of globalisation 
rather than presenting a one sided perspective.  
 
Some writers have noted that globalisation is a “vehicle by which European 
public law was projected on to the rest of the world”.40 European public law, the 
once coveted and revolutionary ideals of a single region, is now, to use Santos’ 
term, a globalised localism. Similarly, the notion of the nation state that was born 
                                            
39 William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000) at 5. 
40 Frédéric Mégret, “Globalization and International Law in R. Wolfrum ed, The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, online edition) 
at 6. 
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out of the Treaty of Westphalia is also a globalised localism. 41  To invoke 
Sassen’s contribution, it is through the state that localised globalism and 
globalised localisms are now possible. 
 
In this complicated and contested intellectual map of globalisation, what is clear 
is that globalisation is a process rather than an end result. International lawyers 
and international law scholars at times are silent about this type of processes. It 
has been argued that their domestic counterparts were the first to sense the 
importance of globalisation as it affected their domestic areas of legal practice.42  
 
As international lawyers and international law scholars became more attuned to 
the forces of globalisation and the role of the state, they realised the significance 
of its role and consequences for their discipline. One of the central 
consequences is the recognition that the process of globalisation is generating 
multiple and often overlapping systems of governance. Once these regimes are 
created, often with the consent of the nation state, they operate and function 
without oversight, as I illustrated in the previous chapter. Undoubtedly, there is a 
lacuna in accountability 43  and legitimacy 44 . The preoccupation with both 
                                            
41 Makau W. Mutua, "Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry" (1994) 16 Mich 
J Intl L 1113. 
42 Frédéric Mégret, “Globalization and International Law” in R. Wolfrum ed, The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, online edition) 
at 4; While this claim is plausible, the opposite has been argued by Peer Zumbansen and Craig 
Scott, "Foreword: making a case for comparative constitutionalism and transnational law (2008) 
46 (3) Osgoode Hall LJvii at xix. 
43  Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B Stewart “The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law” (2005) 68 Law & Contemp Prob 1. 
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legitimacy and accountability will be the focus of the following two chapters. The 
process of globalisation, global constitutional and global administrative scholars 
argue, is one of the main reasons why they are seeking to discover, either 
through meta constitutional or administrative norms or principles, the 
constitutional and administrative tendencies within international law and its 
international regulatory regimes. By discovering these norms, the scholars 
working on global governance theories hope to curb, mediate and moderate 
these institutions using domestic law analogies. Yet these writers simply ignore 
the very nature of globalisation narrated by Santos. In ignoring this aspect of 
globalisation, these scholars are also able to forgo and omit any discussions 
about the context (and the dynamic of difference) in which these global 
governance regimes operate. 
 
2.3 Fragmentation of International Law 
The evolution of international law, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
illustrates a struggle for cohesion and uniformity. International law started out as 
a means to regulate the relationships between equal European sovereigns. 
Another reading could be that international law concretised the framework in 
which European sovereigns could interact with their conquered subjects. 
International law expanded drastically from the Treaty of Westphalia to the 
current system in which there are multiple norms, actors, and processes. By the 
                                                                                                                                 
44 Ronald St John Macdonald and Douglas M Johnston, eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: 
Issues on the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005). 
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late 1990s to the early 2000s, scholars and practitioners, in particular the judges 
of the International Court of Justice, worried about the proliferation of self-
contained units and the possibilities of having multiple and competing 
interpretations of international law.45 Their anxieties can be illustrated through 
two examples of contradictory judicial interpretations by different international 
courts.  
 
The first is the competing interpretation of territorial reservations by the 
European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice.46 The 
second example is conflicting judicial interpretation state responsibility between 
the International Court of Justice and the ICTY. In this example, one of the first 
ICTY decision conflicted with the state responsibility test created by the 
International Court of Justice in its landmark decision in US v Nicaragua.47  
 
The real danger, according to judges, scholars and the international law’s 
epistemic community, is “that international law as a whole will become 
fragmented and unmanageable”.48 In thinking about this particular issue, Rosalyn 
Higgins suggests writes the following: 
 
                                            
45 Mario Prost, The Concept of Unity in Public International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing,  2012) 
[Prost, Unity of PIL]; Koskenniemi & Leino, “Fragmentation” supra note 5 at 553-555. 
46 Loizidou v. Turkey (1995) ECHR (Ser. A) No. 310l; Koskenniemi & Leino, “Fragmentation” 
supra note 5 at 555. 
47  Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1, [2000]; Nicaragua v. United States , ICJ Reports 1984; 
Koskenniemi & Leino, “Fragmentation” supra note 5  at 555. 
48 Ibid at 555. 
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“Judicial findings that are inconsistent with the judgments of the 
International Court of Justice would present particular problems for 
the role of international law in international relations, given that the 
International Court is the judicial arm of the United Nations and the 
only judicial body vested with a universal and general subject matter 
jurisdiction”.49 
 
This problem is significant for the discipline of international law, its institutions 
and practitioners of international law. The presence of conflicting interpretation of 
specific rules of international law by various tribunals and courts simply creates a 
lack of coherent and predictable rules that can be generally applied. The 
International Law Commission’s study of fragmentation suggests that there are 
three potential places of conflict: there are tensions between different 
interpretations of general law, tension between general law and special law, and 
tension between two types of special law.50  
 
The hyper-specialisation of international law has compelled certain scholars to 
question the self-contained units of international law.51 In order to overcome the 
issue of hyper-specialisation, some scholars have used the metaphor of 
international law as a highway between the different and “isolated villages of 
international environmental law, international criminal law, international trade 
                                            
49 Rosalyn Higgins “The ICJ, the ECJ, and the Integrity of International Law" (2003) 52 Intl L & 
Comptemporary Leg Q at 18. 
50  International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, UNGAOR, Fifty-eighth session, A/CN.4/L.682 (2006) at para. 
483. 
51 Bruno Simma “Self-Contained Regimes” (1985) 18 Netherlands YB112.  
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law, et cetera”. 52  The literature suggests various methods of tackling this 
particular issue, ranging from specific construction of the conflicting treaties to 
applying the hierarchy of rules found in the International Court of Justice’s 
Statute.53 
 
It is difficult to describe the emergence of new global governance actors that are 
not wedded to the nation state using our international law vernaculars. These 
regimes, with their particular rules and regulatory norms, have further 
exacerbated our conceptions of the strict divisions of labour between the 
executive and legislative arms of government. Our conceptions of governance 
moreover are wedded to orthodox understandings of our existing national 
worlds.54 The division of labour in this instance is the various roles taken on by 
the judiciary, the legislative and executive branches of government in the nation 
state through the constitutional separation of powers. In light of these concerns 
about the bifurcation of international law, scholars, primarily in Europe have 
unsurprisingly sought to unify the field of international law through ideas 
embedded in constitutions and constitutionalism and administration.55 
                                            
52 Oscar Schachter, International Law in theory and Practice (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) 
at 1; Jan Klabbers “Setting the Scene” in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein eds, The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 11. 
53 Campbell McLachlan “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Art. 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna 
Convention” (2005) 54 ICQL 279 at 280; Joost Pauwelyn "Fragmentation of International Law" in 
R. Wolfrum ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 11 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013, online edition). 
54 Peer Zumbansen “Transnational Legal Pluralism” (2010) 1: 2 Transnational Leg Theory 144 at 
147; Philip C Jessup, Transnational Law, Storrs Lectures in Jurisprudence at Yale Law School 
(New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1956). 
55 Bruno Simma “Fragmentation in a Positive Light” (2003-2004) 25 Mich J Intl L 845 at 845-846; 
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B Stewart “The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law” (2005) 68 Law & Contemp Prob 1. 
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For the purpose of this analysis, it is useful to define fragmentation as the 
“branching out and gaining some form of quasi-independence” of various 
international mini regimes and orders.56 Fragmentation is described as “having 
developed in two distinct periods”.57 Mario Prost suggests that the first period 
can be visualized through two themes: “the functional automisation of special 
regimes” and “the multiplication of international tribunals”.58 Within each thematic 
space, scholars oscillate between having strong views on how special 
international regimes, which were created with their own rules of interpretation, 
are self-contained units, to those that view self-contained units as being 
dependent upon a general body of international rules. With reference to the 
second theme, there are those that view the proliferation of different institutions 
as creating “problems of overlapping and conflicting jurisprudence in a way that 
undermines the coherence, foreseeability and efficacy of the international legal 
order”.59 The first period, which would ultimately start from the rapid of expansion 
of international law and international institutions in the Post-War era is concerned 
with the predictability of the international legal order.  
 
But what is missing from these debates, as illustrated from the previous chapter, 
is the manner in which international law and its institutions were constructed and 
                                            
56 Jan Klabbers “Setting the Scene” in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein eds, The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 14. 
57 Prost, Unity of PIL supra note 45 at 9. 
58 Ibid  at 9 & 9-14. 
59 Ibid at 11. 
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how they continue to act. Even though there were concerns about the specific 
rules and their applications in the broader international legal order, there was 
very little emphasis on how these rules affected the global South. 
 
In the second period of fragmentation, important questions centre on the search 
for coherence and unity in international law. If these are legitimate objectives, 
then how can this complex web of interactions and interrelations between all of 
these different actors, norms and processes be organised? The aim is to find 
“principles, methods and techniques that can be used to put the pieces of the 
puzzle together and bring order to multiplicity.”60 Oddly enough, as Prost has 
pointed out, postmodern anxiety has focused solely on one side of the debate: 
fragmentation. It has ignored the concept of unity, “a graded concept for it can be 
taken from different angles and standpoints, and it possesses various semantic 
layers”.61  
 
Similar to the reactions about globalisation, what emerges from the literature on 
fragmentation is the desire, in some way, to piece together often-conflicting parts 
of international law and its institutions through a unifying theory. These various  
components of the international legal order had to be unified in a manner that 
would resemble domestic incarnations of a legal system.  
 
                                            
60 Ibid at 11. 
61 Ibid at 17. 
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The search for what Prost has suggested as unity in international law can be 
discovered in attempts to find accountability and or legitimacy through ideas of 
constitutionalism or delegation and accountability as principles encapsulated 
within administrative law. Yet this search for unity does not take stock of the 
challenges of international law. To bring Santos back into the discussion, there is 
complete omission of the second mode of insurgent 
cosmopolitanism. 62 Fundamentally, the anxieties about fragmentation have 
prompted scholars to search for some means of unifying the various international 
legal orders.   
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to position globalisation and fragmentation of 
international law as the reason behind the surge in scholarship focused on public 
authority, accountability and legitimacy in international law. This search can be 
broadly encapsulated under global constitutionalism and global administrative 
law. Arguably, the effects of both globalisation and fragmentation have lead 
scholars to search for new ways of imaging our international order. In the next 
two chapters, I trace how scholars are articulating these measures. I detail how 
scholars are theorising global governance through global constitutionalism and 
global administrative law.  
                                            
62Ibid at 396; Ibid at 263. 
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Chapter 3:  False Universalism of Global Constitutionalism and Global 
Constitutionalisation? 
3.1 Introduction  
Globalisation and fragmentation of international law have inspired international 
lawyers and international law scholars to theorise global governance through 
global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation.1 It is not surprising that 
international lawyers and international law scholars are using the constitutionalist 
lens as a means to understand, mitigate and contend with the fast-paced 
evolution of international norms and international institutions. 2  Lawyers and 
scholars who adopt this perspective are suggesting it is possible to use 
constitutional vernaculars to describe the emergence and operation of 
international law and its various institutions.3 International criminal law and its 
institutions are an illustrative example in this exercise.4  
 
                                            
1  Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, “A Functional Approach to International 
Constitutionalization” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds, Ruling the World; 
Constitutionalism, international law, and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
at 5-9 [Dunoff & Trachtman, “Functional Approach”]. 
2 Peters & Armingeon regard it as “constitutionalist spectacles”; Anne Peters & Klaus Armingeon, 
“Introduction—Global Constitutionalism from an Interdisciplinary Perspective” (2009) 16:2 Ind J 
Global Leg Stud 385 at 385 [Peters & Armingeon, “Introduction”]. 
3 Ronald St. John Macdonald & D. M. Johnston, eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on 
the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005) [Macdonald & 
Johnston, World Constitutionalism]. 
4 Axel Marschik, “Legislative Powers of the Security Council” in Ronald St. John Macdonald & D. 
M. Johnston eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the Legal Ordering of the World 
Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005) 457 at 461-472 [Marschik, “Legislative powers of 
SC”]. 
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Arguably the emergence of various global constitutionalism and global 
constitutionalisation perspectives is indicia of the concretisation of international 
norms. An example of this concretisation is the development of the prohibition 
relating to the commission of genocide. The prohibition of genocide can pierce 
the veil of immunity often afforded to incumbent heads of state and their foreign 
ministers. As such it prohibits officials from violating internationally accepted 
principles. The prohibition of genocide is similar to a constitutional arrangement 
within the domestic/national legal frameworks with guaranteed rights, duties and 
other such protections against arbitrary use of public power. Another example is 
the cosmopolitan project of creating the federal European state.5 A large number 
of scholars writing about constitutionalism (and surveyed in this dissertation) are 
inspired by the European integration project that started with the nuclear 
agreements during the early Post-War period.6 The recent European Union debit 
crisis has further spurred on this curiosity and the potential viability of the Union 
as a constitutional project.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to study global constitutionalism and global 
constitutionalisation as a unified field of inquiry. The current literature on global 
                                            
5  Claus Offe, Europe Entrapped (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015); Claus Offe, "Europe 
entrapped"(2013-02-06) Eurozine Review < http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2013-02-06-offe-
en.pdf>. 
6  Christine Schwöbel, “The Appeal of the Project of Global Constitutionalism to Public 
International Lawyers” (2012) 13:1 German LJ1 at 5; See below for an in depth discussion of 
Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein eds, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
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constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation is tremendous.7 In what follows, 
the first section will introduce the various components of global constitutionalism 
and global constitutionalisation. Based on this analysis, the second section will 
identify three specific camps within the current literature on global 
constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation: normative, descriptive and 
pluralist. I will provide a detailed description of the arguments in each camp while 
paying close attention to the various  scholars that push the normative and 
descriptive agendas housed therein. My selection of the different scholars is 
based on their contributions to their respective camps. Simultaneously, by using 
the case studies detailed in the first chapter, I will challenge key assertions made 
by these scholars. In particular, I will delve into the way in which global 
constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation are being deployed in unison to 
further entrench the universalisms embedded in international law chronicled in 
the first chapter.  
 
I argue that global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation ignore, 
obscure, and efface the underlying context and histories of international law and 
its international institutions. Global constitutionalism presents a particular 
western understanding of constitutionalism as universally applicable in diverse 
contexts and thus, scholars writing in this genre of global governance theory re-
enact Antony Anghie’s dynamic of difference. By presenting such an image of 
                                            
7  Christine Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective. 
(Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011).  
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the current world order, these scholars miss an important opportunity to take 
stock of on-the-ground realities within contemporary international institutions.  
 
3.2 Global Constitutionalism: Introducing Three Perspectives 
The popularity of global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation in 
international law coincides with Sujit Choudhry’s reflection that there is a 
globalisation of modern constitutionalism. 8  The rise in comparative 
constitutionalism is demonstrable through the adjudication process where judges 
rely on interpretative techniques from foreign jurisdictions as guidelines for their 
own adjudicatory practices. Comparative constitutionalism is often utilised as tool 
to examine the proliferation of human rights protection across jurisdictions. 
Scholars have coined this as the rights revolution. 9  
 
The rise in comparative constitutionalism can be credited, rightly or wrongly, to a 
number of reasons, including the transition to democracy in different countries.10 
As countries emerge from Post-War, post-conflict, and post-authoritarian 
contexts, they are searching for ways in which to structure their institutions, their 
politics and their society. Good governance practices are used by international 
                                            
8 Sujit Choudhry, “Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) 74:3 Indiana Law Journal 819 at 821. 
9 Sujit Choudhry, "Introduction: Integration, Accommodation and the Agenda of Comparative 
Constitutional Law" in Sujit Choudhry ed, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration 
or Accommodation? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 8. 
10 Ibid at 8; Ran Hirschl, Towards Jurisocracy: The Origin and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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development agencies as part of an arsenal of tools to support these countries.11 
Some jurisdictions are attempting to move forward from a debilitating past 
marred with mass human rights violations. At times these particular countries 
want to confront individuals that may have participated in the commission of 
mass atrocities. 12  The use of democratic governance in these countries, 
especially after an intense period of authoritarian rule, repression, or conflict, has 
been challenged. The challenge is three-fold predicated on who makes decisions 
about the choice of procedures in democratic governance, how these decisions 
are made, and in whose interests these decisions are made.  
 
The transition from a violent past to a peaceful future has been the central focus 
of the dynamic field of transitional justice. The field of transitional justice seeks to 
understand how to move forward from times of acute crisis. Moreover, 
transitional justice is often a catalyst to transition to democratic rule from post-
authoritarian, post-communist, and post-conflict societies. There is an attempt in 
this context to transition from moments of acute crisis by moving forward through 
the prosecution of those responsible for human rights violations as a means to 
heal the divisions in the respective communities.13  
                                            
11  Terence C. Halliday, “Architects of the State: International Financial Institutions and the 
Reconstruction of States in East Asia” (2012) 37:2 Law and Soc Inquiry 265 at 272. 
12 Rama Mani, “Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus between 
Transitional Justice and Development” (2008) 2 Intl J Transitional Justice25; Vasuki Nesiah, “The 
Trials Of History: Losing Justice In The Monstrous And The Banal” in Peer Zumbansen and Ruth 
Buchanan, eds, Law in Transition: Development, Rights and Transitional Justice (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2013). 
13 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Ruti G. Teitel, “The 
Transitional Apology” in Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn, eds, Taking Wrongs Seriously: 
Apologies and Reconciliation (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006); Paige Arthur, “How 
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International prosecutions are part of the legal formalist answer to violence. 
There are numerous alternatives to the formalist responses in transitional justice, 
ranging from national prosecutions, truth commissions, sanctions, reparations, 
amnesties and pardons.14 Earlier debates in international law, vis-à-vis large-
scale violence, focused on the creation of a right to democracy and the 
promotion of democratic values.15 The right to democracy was both celebrated 
and criticised. It was celebrated for its embedded values of democracy and the 
potential for democracy to allow for participation. It was criticised for its 
universalising nature, analogous to claims I set out in the first chapter.16  
 
In a similar vein, the rise of global constitutionalism and global 
constitutionalisation in international law is important. Constitutionalism, as 
understood by constitutional scholars, is the theory associated with various 
models of constitutions and norms that permeate any constitutional order. It is 
the theory of governmental structure, limits of public power17 and procedures 
                                                                                                                                 
Transitions Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice” (2009) 31 
Hum Rts Q 2; Nicola Palmer, Phil Clark & Danielle Granville, Critical Perspectives in Transitional 
Justice (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012).  
14 Jose E. Alvarez, “Alternatives to International Criminal Justice” in Antonio Cassese, ed, The 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 25 
[Alvarez, “Alternatives to ICL”].  
15 Thomas Frank, “Emerging Right to Democratic Governance” (1992) AJIL46; James Crawford, 
Democracy in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
16 Susan Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
17  The term public power is specifically used by those advocating for and against global 
constitutionalism; Martin Loughlin, “What is Constitutionalisation” in Petra Dobner and Martin 
Loughlin eds, Twilight of Constitutionalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2010) 47 at 63-68 
[Loughlin, “What is Constitutionalisation”]; Neil Walker, “Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global 
Context” in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek, eds, Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union 
and Beyond (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2012) 17 [Walker, “Constitutionalism and Pluralism”]. The 
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through which public power can be exercised. The key principles of 
constitutionalism are independence of the judges, delineation and separation of 
the various branches of government, the protection of fundamental rights, and 
the role of judges in policing the boundaries of public power.18  
 
If constitutionalism is the political theory of constitutions, constitutionalisation can 
be then described as a “process born of a reconfiguration of the political theory 
of constitutionalism”.19  Martin Loughlin argues that constitutionalism is being 
repackaged as western liberal-legal constitutionalism and is presented as a free-
standing set of norms20 that legitimises our fragmented and globalised social 
order at all jurisdictional levels. Loughlin states:  
Constitutionalism is no longer treated as some evocative but vague 
theory, which expresses a belief in the importance of limited, 
accountable government, to be applied flexibly to the peculiar 
circumstances of particular regimes. It now is being presented as a 
meta theory which establishes the authoritative standards of 
legitimacy for the exercise of public power wherever it is located.21 
 
Modern-day global constitutionalism can be traced back to Cicero and the 
Roman Republic.22 Some scholars argue that Alfred Verdross and Hans Kelsen 
                                                                                                                                 
reliance on the term public is the subject of a larger debate in critical legal studies; see for 
example, Joseph Singer, “Legal Realism Now” (1988) 76 (2) Cal L Rev 465 at 477 & 534-535. 
18 Loughlin, “What is Constitutionalisation” supra note 17 at 55. 
 
20 Ibid at 61-62. 
21 Ibid at 61. 
22 D. M. Johnston, “World Constitutionalism in the Theory of International Law” in Ronald St. John 
Macdonald & D. M. Johnston, eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the Legal 
Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005) 3 at 16 [Johnston, “World 
Constitutionalism in Theory”]. 
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were the first international lawyers to look to constitutionalism. 23 Some credit the 
scholarship of Immanuel Kant and other philosophers of the 17th and 18th century 
as inspiring the use of constitutionalism in international law.24 The creation and 
development of international institutions during the mid-19th century, such as the 
Danube Commission to regulate the international waterways, is emblematic of 
the ideas expressed in Kant’s Perpetual Peace.25 International institutions were a 
potential catalyst for dispute resolution. Arguably, the expansion of the nation 
state through colonialism and imperialism facilitated the development of 
international institutions. As demonstrated in the first chapter, the expansion of 
the nation state, through conquest and colonisation of the new world, solidified 
the unequal distribution of wealth and power. Global constitutionalism, as an 
international legal discourse, seeks to contend with the modern-day incarnations 
of these international institutions that make up the dense web of inchoate 
regulatory actors, norms, and processes.26  
 
                                            
23 Bardo Fassbender, “The Meaning of International Constitutional Law” in Nicholas Tsagourias, 
ed, Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 312 [Fassbender, “The Meaning of International 
Constitutional Law”]. 
24 Martti Koskenniemi, “Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about 
International Law and Globalization” (2007) 8 Theor Inq L 9 at 12; Petra Dobner, “More Law, 
Less Democracy? Democracy and Transnational Constitutionalism” in Petra Dobner & Martin 
Loughlin, eds, The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford University Press, 2010) at 141. 
25 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace; A Philosophical Essay (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1903) 
[Translated by Mary Campbell]. 
26 Peer Zumbansen, “Transnational Law, Evolving” in J. M. Smits ed, Elgar Encyclopedia of  
Comparative Law (Surrey: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2012).  
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José Alvarez observed that different disciplines have different methods of 
examining the proliferation of international law and its institutions.27 The literature 
on global constitutionalism is akin to an interdisciplinary attempt to tackle the 
fast-paced growth of international law and its institutions.28 International lawyers, 
political scientists and scholars from other disciplines are leading the charge in 
encouraging the conceptualisation of the constitutionalisation of international law 
because of globalisation and fragmentation.29   
 
Alec Stone Sweet describes global constitutionalisation as thick and thicker to 
illustrate the varying perspectives that can be discerned within the current 
literature on global constitutionalism. 30  Proponents of the thick version of 
constitutionalism have a foundational notion of how “we organi[z]e the state, 
constitute our government, provide for representation and participation, protect 
minorities, promote equality, and so on”.31 The thicker version depicts a much 
more cultural view of constitutionalism that is conceived “as an overarching 
ideology of politics, community, citizenship, and the state”.32  
                                            
27 Jose E. Alvarez, "The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences”, (2003) 38 
Texas Intl LJ 405 [Alvarez, “The New Dispute Settlers”]. 
28 Mattias Kumm, Anthony F. Lang, Jr., James Tully & Antje Wiener, “How large is the world of 
global constitutionalism?”, (2014) 3:1 Global Constitutionalism 1 at 1 [Kumm et al, “How large is 
the world”]; Anthony F. Lang, Jr., Mattias Kumm, Antje Wiener, James Tully, & Miguel Poiares 
Maduro, “Interdisciplinarity: Challenges and opportunities” (2013) 2 (1) Global Constitutionalism 1 
[Lang et al, “Interdisciplinarity”]; Antje Wiener, Anthony F. Lang, Jr., James Tully, Miguel Poiares 
Maduro & Mattias Kumm, “Global constitutionalism: Human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law” (2012) 1 (2) Global Constitutionalism 1 [Wiener, “Global Constitutionalism”]. 
29 Alvarez, “The New Dispute Settlers” supra note 27. 
30 Alec Stone Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes” (2009) 16:2 
Ind J Global Leg Stud 621 at 627; Sweet uses the language of thick and thin versions of 
constitutionalism to identify the possible critique of constitutionalism. 
31 Ibid at 627. 
32 Ibid at 627. 
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As alluded to earlier, irrelevant of whether one is operating at the thick or thicker 
register of constitutionalism at the global level, there remains a tendency to 
obscure the history of international law and its institutions. Discussions about the 
organisation of various international institutions (thick version) or the cultural 
views of constitutionalism (thicker version) simply ignore the manner in which 
international institutions were forged and have evolved. By disregarding these 
foundational aspects of international law and its institutions, scholars working in 
global constitutionalism simply forgo any analysis of how western values of 
constitutional arrangements, such as separation of powers, have become the 
bedrock of their constitutional analysis.   
 
In light of the burgeoning interdisciplinary literature, scholars have more recently 
suggested yet another characterisation to understand global constitutionalism. In 
a recent editorial in Global Constitutionalism, one of the leading international 
interdisciplinary journals, the editors suggest that the current scholarship can be 
grouped within the following three registers: normative school; functional school; 
and pluralism school.33 Those working under the moniker of the normative school 
view global constitutionalism as a “legal or moral conceptual framework that 
guides the interpretation, progressive development or political reform of legal and 
political practices beyond the state to reflect a commitment to constitutional 
                                            
33 Wiener, “Global Constitutionalism” supra note 28. 
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standards”.34 The functional school focuses on the manner in which international 
organisations are created through different bargaining processes and 
negotiations. Their task is to investigate how international institutions function. 
The pluralist school houses some of the more contested claims and arguments. 
Here the literature is concerned with both describing the current fields of global 
governance and creating new global governance regimes found within the 
normative and functional schools of global constitutionalism. The literature 
“emphasize[s] the importance of distinct, ancient, modern and post-modern eras 
of constitutionalism”.35  
 
In addition to José Alvarez’s depiction of the state of affairs based on disciplinary 
methods, Stone Sweet’s thick and thicker constitutionalism and the three 
different schools’ models described above, there are other taxonomies that 
augment the contemporary attempts to understand global constitutionalism.36  
 
These recent shifts in the taxonomies of global constitutionalism are subject to 
both admiration and contestation. It is admired because of its uniqueness. 
Scholars have been busy building the frameworks necessary to understand the 
different claims being articulated in the vast literature of global constitutionalism 
that describe constitutional formations in the global context. It is challenging in 
                                            
34 Ibid at 7.  
35 Ibid at 7-8. 
36 These taxonomies of the current literature include for example: Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & 
Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009); Christine Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective. 
(Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011). 
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that there are multiple ways to organise the literature ranging from the above-
discussed typology of thick and thicker versions to the three different schools. 
There are also suggestions that the literature can be organised under the idea of 
strands 37  or under the headings of mappers and shapers. 38  Some have 
suggested that supranational constitutionalisation can be viewed as trying to 
reform the way in which international institutions function.39 Additionally, the 
same scholars argue for a “reconfiguration of the basis of the constitutionalism in 
light of late modern conditions”.40  
 
I have elected to pursue global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation 
through the prism of three schools or camps outlined by the editors of Global 
Constitutionalism. The normative, functional (or what I have reformulated as the 
descriptive) and pluralist camps capture the major themes encapsulated within 
the current literature on global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation. 
Moreover, the themes contained in these three camps are an accurate 
characterisation of the various strands of literature in global constitutionalism as 
opposed to other descriptors. 
 
                                            
37 Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) [Klabbers et al, Constitutionalization of IL].  
38 Garrett Wallace Brown, “The Constitutionalization Of What?” (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 
201. 
39  Loughlin, “What is Constitutionalisation” supra note 17 at 63; Rob Howse and Kalypso 
Nicolaidis "Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?"  (2003) 16 
Governance 73; Jeffrey Dunoff, “Ehard: The WTO's Constitution and the Discipline of 
International Law (2006) 17 (3) Eur J of Intl L 647 [Dunoff, “Constitutional Conceits”]. 
40Loughlin, “What is Constitutionalisation” supra note 17 at 64. 
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The normative camp seeks to understand the proliferation of international law 
and its institutions as part of the process of greater interconnectedness brought 
on by globalisation.41 The writers in this camp focus on moulding the foundations 
and practices of global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation as a 
normative exercise.42 Their project promotes compliance with notions of the rule 
of law as it is embodied in international law. More importantly, the scholars 
envision global constitutionalism as a response to the acute crises presented by 
globalisation and fragmentation, which generates a legitimacy gap in 
international law and its institutions. In this regard, the normative camp wants to 
transcend the democracy deficit through global constitutionalisation.  
The democracy gap stems from both fragmentation of international law and 
globalisation of international law in which international institutions are not 
accountable to a constituent population. In our modern global order, international 
institutions are making decisions without having the consent or validation that 
stems from democratic practices found at the local national level. 
 
The writers grouped under the descriptive camp want to understand and identify 
the production of international law and its institutions as a form of 
constitutionalisation in multiple jurisdictional levels.43 These scholars attempt to 
                                            
41 Jürgen Habermas, Divided West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006) [Habermas, Divided West]; 
David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus 
(London: Polity Press, 2004) [Held, Global Covenant]. 
42 Garrett Wallace Brown, “The Constitutionalisation Of What?” (2012) 1 Global 
Constitutionalism 201 at 204. 
43 Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, eds, Ruling the World; Constitutionalism, International 
Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009)[Dunoff & Trachtman, Ruling 
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disentangle the existing structures of international institutions and understand 
how multiple actors, norms, and processes operate. It is possible to simply 
characterise those writing in this genre as providing a descriptive account.44 By 
envisioning the constitutional imperative, scholars in this camp are attempting to 
provide a baseline from which the current international order can be vested with 
legitimacy.  
 
The pluralist camp has both empirical and normative elements. The empirical 
project in this camp is concerned with describing the “competing claims of 
ultimate political and legal authority raised in the names of different political 
communities”.45 The normative perspective affirms and demands commitments 
to political pluralism by thinking about constitutionalism as a doctrine and as a 
potential to imagine a new and better world.46  
 
In examining the three camps, I will pursue the scholarship of writers that have 
actively engaged in expanding their research on global constitutionalism. I 
selected the following scholars for a number of reasons ranging from clarity of 
their respective claims, to the importance and significance of their contribution to 
the discussions on global constitutionalism. I have included a diverse set of 
scholars writing from various perspectives. For example, in the normative camp, 
                                                                                                                                 
the World]; Macdonald & Johnston, World Constitutionalism supra note 3; Klabbers et al, 
Constitutionalization of IL supra note 37. 
44 Wiener, “Global Constitutionalism” supra note 28 at 7. 
45 Zoran Oklopcic, “Provincializing Constitutional Pluralism” (2014) 5:2 Transnational Leg Theory 
200 at 203 [Oklopcic, “Provincializing”]. 
46 Ibid at 203. 
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I have solely focused on the scholarship of David Held and Jürgen Habermas, 
two interdisciplinary scholars that have made enormous contributions to our 
understanding of global governance, legal norms and world politics.47 In the 
descriptive camp, I have included the three sets of scholars that brought together 
experts from various fields to describe and challenge the manner in which global 
constitutionalism is conceptualised and described.48 In the pluralist camp, I focus 
on the writings of Neil Walker, one of the central figures in the global 
constitutionalism literature. All of these scholars come to global constitutionalism 
from their respective fields and their scholarship examines specific institutions, 
such as the European Union and the World Trade Organisation. 49 
Understandably, their perspective on global constitutionalism is greatly 
influenced by the dynamics of their respective fields.  
 
In the following section, the writings of these scholars will be presented using the 
prism of the three camps. In the remaining parts of this chapter, it will be argued 
that global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation do not present a 
wholesome understanding of how international law and international institutions 
operate. Prompted by globalisation and fragmentation of international law, global 
constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation are new forms of global 
                                            
47 David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); Jürgen 
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (Boston: MIT Press, 1998) [Translated by William Rehg]. 
48Macdonald & Johnston, World Constitutionalism supra note 3; Dunoff & Trachtman, Ruling the 
World supra note 43; Klabbers et al, Constitutionalization of IL supra note 37. 
49 For example, Neil Walker writes about the European Union while Jefferey L. Dunoff’s writes  
about the World Trade Organisation; Neil Walker 'Not the European Constitution' (2008) 15:1 
Maastricht J European & Comparative L 135; Dunoff, “Constitutional Conceits” supra note 39. 
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governance theory that are premised on a narrow and particular reading of 
international law and its institutions. Such a critique of global constitutionalism 
and global constitutionalisation is part of a recent trend in scholarship that 
challenges the existing orthodoxies of international law.50 This trend is part of a 
larger critical tradition that challenges law’s formalism.51 Scholars working on 
global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation do not acknowledge the 
origins of international law and its institutions, the context of its evolution, or its 
predilection to present the western particular as universal ideal.  
 
3.3 Normative Global Constitutionalisation and Global Constitutionalism  
In what follows, I will examine the discourse that overtly calls for the 
development of a normative agenda to shape and mould the existing 
international legal order through attempts to secure peace and promote human 
rights “as part of the good governance discourse”.52  This particular agenda’s 
cosmopolitanism seeks to structure international law and its institutions, broadly, 
                                            
50  Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of the Legal (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 70; Mario Prost, “Born Again Lawyer” (2006) 7:12 German 
LJ 1037 at 1042; Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic 
Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Antony 
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004).  
51 Elizabeth Mensch, “The History of Mainstream Legal Thought” in David Kairys, ed, The Politics 
of Law: A Progressive Critique (Pantheon, 1998) at 21; Jack M. Balkin, “Deconstructive Practice 
and Legal Theory” (1986) 96 Yale LJ 743 at 746; Roscoe Pound, “A Call For a Realist 
Jurisprudence” (1931) 44 Harv L Rev 697; Felix Cohen, “Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach” (1935) 35 Columbia Law Review 809. 
52 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 24 [Anghie, Imperialism]. 
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for the betterment of mankind.53 This type of analysis is tied to the progress 
narrative presented earlier that position international law as the search for 
universal law applicable to all.54 The idea of progress in international law is 
intricately connected to the work of international lawyers to plough their 
respective fields of law.55 They do this work as a means to usher in regulatory 
frameworks in various areas at the global level. 
 
The implementation of this type of cosmopolitan ideals in the global context is 
challenging. There is an absence of an executive or legitimate sovereign. There 
is a lack of democratic legitimacy as generally seen in the domestic jurisdictions. 
There is no ability to enforce international norms and practices similar to the 
intermediary nation state. There is an absence of an executive or even a 
legitimate sovereign in the global order. Finally, there is a lack of democratic 
legitimacy as generally seen at the local national context.56 Notwithstanding 
these significant hurdles, there are numerous scholars that are pursuing a 
normative research agenda under the moniker of global constitutionalism that 
seek to reform the existing international institutional structures. Those working 
                                            
53 This understanding of cosmopolitanism is based on what Neil Walker deems as “… at least 
four sets of questions, and sets of candidate answers, which a comprehensive cosmopolitan 
vision must embrace”; Neil Walker, “Making a World of Difference? Habermas, Cosmopolitanism 
and the Constitutionalization of International Law” online: (2005) European University Institute 
Working Paper Law 17 at 4< http://ssrn.com/abstract=891036> [Walker, “Making a World of 
Difference”]; Printed as Neil Walker, “Making a World of Difference? Habermas, 
Cosmopolitanism and the Constitutionalization of International Law” in O. Payrow Shabani, ed, 
Multiculturalism and Law: A Critical Debate (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2007) 219.  
54 See Chapter 1, section 1.4. 
55 Lassa Oppenheim, “The Science of International Law: Its Task, Its Method” (1908) 2 AJIL313. 
56 Habermas, Divided West supra note 41 at 171. 
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within this normative research agenda want to mould the existing international 
legal order to secure peace, promote economic development, and human rights.  
 
In order to understand the normative camp, I will examine the prolific scholarship 
of David Held and Jürgen Habermas. These scholars have captured the 
imagination of our contemporary international community through their 
respective innovative research and knowledge production.57 More importantly, 
these two scholars have significantly influenced the development of an 
international legal order through their research by explicitly calling for greater 
reforms of the United Nations. It is for this reason that I engage with their 
scholarship in this section under the heading of the normative claims of global 
constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation.  
3.3.1 David Held and Collective Security 
David Held’s scholarship on global constitutionalism has concentrated on the 
building and strengthening of existing infrastructures to tackle current global 
concerns. In an article titled “Reframing Global Governance: Apocalypse Soon or 
Reform!” he identifies three sets of global problems with which the international 
community must grapple. They are: “concerns with sharing our planet (global 
warming, biodiversity and ecosystem losses, water deficits), sustaining our 
humanity (poverty, conflict prevention, global infectious diseases) and our 
                                            
57 Wiener, “Global Constitutionalism” supra note 28 at 7. 
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concern over our rulebook (nuclear proliferation, toxic waste disposal, intellectual 
property rights, genetic research rules, trade rules, finance and tax rules)”.58  
 
In order to tackle these issues, Held suggests that we move away from the 
Washington Consensus59 based economic policy model to a “wider vision of 
institutions and policy approaches”. 60  This approach is premised on social 
democracy. Held argues that we should strengthen existing institutions and 
foster infrastructure that will deepen our abilities to solve issues of global 
concern. In this regard, he argues for future of collective security through 
regional and international organisations.  
 
In Global Covenant, Held promotes the project of global social democracy as the 
basis for guaranteeing “international law, greater transparency, accountability 
                                            
58 David Held, “Reframing Global Governance: Apocalypse Soon or Reform!” (2006) 11:2 New 
Political Economy 157 at 158 [Held, “Reframing Global Governance”]; David Held, “The 
Changing Face of Global Governance”, (2010) Social Europe Journal online: http://www.social-
europe.eu/2010/01/the-changing-face-of-global-governance-between-past-strategic-failure-and-
future-economic-constraints/ [Held, “Face of Global Governance”]. 
59 David Held defines the Washington Consensus as: “For the last two to three decades, the 
agenda of economic liberalisation and global market integration – or the Washington Consensus 
as it is sometimes called – has been the mantra of many leading economic powers and 
international financial institutions. The thrust of the Washington Consensus was to promote this 
view and to adapt the public domain – local, national and global – to market-leading institutions 
and processes. It thus bears a heavy burden of responsibility for the type of common political 
resistance or unwillingness to address significant areas of market failure, including: The problem 
of externalities, such as the environmental degradation exacerbated by current forms of 
economic growth; The inadequate development of non-market social factors, which alone can 
provide an effective balance between ‘competition’ and ‘cooperation’ and thus ensure an 
adequate supply of essential public goods, such as education, effective transportation and sound 
health; The under-employment or unemployment of productive resources in the context of the 
demonstrable existence of urgent and unmet need; and Global macro-economic imbalances and 
a poor regulatory framework – policies that led to the financial crisis”; Held, “Face of Global 
Governance” supra note 58.   
60 Held, “Reframing Global Governance” supra note 58 at 158. 
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and democracy in global governance […]”.61 Ultimately the long-term goal is to 
bring the various players to the table, even though they may have different 
interests at stake. In the short-term, Held suggests reforming the existing 
international institutions and the creation of specific international non-
governmental organisations. One of Held’s central goals is to ensure that there is 
a new convention that reconnects security and human rights elements through 
unification of the various spheres of international humanitarian law.  
 
This goal in mind, Held calls for the creation of a new global international 
constitutional convention “to explore the rules and mandates of new democratic 
global bodies” along with the creation of other mechanism to regulate tax, water 
and other relevant global issues.62 Moreover, he suggests that there should be 
an expansion of the jurisdictions of the International Court of Justice and the 
International Criminal Court, and calls for the creation of yet another human 
rights court.63 The position Held advocates for is quite straightforward - greater 
development of international law and the creation of additional international 
institutions. Doing so, Held argues, will secure world peace and bring about 
equitable redistribution of wealth and alleviation of poverty.  
 
                                            
61 Held, Global Covenant supra note 41 at 162. 
62 Ibid at 164-165. 
63 Ibid at 164-165. 
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We have already encountered this collective security argument in the context of 
international criminal institutions.64 This argument is analogous to earlier claims 
in favour of further developing international law, especially as it relates to the use 
of the United Nations Security Council’s Chapter VII Charter powers to create the 
ICTY and ICTR. At the end of the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council 
was able to move beyond its limitations created by the power struggle between 
the West and the Communist Block. Subsequently, the Security Council was 
able to use its Charter power to maintain peace and security. This was a shift 
from earlier policies of the Security Council because of the potential threat of the 
veto by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its allies on the Council.  
 
The suggestion to create international institutions as part of the normative 
agenda of global constitutionalism, simply ignores the history of international law 
and its institutions. Within international criminal institutions, we are able to see 
the institutionalisation of Anghie’s dynamic of difference as it relates to the rights 
of the accused and the role of experts in engendering a pro-conviction bias with 
the two ad hoc tribunals. The dynamic of difference captures the means by which 
European colonisers sought to dominate the indigenous population though the  
sovereignty doctrine during the development of international law in the 16th 
century. In particular, the argument is that natural law was extended to the 
indigenous inhabitants as a means to apply western conceptions of law during 
colonial contact. A universal idea of law was composed and made applicable to 
                                            
64 See Chapter 1 section 1.4. 
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indigenous inhabitants.65 Scholars have traced the evolution of the dynamic of 
difference in various fields of international law.66  
 
The ICTY and ICTR are illustrative of this point. In creating the tribunals, the UN 
Security Council granted judges the power to amend the rules of evidence and 
procedure. These powers, with reference to the ICTY may be seen through a 
constitutional lens. The legislative powers of the judges can be conceptualised 
as a moment in delegation of Security Council’s law-making capacity. But 
simultaneously, power to amend the rules of evidence and procedure has lead to 
severe restriction on, and violation of, the rights of the accused.  
 
The ICTY’s mandate is to render justice to the victims and bring the perpetrators 
to justice. Its procedures however are problematic; the judges have opted to 
make changes that would effectively repeal judicial decisions of the appeals 
chamber67, significantly delay the trials68 and admit new evidence on appeal69.  
 
The rights of the accused, even though enshrined in the ICTY Statute, becomes 
a mere formality that can be overlooked given the barbarous nature of the acts 
that that the accused have allegedly committed. This unhappy result, to use 
Justice Pal’s words, takes us back to the way in which international law has 
                                            
65Aimée Craft, "Living Treaties, Breathing Research" (2014) 26 Can. J. Women & L. 1. 
66 Anghie, Imperialism supra note 52 1-18. 
67 See Chapter 1, section 1.4.1.1. 
68 See Chapter 1, section 1.4.1.2. 
69 See Chapter 1, section 1.4.1.3. 
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evolved.70 A particular version of justice is extended as the universal and is 
meted out against those that have committed heinous acts of violence. The irony 
is that, in doing so, the universal extension is incomplete. Rather, these 
perpetrators are prosecuted using western understandings of law (for example 
ICTR), but they are not afforded full trial fairness and due process guarantees as 
promised by the respective Statute and the International Bill of Rights. This 
raises the idea of victor’s justice that has haunted international criminal law from 
its inception.71  
 
Ultimately, Held’s calls to strengthen existing institutional frameworks may be 
legitimate.  His arguments however ignore the on-the-ground realities of 
international institutions and how they function. Held’s position elides the power 
dynamics within international institutions, whether it is United Nations Security 
Council as discussed earlier vis-à-vis ICTY or the ICC.  
 
Drawing from earlier discussions about the politics of prosecution within the 
International Criminal Court, one can see the powerful role of politics in 
prosecuting international war criminals. Take for example the emphasis on 
prosecuting war criminals from the African continent and the resulting criticism.72 
Two Security Council referrals have thus far been made to the ICC. Yet on the 
                                            
70 International Military Tribunal for the Far East, United States et al. v. Araki Sadao et al., 
Dissenting Judgment of Justice Pal (Tokyo: Kokusho-Kankokai, 1999) at 923. 
71 Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni “Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts” (2003) 2:1 Chinese JIL 71at 91. 
72Makau Mutua, “Africa and the International Criminal Court: Closing the impunity gap”, The 
Broker Magazine (December 07, 2010). 
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surface, it seems like the Security Council is unwilling, or unable, to act regarding 
Palestine or Sri Lanka for political reasons. It is clear that once international 
institutions are created, they develop a particular dynamic. We see this unfolding 
within the International Criminal Court, particularly as it relates to regulatory 
capture of prosecutorial policy by special interests groups.73 These dynamics are 
part of the perpetuation of a singular western narrative that is deployed as the 
universal, which can be exemplified through the politics decisions of the ICC. 
These dynamics then significantly affect the manner in which these institutions 
function. Moreover, it affects the ability of these institutions to deliver on their 
proposed mandates.74  
 
There are a number of criticisms emerging from the inner workings of the 
international criminal justice regime as laid out above and by extension 
international institutions broadly. Why then are scholars like Held arguing for 
greater reforms to the United Nations and normative global constitutionalism? 
3.3.2 Jürgen Habermas and Renewed Cosmopolitanism? 
Jürgen Habermas is one the most acclaimed contemporary public intellectuals of 
our time. In The Divided West, Habermas examines the relevance of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism in our modern world with a singular superpower, the United 
                                            
73Galit Sarfaty, “Measuring Justice: Internal Conflict over the World Bank's Empirical Approach to 
Human Rights” in Kamari Clarke & Mark Goodale eds, Mirrors of Justice: Law and Power in the 
Post-Cold War Era (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009) [Sarfaty, “Measuring Justice”]; 
Annelise Riles, “Models and Documents: Notes on Some Artifacts of International Legal 
Knowledge” (1989) 48: 2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 809 [Riles, “Models and 
Documents”]. 
74 Sujith Xavier, “Theorising Global Governance Inside Out: A Response to Professor Ladeur” 
(2013) 3 Transnational Leg Theory 268. 
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States. His argument is premised on the idea that national sovereignty has 
eroded in the current era of globalisation.75 The fast-paced creation of norms and 
their deployment outside the four corners of the nation state precipitates this 
erosion. Habermas accepts the traditional understanding of globalisation 
discussed earlier in the second chapter. Such a state of current affairs as 
Habermas notes has ushered in “horizontal networks of a global society”.76 
Habermas argues that the cosmopolitan project needs to confront the objections 
raised by those who prefer brute power instead of law.  
 
The role of law animates the theatre between these two diverse perspectives: 
“whether law remains appropriate medium for realising the declared goals of 
achieving peace and international security and promoting democracy and human 
rights throughout the world”.77 This formulation therefore raises the following 
question: Can we achieve a solution to the world’s problems through an all-
powerful hegemon78 or through legally established procedures of an inclusive, 
but often weak and selective world organisation?79  
 
In 2005, two years after the invasion of Iraq, Habermas reflected on our global 
order. Citing the failure of the imperial approach, especially the invasion of Iraq, 
Habermas rhetorically asked: “… should we not rather hold steadfastly to the 
                                            
75 Habermas, Divided West supra note 41 at 115. 
76 Ibid at 116. 
77 Ibid at 116. 
78 Habermas, “Interpreting the Fall of a Monument” (2003) 4:7 German LJ701. 
79 Ibid at 116. 
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alternative project of a constitutionalisation of international law […]”?80 In this 
process, he acknowledges the successes and pitfalls of the United Nations 
system in securing peace, protecting and promoting human rights. In 
acknowledging the failures of the UN system, he suggests that globalisation, the 
“dissolution of the national constellation and the transition to a post-national 
constellation” are not challenges to the Kantian project.81 Rather, these factors 
provide a “supportive context for the aspiration of a cosmopolitan condition”.82 
 
Once Habermas has outlined the dangers of an all-powerful hegemon and 
depicted the United States as the contemporary example, he wonders: “[d]oes 
the inefficiency of the United Nations, its selective perception and temporary 
inability to act, provide sufficient reasons to break with the premises of the 
Kantian project?”83 In trying to argue for his modest reforms, Habermas contends 
that the international community can only overcome the ills of our contemporary 
society, such as terrorism, the scourge of war, or military occupation, through 
effective coordination of the different available services and procedures. 
Additionally, this can be achieved through “the combination of social 
modernization with self-critical dialogue between cultures”.84  
 
                                            
80 Ibid at 116. 
81 Ibid at 175.  
82 Ibid at 173. 
83 Ibid at 183 
84 Ibid at 184. 
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Habermas’ contribution to cosmopolitanism and the normative shaping of an 
international legal order is the preservation of a multilevel system in which “the 
main site of transnational norm generation and application is the continent 
regime”.85 Similar to Held, the primary tenet for Habermas’ arguments are that 
nation states, given the nature of globalisation and their lack of power, must use 
existing institutions such as the ICC to resolve potential conflicts.  If this is not 
possible, then states must create new mechanisms through the existing 
institutional frameworks to resolve these issues, such as the two ad hoc 
tribunals. In doing so, Habermas offers an agenda for reform of the United 
Nations that is rooted in modern needs that occupy our international concerns. 
The overarching theme is that state action must be governed by, and through, 
international law. Some scholars have re-characterised this claim as the 
“specification of a modest role for global regulation and the emphasis that this 
should take place within the universal register of law”.86 In making this claim, 
there is recognition of a loose constitutional framework that informs the operation 
of law at the global level. 
 
In their inaugural editorial Global Constitutionalism, the editors identify some of 
the different camps in global constitutionalism that are interested in shaping how 
the global order is constructed by extending the norms and principles of 
constitutionalism beyond the nation state’s borders. Similar to the ideas of Held, 
                                            
85 Walker, “Making a World of Difference” supra note 53 at 7. 
86 Ibid at 7. 
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Habermas, and more recently Jean Cohen 87 , the editors of Global 
Constitutionalism recognise that some scholars want to expand the alleged 
benefits of the domestic constitutional order. These writers do this as a way to 
grapple with global concerns such as poverty and human rights violations. There 
are numerous examples within the current legal discourse on global 
constitutionalism that adopt this normative approach. For certain scholars, a 
constitution is a structure-system that is shared by all societies. 88 They argue 
that the transfer of the constitutional idea to the international area is 
uncontroversial. 89  The constitutional language is often used to describe, 
promote, and capture the fundamental changes occurring within international law 
that everyone can sense but cannot articulate. The European Union and other 
international institutions (World Trade Organisation for example) have 
complicated this process.  
 
Yet there is a long-standing critical tradition operating under Third World 
Approaches to International Law that has sought to challenge the universalism of 
international law. It is now incontestable that the 17th and 18th century 
development of international law is rooted to colonialism and imperialism.90 The 
                                            
87  Jean Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality and Legitimacy and 
Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012); Martti Koskenniemi, “Book 
Review of Jean Cohen's Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality and Legitimacy and 
Constitutionalism (2013) 11:3 Intl J Constitutional L 818. 
88  Fassbender, “The Meaning of International Constitutional Law” supra note 23 at 309. 
89 Ibid at 309. 
90 Makau Mutua, “What is TWAIL?” (2000) 94 American Society Intl L Proceedings  31; Antony 
Anghie, “What is TWAIL: Comment” (2000) 94 Am Soc Int’l Proc 39. 
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traditional public international law literature has sought to omit this connection.91 
A number of international lawyers and international law scholars have argued 
that international law is monolithic in its very nature.92 As demonstrated in the 
first chapter, Anghie has historicised the evolution of sovereignty as part of the 
colonial encounter. 93  Anghie illustrates that the sovereignty doctrine was 
developed as a means to subjugate the savages, the original inhabitants of the 
Americas and the new world. This intervention is an important contribution to the 
current understanding of international law.94 The effects of colonialism and its 
relationship to international law can be deployed directly to challenge the 
orthodox understandings of international law to which Habermas is wedded.  
 
Starting the history of international law with the creation of the current 
international regime beginning in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia is a 
narrative that seeks to universalise the western understanding of international 
law. It seeks to morph the particular into the universal. This characterisation of 
international law ignores indigenous peoples that lived in the colonised spaces 
prior to first contact.95 I raise this critique to illuminate the somewhat simple 
assertions that normative global constitutionalism, and Habermas in particular, 
                                            
91James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2012) at 16; Malcolm Shaw, International Law, 4th edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997). 
92Obiora C. Okafor, “Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, 
Methodology, or Both?” (2010) 10 Intl Community L Rev37; James Gathii, “TWAIL: A Brief 
History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography” (2011) 3(1) Trade, 
L & Development 26. 
93 Anghie, Imperialism supra note 52. 
94 Ibid at 37. 
95 Ibid at 13-31. 
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rely upon. While the scholars working in the normative camp are pursuing an 
interesting project, the innocent assumptions that they rely upon remain 
problematic. In both Held and Habermas’ assertions, the existing international 
infrastructure of international institutions can be called on to deal with 
international problems. Drawing from the empirical evidence that I presented 
earlier, this is a difficult task to complete.  
 
The three case studies of the ICTY, the ICTR and the International Criminal 
Court reveal that the dynamic of difference is buried deep within their respective 
structures. The dynamic of difference creates a gap between two cultures by 
deeming one as uncivilised and barbaric, the other as civilised, and developing 
techniques to transcend the difference. With the ICTY and the ICTR, the 
amendments by the judges to the rules of evidence procedure caused significant 
effects on the rights of the accused. The denial of fair trial rights to the accused 
illustrates the manner in which the dynamic of difference operates within the 
tribunals. The accused are deemed barbaric and guilty of the alleged crimes, 
indicating that they are not worthy of having their guaranteed rights protected. 
Moreover, this type of practice is indicative of a pro-conviction bias where the 
judges and other officials are convinced that the allegations against the accused 
are true. There is therefore no need to have the respective fair trial rights 
protected. Even though the international community sought to prosecute the 
perpetrators of mass violence in these respective regions, what has transpired, 
especially through the actions of those in charge of these institutions is to 
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perpetuate a form of victor’s justice that Justice Pal was concerned about within 
the Tokyo Tribunal in 1946.  
 
A critical look at the ICC reveals the dynamic of difference as evidence by the 
court’s selective prosecution of certain individuals over others as well. The Court 
has decided to prosecute Saif al-Arab Gaddafi but it has not decided to 
prosecute alleged war criminals from the global North or allies of the West. When 
the prosecutorial policy of the ICC is examined, it becomes apparent that politics 
determines the selectivity of cases to be placed on the Court’s docket.  
 
In this context, the ideals encapsulated within the worthwhile claims of both Held 
and Habermas to reform the international system are illusory because of the 
manner in which the dynamic of difference operates. Global governance reforms 
simply do not take into account the history of international law. More importantly, 
the calls for more law (and institutions) through reform at the international level 
simply ignore the legacies of colonialism and imperialism on international law. 
The dynamic of difference, as it operates within the international criminal justice 
regime and more broadly within the international institutions, is an illustration of 
the challenges of normative global constitutionalism. If constitutionalism is to be 
a worthwhile project on a global scale, then it must confront the continuing 
historical effects of imperialism and colonialism on international law and its 
institutions. 
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3.4 Context Based Descriptive Global Constitutionalism and Global 
Constitutionalisation 
In this section, I will canvas the different arguments put forward by scholars 
relying on a contextual understanding of international law and its institutions as 
an illustration of global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation.96 This 
strand of the literature describes itself as the functional camp. The authors 
gathered under the umbrella of functional camp study the “processes of 
constitutionalisation, which are revealed through bargaining and negotiations in 
the environment of international organisations such as the WTO and the EU”.97 I 
have reformulated this characterisation as context-based and descriptive global 
constitutionalism to include authors writing about global constitutionalism from 
diverse institutional perspectives that align with this type of analysis. A contextual 
understanding is descriptive of the manner in which international institutions 
originated, how they function, and what they accomplish. Scholarship relied upon 
in this section is concerned with the descriptive, rather than prescriptive, 
accounts of reforming the international system or creating new institutions (as 
discussed in the previous section). The descriptive accounts thus seek to identify 
existing structures exemplifying global constitutionalism. Scholars writing in this 
genre of global constitutionalism do this as a way to demonstrate the existence 
of the international order. There is an increase in this particular genre of global 
                                            
96 Wiener, “Global Constitutionalism” supra note 28 at 7. 
97 Ibid at 7;For a critique of this tendency to focus on the WTO and EU, see Ruth Buchanan, 
“Legitimating Global Trade Governance: Constitutional and Legal Pluralist Approaches” (2006) 
57:4 N Ir Leg Q 654 at 662 [Buchanan, “Legitimating Global Trade”]. 
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constitutionalism scholarship.98  Scholars operating under this framework are 
“interested in examining the extent to which law-making authority is granted (or 
denied) to a centralized authority as the distinguishing feature of international 
constitutionalization”.99  
 
In this section, I will examine three different perspectives through the scholarship 
of the following authors in three groups: Ronald St. John Macdonald and 
Douglas M. Johnston; Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman; and Jan Klabbers, 
Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein. I will first explore their various perspectives and 
then I will use the evidence that I have gathered in the first chapter to challenge 
these perspectives. The diverse perspectives offered in this camp are 
representative of this line of argumentation in global constitutionalism, making 
these authors an ideal selection for this dissertation. 
 
3.4.1 Macdonald and Johnston & Towards World Constitutionalism 
The first pair of scholars that fit into the descriptive camp is Ronald St. John 
Macdonald and Douglas M. Johnston. While these two scholars were prolific in 
their own right, together they pushed for a greater cosmopolitan agenda of 
                                            
98 For a recent description of the three camps, see Christine Bell, “What We Talk About When 
We talk About International Constitutional Law” (2014) 5:2 Transnational Leg Theory 241 at 244; 
Erika De Wet, “The Constitutionalization of Public International Law” in Michel Rosenfeld & 
Andras Sajo, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
99 Wiener, “Global Constitutionalism” supra note 28 at 8. 
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international law. 100  Macdonald and Johnston identified diverse but often 
overlapping models of international law that seek to address plural values in their 
collection of essays Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the Legal 
Ordering of the World Community.101 Their central aim in this edited volume with 
over thirty contributors is to challenge the assertions by American officials that 
international law is not binding, especially as it relates to the ICC and 
international environmental initiatives.102  
 
What they coin as world constitutionalism emerges out of various western 
cultural modes of civic idealisation. 103  For these scholars gathered in this 
volume, the rule of law ideology, the concept of the Rechtsstaat, American and 
Dutch experiments with federalism and western Bill of Rights traditions, have all 
contributed to the imagination of the international order through a constitutional 
lens. Constitutionalism therefore is derived from the domestic theories of a nation 
state as a means to unscramble the legitimacy problem illustrated in the global 
order.  
                                            
100 Craig Scott, "Ronald St. John Macdonald and International Legal Education" (2002) 4:4 Intl 
Law Forum Du Droit Intl 215 at 215 footnote 3. 
101 Ronald St. John Macdonald & D. M. Johnston, “Foreword” in Ronald St. John Macdonald & D. 
M. Johnston, eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the Legal Ordering of the World 
Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005) at xvi: They suggest the following possible models: 
state autonomy; world constitutionalism; civic benevolence; fairness; order; regulation; war 
prevention and management; peaceful conflict resolution; national development; environmental 
protection; cooperation and convergence of legal systems. 
102 Christian Tomuschat, “Multilateralism in the Age of US Hegemony” in Ronald St. John 
Macdonald & D. M. Johnston eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the Legal 
Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005) at 53-57; Carla M. Zoethout, 
"Book Review Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World 
Community. Compiled and edited by Ronald St. John Macdonald and Douglas M. Johnston” 
online: (2007) Global Law Books < 
http://www.globallawbooks.org/reviews/archive.asp?order=author&index=M> 
103 Johnston, “World Constitutionalism in Theory” supra note 22 at 16. 
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Macdonald and Johnston subsequently argue that constitutionalism has 
numerous essential components. To them, these components can be 
transplanted to the international sphere to reconcile the lack of legitimacy and 
legality in the international space. 104  They identify various examples that 
evidence the presence of a constitutional order. These include the United 
Nations Charter, the difficulty in amending the United Nations Charter, and the 
fundamental human rights guarantees found in the International Bill of Rights.105 
Moreover, they cite to clearly visible trends towards the move to constitutionalism 
in contemporary international law. They illustrate their point through the following 
empirical examples: the codification of international human rights law, the recent 
crystallisation of international criminal law and its respective institutions, the 
recent trends within the World Trade Organisation, and international trade law.106 
In this instance, Macdonald and Johnston are scanning the existing international 
institutional infrastructure produced through international law to argue that 
constitutionalism is a possibility within the global order. Johnston, in his essay in 
the same volume suggests that “such a project, to be useful, must be shared 
across all regions, so that allegations of cultural bias in the field of international 
                                            
104 These can be summarized through the following: fundamental law; a difficult amendment 
procedure; the ‘constitution must include living law’; it must be rooted in the sovereignty of the 
people; originates from a primordial social contract; bill of rights that guarantee fundamental 
rights; separation of powers; judicial invalidation of ordinary law; HR thorough common law; and 
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22  at 17. 
105 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp.  
No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948); International Convention of Civil and Political Rights, 19 
December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); International Convention 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 3 January 1976, 999 U.N.T.S 3. 
106 Johnston, “World Constitutionalism in Theory” supra note 22 at 19. 
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law can be confronted. The goals of legal uniformity and universality may have to 
be reconciled with the value of cultural diversity”.107 
 
In this descriptive account of global constitutionalism, Macdonald and Johnston 
are much more concerned with the ways in which international institutions are 
created. Rather than focusing on the internal dynamics of these institutions or 
the politics involved in their creation, they focus on the overall presence of these 
institutions. These scholars agree with the assertion that the creation of the two 
ad hoc tribunals by the United Nations Security Council is a constitutional 
moment.108 The manner in which the Security Council deployed its Chapter VII 
powers to maintain peace and security is a good example of the United Nations 
Charter being deployed for constitutional reasons.  
 
Even the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has waded into this debate. In Tadić, the 
Appeals Camber suggests the following: 
 
“It is clearly impossible to classify the organs of the United Nations 
into the above-discussed divisions which exist in the national law of 
States. Indeed, Appellant has agreed that the constitutional 
structure of the United Nations does not follow the division of 
powers often found in national constitutions. Consequently the 
separation of powers element of the requirement that a tribunal be 
"established by law" finds no application in an international law 
setting. The aforementioned principle can only impose an obligation 
on States concerning the functioning of their own national 
systems”.109 
                                            
107 Ibid at 27. 
108 Marschik, “Legislative powers of SC” supra note 4 at 461-472. 
109 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić (Judgment in Sentencing Appeals), IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-A. 
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The decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber may give some jurisprudential 
weight  to the claim that constitutionalisation at the global level need not mimic a 
particular domestic model of constitutionalisation. Rather, Tadić, one of the first 
decisions of the ICTY supports the idea that there is plurality in how 
constitutionalisation may occur.  
 
But based on the empirical evidence that I examined from the ICTY, ICTR and 
ICC, this is simply not the case. Empirical scholarship suggests that international 
institutions have particular internal dynamics. 110  These dynamics have a 
significant effect on the manner in which international criminal institutions 
function and whether they are able to deliver upon their promises. 111  The 
empirical data from both the ICTY and the ICTR suggests that the changes to 
the rules of evidence and procedure have significantly curtailed the rights of the 
accused.  
 
Focusing on witness testimony, the ICTR has struggled with cultural competence 
within the adjudicatory process. The questions that scholars like Nancy Combs 
raise is how to grapple with the local witness that has a different culture than the 
experts and officials of the tribunals.112 The ICTR witnesses rely on cultural 
                                            
110 Sarfaty, “Measuring Justice” supra note 73; Riles, “Models and Documents” supra note 73. 
111Ibid; Sujith Xavier, “Theorising Global Governance Inside Out: A Response to Professor 
Ladeur” (2013) 3 Transnational Leg Theory 268. 
112 Nancy A. Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of 
International Criminal Convictions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 222 
[Combs, Fact-Finding without Facts]. 
 180 
practices to identify events. They recount their narratives of who did what to 
whom based on their understandings of the seasons (which helps them identify 
the time of the year). Combs’ account thus suggests that the ICTR based its 
findings on highly suspect witness testimony. These faulty witness testimonies 
however have a direct effect on the rights of the accused, which is protected in 
the ICTR Statute.  
 
To make the claim that there is constitutionalisation of international criminal law 
by pointing to the manner in which these ad hoc tribunals were created is simply 
insufficient. This type of claim only signals to legal texts rather than how these 
laws-on-the-books are deployed within international institutions. Surely theorising 
global constitutionalism must go beyond just describing the existing legislative 
frameworks and must take into account how international institutions function. In 
doing so, one has to take stock of the various practices of these institutions to 
actually ascertain whether constitutionalisation is possible and is present.  
 
3.4.2 Dunoff and Trachtman & Ruling the World through 
Constitutionalism? 
Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman’s Ruling the World; Constitutionalism, 
International Law, and Global Governance is a collection of essays that can be 
grouped within the descriptive global constitutionalism camp. 113  Dunoff and 
                                            
113 Wiener, “Global Constitutionalism” supra note 28 at 7; Christine Bell, “What We Talk About 
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Trachtman portray international law as developing in regional and functional 
pockets within a highly “decentralized and non-hierarchical system”. 114 
Constitutional coordination therefore is “both necessary and problematic”.115 
They argue that global constitutionalism can harmonise and coordinate the 
various components of the international legal system. For Dunoff and Trachtman, 
constitutionalised systems authorise the exercise of power. Furthermore, such a 
system ensures that the exercise of power does not go institutionally unchecked 
and unbalanced.116 Legal orders may “exhibit various constitutional mechanisms 
in various degrees”, and constitutionalisation therefore “is a process”.117 From 
their perspective, global constitutionalism is the natural extension of 
constitutional thinking from the domestic to the world order. They are using their 
own experience in the field of international trade law to facilitate such a claim.  
Their assertion is premised upon ideas, convictions, and commitments, as much 
as on politics and legal doctrines.  
 
Dunoff and Trachtman, and some of the contributors to their volume adopt a 
functional (or as I suggest context based descriptive) approach to international 
constitutionalism. They argue that such an approach sidesteps issues of 
definition. The issue of definition is what drives most of the writing on 
                                                                                                                                 
at 244; David Kennedy for example challenges some of the assertions of Dunoff and Trachtman; 
David Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds, 
Ruling the World; Constitutionalism, international law, and Global Governance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 37 at 40-41 [Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance”]. 
114 Dunoff & Trachtman, “Functional Approach” supra note 1 at 30. 
115 Ibid  at 30. 
116 Ibid at 18. 
117Ibid. 
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international constitutionalism. Their’s is a checklist approach, similar to that of 
Macdonald and Johnston, which prevents engagement with the substantive 
aspects of contemporary developments in the international sphere, materially 
spurred on by the process of globalisation and the specialisation of international 
law. Their claim is predicated on the “type” based classification, “rather than a 
quantum of rules”.118  
 
The distinguishing feature of global constitutionalism for Dunoff and Trachtman is 
“the extent to which law-making authority is granted (or denied) to a centralized 
authority”.119 They suggest that constitutionalism has three important functional 
roles: enabling the formation of international law; constraining the formation of 
international law, and filling in the gaps in domestic law.120 These three functions 
are implemented through seven mechanisms that are commonly associated with 
constitutionalisation.121 These mechanisms are utilised to enable, constrain, or 
supplement constitutionalisation. Simultaneously, Dunoff and Trachtman are 
cognisant of multiple institutional structures. They take account of these 
institutional structures by being consistent with notions of constitutional pluralism. 
I will examine global constitutional pluralism in the following section.122  
 
                                            
118Ibid at 9. 
119Ibid. 
120Ibid at 11. 
121  These are: horizontal allocation of authority; vertical allocation of authority; supremacy; 
stability; fundamental rights; review; and accountability or democracy; Ibid at 13. 
122 See below for a broader discussion of constitutional pluralism; Walker, “Constitutionalism and 
Pluralism” supra note 17 at 17-38. 
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By focusing on the law-making power of international institutions, analogous to 
Macdonald and Johnston, Dunoff and Trachtman do not take account of the 
manner in which these institutions function or the history of international law and 
its institutions. The focus on the law-making capacity of an institution does not 
increase the legitimacy of the regime; rather this type of focus seeks to impose 
constitutionalism through the act of law-making. The law-making capacity of an 
institution is representative of a partial story of constitutionalism. To use the 
examples from the three case studies presented in the first chapter, the reliance 
on the law-making authority of an international criminal institutions (for example 
the powers of the judges or the discretionary power of the ICC prosecutor) would 
demonstrate the success story of international criminal justice in curbing impunity 
as a form of constitutionalism. In adopting such a perspective, global 
constitutionalisation would be a possibility because the United Nations Security 
Council, prompted by the mass human rights violations, had the power to create 
the two ad hoc tribunals or make referrals to the ICC.  
 
But the reality is that these institutions have significant problems in how they 
operate. Focusing on the ICTR and its pro-conviction biases substantiates David 
Kennedy’s argument in Dunoff and Trachtman’s volume that global 
constitutionalism, as a theory of global governance is a mystery.123 Even though 
the Security Council guaranteed the rights of the accused in the enabling Statute 
of the ICTR (and the ICTY), the changes to the rules does not adhere to this 
                                            
123 Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance” supra note113. 
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concretisation. Focusing on the witness testimony, the judges, and the ICTR as a 
whole have adopted western legal traditions as their modus operandi. Thus, by 
using the western adjudicatory form, “international criminal proceedings cloak 
themselves in the form’s garb of fact-finding competence, but it is only a cloak, 
for many of the key assumptions that underlie the western trial form do not exist 
in the international context”.124 Imagining a constitutional order based on formal 
structures of international institutions simply ignores the realties on-the-ground. 
Moreover this type of scholarship reifies a rudimentary understanding of 
international law that perpetuates the dynamic of difference by continuing the 
embedded universalism symptomatic in this area of law. 
 
3.4.3 Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein: Eurocentric 
Constitutionalism? 
The third set of writers, Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein, offers 
another descriptive account. These scholars are motivated by the European 
Court of Justice’s jurisprudence and the possibility of judicially reviewing United 
Nations Security Council resolutions. 125  They suggest that the process of 
constitutionalisation is a reality and thus provide an account of the “invisible 
constitution of the international community” by taking the idea of 
“constitutionalism and running with it”.126 More precisely, they unveil how one 
                                            
124 Combs, Fact-Finding without Facts supra note 112 at 179. 
125 Jan Klabbers, “Setting the Scene” in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein eds, The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 1 at 2 
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126 Ibid at 4. 
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could reasonably think about the various elements of a global constitutional order 
and articulate “our constitutional instincts”.127  
 
For Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein, constitutionalism is a “philosophy of striving 
towards some form of political legitimacy”.128 This legitimacy is representative of 
a constitution. However, they are unclear about what they mean by political 
legitimacy.129  
 
Klabbers, Peters, and Ulfstein are certain that a top-down constitutional process 
is not a possibility at the international level. Moreover, existing international 
treaties cannot be nominated as constitutional documents.130 Their discussions 
have focused on specific regimes, such as the European Union and the resulting 
possible constitutionalisation. Unlike the above-mentioned scholars in descriptive 
global constitutionalism camp, they argue that these attempts to focus on these 
regimes cannot be transferred to the global context.  
 
Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein point to the existence of “a bric-a-brac of 
decisions” taken by actors in a position of authority, responding to the exigencies 
of the moment, almost by default.131 This type of decision-making is more likely 
to occur at the global level. They contend that, given the unlikely success of all 
                                            
127 Ibid at 5. 
128 Ibid at 10. 
129 Ibid at 37-43. 
130Ibid at 24. 
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other possibilities, global constitutionalism has to make use of other more limited 
techniques. These techniques are: subsidiarity, margin of appreciation, and 
proportionality.132 These techniques are essential components of the European 
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice jurisprudence. The 
European Court of Human Rights monitors the implementation of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. It was created through the Council of Europe.  
European Court of Justice on the other hand monitors the implementation of the 
European Union Treaty. 
 
Ultimately, their suggestion is to rely on the existing European principles and 
norms within the current global order as illustrations and mechanisms of global 
constitutionalism. Nonetheless, their descriptive account, while the most 
compelling of the three groups of writers in this section for its specificity, ignores 
the significant history of international law and its institutions. For example, the 
three techniques they employ are part of the doctrines developed and employed 
by the European Union’s Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
Rights. Even though some of the doctrines have migrated to other juridical 
milieus,133 their arguments are Eurocentric. As illustrated in the arguments made 
by Macdonald and Johnston and Dunoff and Trachtman examined earlier, there 
is a denial of the specificity of these doctrines to Europe. What is even more 
troubling is that there is an attempt to transplant the experience from Europe to 
                                            
132 Ibid at 31. 
133Amaya Alvez Marin, “Proportionality Analysis as an ‘Analytical Matrix’ Adopted by the Supreme 
Court of Mexico” online: (2009) CLPE Research Paper No. 46/2009 < 
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the global through these principles. They simply rely on the European regulatory 
framework and the ensuing principles as demonstrating the required evidence to 
buttress their claims of global constitutionalism. The focus on the European 
experience thus reifies a specific understanding of the constitutional order and its 
possibilities. These authors do not at all understand the politics of international 
institutions and they are seemingly intent on pushing for universalism of 
constitutionalism based on western ideals. They could have explored for 
example the Inter-American Court for Human Rights and its use of 
proportionality. They could have also focused on the emerging body of literature 
that hones in constitutionalism’s promises and pitfalls in the global South as 
potential lessons about constitutional theory.134  
 
In this section, each of these different descriptive global constitutional 
perspectives have sought to similarly describe the contemporary global 
governance institutions as mimicking constitutional type behaviour in order to 
harness the potential power of constitutionalism. It must be noted that describing 
the current international order is, in itself, a normative project. Each of these 
scholars, by selecting their respective examples are making choices about what 
to include and exclude in their analysis. They are trying to demonstrate how our 
current international institutions are functioning, either explicitly or implicitly, by 
using the constitutional features. In doing so, they are attempting to embed 
notions of legitimacy that are ushered in by constitutional frameworks and the 
                                            
134 Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, “Introduction” in Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, ed, Constitutionalism of 
the Global South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) [Bonilla, “Introduction”]. 
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language of constitutionalism, whether it is through the formalism of a 
constitution or checks and balances found in systems with unwritten 
constitutions. In doing so, there is “some kind of magic” involved in making 
appear what is not really there.135  
3.5 Global Constitutional Pluralism 
Some of the most contested claims and arguments of global constitutionalism 
are housed within the constitutional pluralist camp.136 The literature is concerned 
with both descriptive and normative elements found in the above-discussed 
camps of global constitutionalism. 137  Its origins can be traced back to the 
European context. Some of its proponents use the European Union and the 
World Trade Organisation as their unique paradigm. 138  
 
The term constitutional pluralism originates from the writings of Neil MacCormick. 
In his reaction to the European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence, MacCormick 
suggests that the “most appropriate analysis of the relations of the legal systems 
is pluralistic rather than monistic, and interactive rather than hierarchical”.139 
                                            
135 Susan Marks, “Naming Global Administrative Law” (2005) 37 NYUJ Intl L & Pol 995 at 995. 
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MacCormick’s analysis is precipitated by the mutual recognition necessitated 
between the European Union and its member states. The interaction between 
these frontiers is based on an old problem that was presented through legal 
pluralism140 and constitutional conflicts.141  
 
Constitutional pluralism is closely connected to legal pluralism, which can be 
traced back to the early 19th and 20th century.142 In the late 20th century, legal 
anthropologists set out to document how multiple legal spaces co-existed and 
how ‘semi-autonomous’ fields of norms (whether formal or informal) influenced 
one another other. Sally Falk More traced the manner in which external law and 
internal norms structure, and influence group behaviour. 143  The central 
contention is that there are multiple norm producers and normative orders that 
regulate human conduct in multiple registers. Formal law is thus subject to, and 
contingent upon, the informal norms of particular communities. These informal 
norms, therefore, have a greater organising effect on the formal structure of law.  
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Constitutional pluralism however is distinct from legal pluralism. Constitutional 
pluralism explores current normative orders with constitutional characteristics. 
Constitutional pluralism “recognises that the European order inaugurated by the 
Treaty of Rome has developed beyond the traditional confines of international 
law and now makes its own independent constitutional claims, and that these 
claims exist alongside the continuing claims of states”. 144  The relationship 
between these normative orders is “now horizontal rather than vertical - 
heterarchical rather than hierarchical”. 145  Constitutional pluralism’s focus on 
Europe has continued over the recent years.146 The recent Greek debt crisis, and 
other global events, will provide an impetus for discussions of constitutional 
pluralism as part of global constitutionalism.147  Other world events will also 
continue to foster discussions about the manner in which constitutional pluralism 
may be deployed as part of the discussions of global constitutionalism.148 Ruth 
Buchanan has suggested that even though constitutionalisation debates about 
the WTO may be large, there is a sense of naivety to such claims. 149 In what 
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follows, I will set out the various claims housed under the banner of constitutional 
pluralism. I will focus primarily on the writings of Neil Walker, one of the main 
proponents of constitutional pluralism.150 
 
3.5.1 Neil Walker and Constitutionalism as Doctrine, 
Constitutionalism as Imagination   
The central features of constitutional pluralism can be divided into two parts: the 
normative and the empirical. The latter is concerned with describing the 
“competing claims of ultimate political and legal authority raised in the names of 
different political communities”.151 Zoran Oklopcic suggests that these empirical 
claims can exist at multiple jurisdictional registers, ranging from marginalised 
demands for political authority by particular minority communities in a ‘fragile 
state’152 to cooperative constitutional arrangements, such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement and the European Union. 153  From this perspective, 
constitutional pluralism is both legal and political. It “exists in different gradients”, 
which only in extreme cases conform to everybody’s entrenched juridical 
understanding of a constitutional reality.154 On the other hand, the normative 
                                                                                                                                 
itself as a collection of equal sovereigns is no longer able to hold in place the hegemonic 
narrative of the divide between law and politics in the transnational, and, hence, justify the broad 
scope of its operation as an exclusively "legal" institution. Debates over the "constitutionalization" 
of the WTO stem from these concerns about the "crisis of legitimacy" and, ironically, as such 
debates have gained momentum, the imagined potential reach of the institution has broadened 
correspondingly”. 
150 Wiener, “Global Constitutionalism” supra note 28 at 8. 
151 Oklopcic, “Provincializing” supra note 45. 
152 Mark Massoud, Law's Fragile State: Colonial, Authoritarian, and Humanitarian Legacies in 
Sudan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
153 Oklopcic, “Provincializing” supra note 45. at 203.  
154 Ibid at 203. 
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perspective affirms and demands commitments to political pluralism. 155 
Oklopcic’s description harkens back to the earlier definitions of constitutional 
pluralism.156  
 
Neil Walker, one of the pioneers of constitutional pluralism writes:  
 
Conceptually, it is argued that in order to capture the full range of 
the 'constitutional experience' and imagine the full range of 
constitutional possibilities within the new plural order, 
constitutionalism and constitutionalisation should be conceived of 
not in black-and-white, all-or-nothing terms but as questions of 
nuance and gradation. There is no unitary template in terms of 
which constitutional status is either achieved or not achieved, but 
rather a set of loosely and variously coupled factors which serve 
both as criteria in terms of which forms of constitutionalism can be 
distinguished and as indices in terms of which modes and degrees 
of constitutionalisation can be identified and measured.  
 
In structural terms, it is argued that in order to appreciate the 
practical significance of the various constitutional phenomena 
identified through the application of these abstract criteria, we must 
assess the variable position of the different types of polity or political 
process with which these phenomena are linked within the global 
configuration of authority, and also examine the relationship 
between these polities or political processes. That is to say, as 
already intimated, constitutionalism in a plural order is necessarily 
conceived of not only as a property of polities and political 
processes but as a medium through which they interconnect - as a 
structural characteristic of the relationship between certain types of 
political authority or claims to authority situated at different sites or 
in different processes as well as an internal characteristic of these 
authoritative claims.157 
 
                                            
155 Ibid at 203. 
156 Walker, “Idea of Constitutional Pluralism” supra note 144. 
157 Ibid at 340. 
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Martin Loughlin is critical of constitutional pluralism. He notes that the 
constitutional pluralist faction can be viewed as a sect and their claims can be 
summarised in three iterations. 158  First, for the constitutional pluralists, the 
foundation of political authority is rooted in a constitution; second within a 
supranational space, the political authority is autonomously constituted as 
highlighted by Walker’s claims above; and therefore “the issue of ultimate 
authority is either left open (radical pluralism) or is re-integrated in a universal 
order of constitutional principles (pluralism under international law)”.159 
 
In light of the push back from public lawyers, 160  legal pluralists, 161  and 
international lawyers,162 constitutional pluralists have retreated to the confines of 
some basic elements in the descriptive and normative camps identified earlier. 
Walker proposes to re-imagine constitutional pluralism in light of the heavy 
criticisms. He argues that constitutional pluralists are beholden to two central but 
different ideas: constitutionalism and pluralism.163  
 
Constitutionalism is premised on the notion that a legal code provides the 
necessary legitimation, while pluralism respects political diversity. The 
constitutional pluralists account is a reaction to the “post-Westphalian age where 
globalising economic, cultural communicative, political and legal influences have 
                                            
158 Loughlin, “Oxymoron” supra note 139 at 22. 
159 Ibid at 22. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Nico Kirsch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010) at 69-103; Buchanan, “Legitimating Global Trade” supra note 97. 
162 Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance” supra note 113. 
163 Walker, “Constitutionalism and Pluralism” supra note 17 at 18. 
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both spread and diluted public power”.164 Constitutional pluralists recognise the 
fast-paced expansion in human interactions on a global scale through the 
process of globalisation. They take stock of the developments by appreciating 
constitutional and political pluralism. This type of argumentation builds on from 
James Tully’s important suggestion that constitutionalism must be located in a 
historical context.165 Tully suggests that there are important interconnections 
between imperialism, colonialism and constitutionalism.166  For Tully, modern 
constitutionalism is about the strange multiplicity of our postmodern world and 
the possibilities of democratising our constitutional imaginations.167 Moreover, 
Tully argues that constitutionalism is deeply imbricated in colonialism and 
imperialism. He suggests that modern arrangements of constituent powers and 
constitutional forms (constitutional democracies) cannot be understood through 
the histories of western states. Rather, modern constitutionalism should be “set 
in the broader imperial context of state formation”.168   
 
For constitutional pluralist, and developing Tully’s cortical insights to some 
extent, it is impossible to be satisfied with the unitary conception of 
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constitutionalism. They want to harness the opportunity presented by the post-
Westphalian moment. Walker suggests: “constitutional pluralist, in short, seeks 
to make a virtue out of necessity”.169 
 
The constitutional pluralist claims are not without criticisms, especially with 
reference to global order beyond the European context. Walker identifies three 
criticisms in his attempt to reimagine constitutional pluralism. The first criticism 
has focused on the monist “singularity” that is produced through the language of 
constitutions, constitutionalism, and constitutionalisation. The second focuses on 
the idea that constitutional pluralism, given its allegiance to various forms of 
political authority, is “nothing more than constitutional plurality”.170  The third 
focuses on the fallout from the first two. If we want to avoid the unified 
constitutional order, or the fragmented self-contained regimes produced by 
globalisation, then we should avoid the language of constitutions and its 
anachronistic usage.171  
 
From these critical insights, Walker argues the following: “there remain today 
good arguments for pursuing the project of adapting the language and mind-set 
of constitutionalism to meet the pluralist imperatives of broader global 
conditions”.172 For Walker, if constitutionalism is to offer us anything under the 
                                            
169 Walker, “Constitutionalism and Pluralism” supra note 17 at 18. 
170 Ibid  at 19. 
171 Nico Kirsch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: 
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current conditions of globalisation, then we must adjust our lens and approach 
the constitutional predicament through a different perspective.173 The impetus to 
adjust our lenses is born out of the experience in unifying Europe through the 
European Union.174 Therefore he suggests that we consider constitutionalism as 
a doctrine, and constitutionalism as imagination. 
 
Constitutionalism, as doctrine, is conceptualised as a toolbox of mobile 
resources. It is a “thin and footloose structure and stylisation of norms used to 
qualify and dignify the emergent site of new global regulatory structure of 
authority without being constitutive of these sites in the thick manner redolent of 
the nation state”.175 Constitutionalism becomes a “matter of detail” forming a 
body of principles and norms that can help guide new governance mechanisms. 
Principles such as fundamental rights, separation of powers, due process and 
natural justice are emblematic of the tools within the constitutional toolbox that 
are at the disposal of new governance mechanisms.  
 
Constitutionalism as imagination follows on from constitutionalism as doctrine. 
Here it is meant to provide a point of departure. It is about the potential to 
imagine a future world based on liberal conceptions of rights, equality and 
freedom. Constitutionalism as doctrine attempts to use the existing tools of 
                                            
173 Ibid. 
174 Neil Walker “Post-Constituent Constitutionalism? The Case of the European Union” in Martin 
Loughlin and Neil Walker, ed, The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 247. 
175Walker, “Constitutionalism and Pluralism” supra note 17 at 32.  
 197 
constitutionalism in a post-Westphalian world while constitutionalism as 
imagination should serve as a reminder of what “should underscore and inform 
our puzzles of governance in state or state-like holistic settings and non-holistic 
settings alike”.176 In Walker’s assessment, constitutional pluralism as doctrine 
and imagination houses both the normative and the descriptive elements of 
global constitutionalism, which then circles back to the scholars that I examined 
in the earlier sections. 
 
International criminal institutions serve to illustrate both normative and 
descriptive account of constitutionalism. First, international criminal institutions 
may demonstrate the existence of a global order that seeks to punish those that 
have committed international crimes as defined by the international community. 
International criminal law and its respective institutions pierce the veil of impunity 
by prosecuting public officials. Simultaneously, the history of international 
criminal institutions is such that it demonstrates how arguments to shape the 
world order and create a better world have significant purchase. For example, 
the International Criminal Court was a dream of international lawyers and 
international human rights activists prior to 1989; an era in which the Cold War 
between the two superpowers determined when and how international 
institutions would function. 
 
                                            
176 Ibid at 32. 
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While the attempts to map the existing international structure as moments in 
constitutionalism are commendable, grafting international law’s realities onto 
ideas of constitutionalism (whether as doctrine or imagination) simply ignore a 
central and pressing concern: the internal dynamic of each international 
institution and very history of international law. 177  While scholars like Tully 
recognise the dangers of relying on western histories of constitutional formation 
and state formation, there is no recognition of international law and its 
institutions’ role in colonialism and imperialism and its continued effects within 
the expositions of constitutional pluralism. What global constitutionalists, in 
particular constitutional pluralists, ignore can be characterised as a central 
contradiction embedded in domestic liberal constitutions, constitutionalism, and 
constitutionalisation. This was the subject of great debate as it relates to liberal 
legalism.178  
 
On the one hand, those pointing to constitutional pluralism refer to the manner in 
which international criminal institutions serve to prosecute grave injustices and in 
the context of genocide, often referred to as the scourge of humanity. The 
international community’s decisions to prosecute the commission of evil acts 
serve as an illustration of limiting government’s power and protecting the 
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fundamental rights of the victims, survivors and the international community. On 
the other hand, arguments for constitutional pluralism, both 
normative/imagination and descriptive/doctrine, simply gloss over the biased 
selectivity of cases by the ICC for example. Moreover constitutional pluralists 
ignore violations of fundamental rights of the accused and the legislative powers 
bestowed upon international judges, reticent of the way in which 
constitutionalism in its original form in the national experience obscured law’s 
role in maintaining societal conflicts.  
 
David Kairys has suggested that a realistic approach to the law (and 
constitutionalism) is needed.179 Such an approach is one where the operation of 
the law and its “social role must acknowledge the fundamental conflicts in 
society; the class, race and sex basis of these conflicts; and the dominance of an 
ideology that is not natural, scientifically determined or objective”.180 Returning to 
the manner in which international law has evolved and paying close attention to 
the dynamic of difference theorised by Anghie and other TWAIL scholars, 
constitutional pluralism and constitutional pluralists like Walker simply rely on 
constitutional doctrines as a means to see through the cloudy international 
space.  
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But this international space, as demonstrated in the earlier discussions is 
plagued by inequities that have become imbedded in the very structure of 
international law and its institutions. My argument is that international law, from 
its inception, was created as a means to regulate the encounter between the 
Europeans and the local inhabitants of the new colonies. Vitoria’s articulation of 
sovereignty is a good illustration of this point.  As it has evolved over the years, 
international law’s foundational nature has not been severed from its colonial 
past. Rather, scholars working under the moniker of TWAIL have chronicled the 
continuation of this by-product of colonialism and imperialism. One illustration of 
this point can be seen through the manner in which international criminal 
institutions function. The selectivity of cases by the ICC or the role of the witness 
before the ICTR are good examples in which the colonial past is front and centre. 
Turning to the ICC, the overrepresentation of African cases is a significant 
problem that threatens the very existence of the international court.181  
 
By choosing to view constitutionalism as a thin structure that is  “used to qualify 
and dignify the emergent site of new global regulatory structure of authority”, 
constitutional pluralists gloss over the underbelly of international institutions as 
they deliver on their mandates.182 Whether one takes the ICTR, the ICTY or the 
International Criminal Court as examples of new global governance structures, 
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what is clear is that these entities are deeply political and they continue the 
tradition of universalising a particular western narrative. Similar to my criticism of 
Klabbers, Peters, and Ulfstein and their use of principles from European 
jurisprudence, constitutional pluralism’s points of departure are susceptible to 
similar attacks.  
 
3.6 Conclusion: Mapping a path forward?  
I understand global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation as a 
taxonomy of contemporary global governance institutions and a normative 
account about global governance.  It is a taxonomy since the writers included in 
this camp describe the existing world institutions and their respective 
infrastructure through the lens of constitutionalism. It is a normative exercise 
because it seeks to structure the existing international order using a 
cosmopolitan universalist vision of western liberal constitutionalism. 
Fundamentally, the rationale for the project of global constitutionalism can be 
rooted in the search for, and the need to have, legitimacy and ultimately legality 
within the international order as result of fragmentation of international law. It is 
also a reaction to our globalised social reality.  
 
The various perspectives presented earlier in this chapter locate formal legal 
frameworks, norms and principles that permeate the international legal order to 
suggest we have constitutional legal values that inform our global system. These 
laws, norms and principles exemplify models through which distribution of power, 
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wealth and resources can arguably be mediated and contested. This does not 
break from or challenge the idea that international law and its institutions are 
closely connected to imperialism and colonialism or international law and its 
institutions are currently dominated by western interests, either in the form of 
capital or power.183 These accounts of global constitutionalism simply do not take 
stock of the realities of how international institutions function within their 
respective fields.  
 
By taking the international criminal justice regime as an example, I argued that 
the different variants of global constitutionalism are parochial in their analysis. 
The parochialism stems from a clear desire to use the western understandings of 
constitutionalism as garb to cloak the particular western values as universal.184 
Whether it is part of the normative camps’ desire to curb social inequities or 
constitutionalism as imagination, there is a tendency to rely on the experience of 
the West as the most important signpost. Ultimately, the desire to understand, 
inform and make changes to the existing global governance structures however 
must take account of the global South. In the following few pages, I will briefly 
explore how global constitutionalism can transcend these limitations.  
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By shifting reference points from global constitutionalism to comparative 
constitutionalism, two particular bodies of interdisciplinary literature offer 
significant insights. These insights open up new vistas on how to potentially 
transcend the limitations I have identified in this chapter. This is a cursory 
account of these fields. It is meant as a signpost to demonstrate that there are 
scholars working on constitutionalism from various perspectives that differs from 
the accounts presented above. I will take up the theoretical questions about the 
turn to the global South in the final chapter.  
 
With reference to the comparative constitutionalism, there are two bodies of 
literature that may be useful in transcending the limitations identified above. First 
there is a burgeoning body of literature that seeks to examine constitutionalism 
of the global South that may open new avenue of analysis.185 The second, 
primarily written by indigenous scholars from North America, has sought to 
challenge liberal constitutionalism’s ability to recognise indigeneity and 
indigenous claims. In the next few pages, I will explore these two types of 
scholarly engagement as a means to signal future directions for global 
constitutionalism. 
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Under the auspice of constitutionalism of the global South186, some scholars are 
interested in challenging the received wisdom of constitutionalism from the global 
North. Daniel Bonilla, a Colombian comparative constitutional scholar writes the 
following in terms of the received wisdom from the global North: 
Only a few institutions - such as the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the European Court of Human Rights, and the German 
Constitutional Court - are considered paradigmatic operators and 
enforcers of modern constitutionalism’s basic rules and principles. 
These legal institutions are the ones that determine the 
paradigmatic use of modern constitutionalism’s basic norms. They 
are the ones responsible for defining and solving key contemporary 
political and legal problems by giving specific content to modern 
constitutionalism’s rules and principles. The answers that these 
institutions give to questions like “What are the limits of judicial 
review?” “What is the meaning of the principle of separation of 
powers?” […] are considered by most legal communities to 
fundamentally enable the connection of modern constitutionalism to 
the realities of contemporary polities.187  
 
Writers working on comparative constitutionalism of the global South invert the 
order of things.188 They examine the jurisprudence of the highest courts in the 
global South, in particular Colombia, India and South Africa. In doing, the authors 
gathered under Bonilla’s Constitutionalism of the Global South examine the 
jurisprudence of these courts. 189  These scholars have “sought to open the 
discussion about the jurisprudence” of three courts on social and economic 
rights, cultural diversity and access to justice and “bridge the gap that exists 
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between Global South and Global North on constitutional matters”.190The various 
analyses encapsulated in Bonilla’s collection expose the manner in which 
constitutionalism, once transported to the colonies and the peripheries, can be 
deployed in various ways to foster greater benefits for the constituents.191 
 
In tracking the manner in which the various constitutions are being deployed and 
understood in these three countries, an important point stands out: when 
confronted by questions of systemic change in Colombia, India and South Africa, 
the three Courts interpreting the respective constitutions are not arriving at 
similar results. There is an internal dialogue taking place within these polities 
about the very nature of constitutionalism, which is divergent from the ways in 
global constitutionalism has been conceptualised in the global North. This type of 
argumentation can be illustrated with the scholarship of Jackie Dugard on the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa and Libardo José Ariza on the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia.  
 
Even though South Africa’s Constitutional Court may have been vested with the 
transformative powers through the post-apartheid constitution, it has been 
unable, or unwilling to use these tools to transform the economic, social, and 
cultural conditions of the most marginalised South Africans. In the context of 
South Africa’s highest court, Dugard asks: “to what extent has the Constitutional 
Court, as one of the primary interpreters of the Constitution, fulfilled its 
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constitutional promise?”192 The Court is unable provide the sought after remedy 
of the various stakeholders. Dugard offers the following insights: 
Thus, despite being racially representative and having expressly 
committed itself to overseeing socio-economic justice in the 
interests of South Africa’s overwhelmingly poor black majority, the 
Constitutional Court has balked at allowing poor people who might 
otherwise be denied justice to gain direct access and has failed to 
operationalise a meaningful recognition of poverty in its socio-
economic judgments. As a consequence, and in stark contrast to 
the popularity of Constitutional Courts in many developing countries 
such as Colombia, in South Africa the Constitutional Court is a 
remote institution that is increasingly sandwiched between growing 
animosity from the polity over its political judgments on the one 
hand and, on the other hand, disinterest and distrust by the majority 
poor citizenry.193       
 
The South African example demonstrates the difficulty of protecting economic, 
social and cultural rights during moments of transitional justice. It demonstrates 
the limitations of constitutionalism and constitutionalisation in potentially 
changing the lives of the most marginalised.  
 
In the Colombian context, the Constitutional Court has taken a completely 
different approach in decisions on prison overcrowding, forced displacement and 
social issues of importance to Colombians.  The unconstitutional state of affairs 
(USoA) doctrine allows the Colombian Constitutional Court to intervene in 
instances of massive and systemic violation of rights by government actors.194 
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By making this type of a declaration and imposing a remedy, the Court takes on 
the role of public policy maker. Ariza writes: 
The doctrine of USoA has certainly had a significant impact. On the 
one hand, for legal clinics and legal activists in human rights, a 
USoA declaration implies that the state acknowledges responsibility 
and can be held accountable for its poor performance in enforcing 
and guaranteeing rights for a significant population. In this sense, 
uttering a USoA declaration means claiming victory in the judicial 
field. On the other hand, the doctrine aims to address structural 
problems and hardships that swamp efficient institutional 
performance, creating institutional and dialogical spaces for policy 
decision making that unblocks an obsolete institutional 
arrangement”.195 
 
In this instance, the Constitutional Court is rearranging the existing 
understandings of the constitutional separation of power doctrine as a means to 
protect the fundamental rights of some of the most marginalised. Further 
investigation of these similarities and divergence is possible and is part of my 
future research agenda to understand global constitutionalism from the 
perspective of the global South. 
 
What is important about the South African and Colombian approaches to 
economic, social and cultural rights is the availability of diverse global South 
perspectives on constitutionalism. In particular, as the sharp edges of 
globalisation, neoliberalism and capitalism calibrates the state of affairs in the 
global South 196 , the responses of the respective nation states through 
constitutionalism either conforms what we already know about legal formalism or 
                                            
195 Ibid at 143-144. 
196 Jean Comaroff & John Comaroff, Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving 
Toward Africa (The Radical Imagination) (London: Paradigm Publisher, 2012). 
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opens up new opportunities to rethink our attitudes about global constitutionalism 
and constitutional ordering. This type of engagement is completely lacking in the 
various global constitutionalism camps discussed above. 
 
The second set of scholars that I want to signal to critique constitutional 
recognition and constitutionalism in North America. I offer this example as part of 
the continuation of the struggle of indigenous people against settler colonial 
states. I do not mean to romanticise these interventions or the current lived 
realities of the indigenous people, rather I point to this example as part of a 
future project to learn from these initiatives of resistance.  
 
The notion of recognition is imbedded in constitutional democracies as a means 
to allocate rights to minority communities. Recognition has had a significant 
effect on the manner in which indigenous communities, such as those located in 
Canada, have sought to regain their sovereignty through the Canadian judiciary 
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.197  In Strange Multiplicity, 
James Tully proposes the following insight as means to support the efforts to 
reorganise constitutionalism through greater protection of minority rights: 
“Perhaps the great constitutional struggles and failures around the 
world today are grouping towards a third way of constitutional 
change, symbolized in the ability of the members in the canoe [i.e. a 
multicultural and diverse societies] to discuss and reform their 
                                            
197 R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; R. v. Sappier; R. 
v. Gray, 2006 SCC 54, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686; R. v. Powley, 2003 SCC 43; Haida Nation v. British 
Columbia (Minister of Frests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511; Taku River Tingit First Nation 
v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director) 2004 SCC 74. 
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constitutional arrangements in response to the demands of 
recognition as they paddle”.198 
 
Tully has subsequently explored how “deeply entrenched roles of constitutional 
democracies [can] be de-imperialized?”199 Tully’s analysis forms the backdrop of 
much of Walker’s discussions on constitutional pluralism.200 Tully suggests that 
there ought be greater participatory democracy by which laws are open to 
criticisms, negotiation and modification, akin to writers in constitutional pluralism 
(for example constitutionalism as imagination). 201  This suggestion and the 
ensuing development chronicled through the Canadian jurisprudence has been 
the subject of a deep critique. There are various strands to the critique that 
focuses on the emphasis on liberal legalism,202 notions of sovereignty,203 the 
politics of recognition204 and the politics of refusal205.  
 
The politics of recognition can be characterised as a set of “recognition-based 
models of legal pluralism” that seek to reconcile the demands for sovereignty by 
indigenous groups from settler states like the United States and Canada.206 
These models of recognition tend to be diverse but most often encompass some 
form of delegation of land, capital and political power from modern settler nation 
                                            
198 Tully, Strange Multiplicity supra note 167 at 29. 
199 Tully, “Modern Constitutional Democracy” supra note 165.at 488. 
200 Walker, “Idea of Constitutional Pluralism” supra note 144 at 329-331. 
201 Tully, “Modern Constitutional Democracy” supra note 165 at 488. 
202 Buchanan, “Constitutive Paradox” supra note 149. 
203 Taiaiake Alfred Peace, Power, and Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
204 Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin White Masks: Rejecting The Colonial Politics of Recognition 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014) [Coulthard, Red Skin]. 
205  Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Setter States 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2014) [Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus] 
206 Coulthard, Red Skin supra note 204 at 3. 
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states to indigenous communities. Yellowknives Dene First Nation scholar Glen 
Coulthard argues that these efforts reproduce colonial and racist state power 
over indigenous communities. Coulthard suggests: 
[I]nstead of ushering in an era of peaceful coexistence grounded on 
the idea of reciprocity or mutual recognition, the politics of 
recognition in its contemporary form liberal promises to reproduce 
the very configurations of colonialist, racist, patriarchal state power 
that indigenous peoples’ demands of recognition have historically 
sought to transcend.207  
 
In a similar vein, in investigating the politics of refusal, Mohawk scholar Audra 
Simpson writes that there is a political alternative to the idea of recognition 
embedded in constitutionalism vis-à-vis minority communities. The alternative is 
the politics of refusal. She suggests that: 
This alterative is refusal and it is exercised by people within this 
book. They deploy it as apolitical and ethical stance that stands in 
stark contrast to the desire to have one’s own distinctiveness as a 
culture, as a people, recognized. Refusal comes with the 
requirement of having one’s political sovereignty acknowledged and 
upheld, and raises the question of legitimacy for those who are 
usually in the position of recognizing: What is their authority to do 
so? Where does it come from? Who are they to do so? Those of us 
writing about these issues can also refuse; this is a distinct form of 
ethnographic refusal […].208 
 
 
There are number of different ways to transcend the limitations that I outlined in 
this chapter on global constitutionalism. The above discussion only highlights two 
contemporary bodies of comparative constitutional literature that offer new 
insights about constitutionalism and constitutionalisation. These fields must be 
                                            
207Ibid at 3. 
208 Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus supra note 205 at 11. 
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exploited if we are to overcome the context-based problems I detailed in this 
chapter. Unfortunately, I cannot engage with this literature in this dissertation. 
Rather I point to it to briefly signal its existence. What is important is to note that 
global constitutionalism must engage with these scholarly formations if it is to 
truly theorise global governance.    
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Chapter 4:  False Universalism of Global Administrative Law?  
4.1 Introduction  
The expansion of governance regimes beyond the nation state has prompted 
scholars to theorise global governance. 1  By moving beyond the simple 
intercourse between sovereign states, this new global order reflects the dense 
web of inchoate regulatory actors, norms, and processes.2 The first steps of 
mapping, describing, and then theorising various regimes are difficult, 
complicated, and often politically contested. As already suggested, there is a 
surge in academic writing that conceptualises the global order through the lens 
of constitutional law,3 transnational law,4 legal pluralism5 and, more recently, 
administrative law. These scholarly interventions seek to legitimise international 
law and its institutions in light of the democratic deficit.6 The democratic deficit is 
precipitated by the rapid expansion of international law and international 
institutions (chronicled in the first chapter).  
                                            
1 Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury, and Sally Engle Merry, “Introduction: Global Governance by 
Indicators” in Kevin Davis et al, eds, Governance by Indicators: Global Power through 
Quantification and Rankings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 10-21 [Davis, 
“Introduction Global Governance”]. 
2 Peer Zumbansen, “Transnational Law, Evolving” in Jan M Smits, ed, Elgar Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2012) at 738.  
3 Jan Klabbers, “Setting the Scene” in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein, eds, The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Ronald St 
John Macdonald and Douglas M Johnston, eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the 
Legal Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005); Alec Stone Sweet, 
“Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes” (2009) 16:2 Ind J Global Leg 
Stud 621. But see Jose E. Alvarez, “The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences” 
(2003) 38 Texas Intl LJ 405. 
4 Peer Zumbansen, “Transnational Legal Pluralism” (2010) 1:2 Transnational Leg Theory 141. 
5 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
6Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, “Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative 
Law in the International Legal Order” (2006) 17 EJIL 1 [Krisch & Kingsbury, “Introduction]; 
Benedict Kingsbury, “The Administrative Law Frontier in Global governance” (2005) American 
Society of International Proceedings 143.  
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Previously I recounted how scholars are turning to a constitutional vernacular in 
response to the democratic deficit in global governance. Inspired by domestic 
experiences, these scholars attempt to discover constitutionalism in the global 
order. Similarly, in this chapter, I will focus on global administrative law as a 
means to bridge the accountability gap found within international institutions. 
 
Globalisation continues to have significant effects on how we regulate order at 
the global level, spurring on the need for greater regulatory oversight. In fact, 
global regulatory regimes govern almost all aspects of our modern existence, 
including dentistry, regulation of food, arms control and even prosecution of 
international war criminals. The current international institutional landscape 
therefore consists of “international, transnational, hybrid, a mixture of public and 
private actors, regimes or networks, or even harder to categorise assemblies of 
evolving governance structures […]”.7 These institutions are created through 
various international law-making mechanisms that compose our modern 
fragmented international legal order. Fragmentation of international law 
continues to occur because international law and its various institutions are not 
part of a unified legal system akin to those found in national jurisdictions with 
specific rules of precedent.  
 
                                            
7 Peer Zumbansen, "Administrative law’s global dream: Navigating regulatory spaces between 
national and “international”, Book Review of Global Administrative Law: The Casebook by Sabino 
Cassese, Bruno Carotti, Lorenzo Casini, Eleonora Cavalieri and Euan MacDonald (2013) 11:2 
Intl J Constitutional L 506 at 507. 
 214 
Most national regulatory institutions have a variety of different branches of 
government consisting of elected executive, legislative and judicial chambers. 
Based on the accepted legal system in place in these national spaces, the 
judiciary can make use of legislative enactments and jurisprudential doctrines in 
adjudication. 8  International law scholars have identified close to 2,000 self-
contained regulatory regimes9, each with their own diverse mechanisms for law-
making and adjudication. As a result of globalisation and fragmentation, there 
are instances in which institutional decisions are contradictory. Scholars have 
characterised this phenomenon as “regime collision”. 10  The fear of “regime 
collision” has justified modern anxieties about our very fragmented global 
order.11  
 
In particular, as a result of fragmentation of international law, these multiple and 
diverse regimes establish “links with other regimes” resulting in the multiplication 
and cross-pollination of global principles and rules.12 The emergence of these 
principles and rules is the basis for global administrative law. In what follows, I 
will provide a description of the various scholars working within global 
                                            
8 Sabino Cassese, Bruno Carotti, Lorenzo Casini, Eleonora Cavalieri and Euan MacDonald, 
“Foreword” in Sabino Cassese, Bruno Carotti, Lorenzo Casini, Eleonora Cavalieri and Euan 
MacDonald eds, Global Administrative Law: The Casebook (Rome Edinburgh New York: ILRP, 
2013) at XXIII [S. Cassese et al, “Foreword”]. 
9 Ibid at XXIII- XXV. 
10  Gunther Teubner & AndreasFischer-Lescano, “Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law” (2004) 24:4 Mich J Intl L 999 at 999-998. 
11 Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino “Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties”, 
(2002) 15 Leiden J Intl L 553 [Koskenniemi & Leino, “Fragmentation”]. 
12 S. Cassese et al, “Foreword” supra note 8 at XXIII. 
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administrative law. In particular, I will present two variations or camps in the 
global administrative law literature.  
 
In our complicated global governance milieu, some academics suggest that 
international regulatory regimes develop administrative law principles by directly 
analogising from domestic administrative law.13 The scholars working within this 
first camp argue that there are now clear principles in these regimes that concern 
due process, procedural fairness, transparency, duty to give reasons, and other 
administrative law doctrines.14 Drawing inspiration from these principles that 
emanate from domestic administrative law, it is argued that the entire “arsenal of 
domestic administrative law […] can be found in the global space”.15 I primarily 
focus on Benedict Kingsbury and Richard B. Stewart, as these two scholars are 
instrumental in the creation of the field of global administrative law. Much more 
importantly they both continue to theorise various aspects of global 
administrative law.16 
 
Some scholars challenge Kingsbury and Stewart’s assertions. 17  Karl-Heinz 
Ladeur in particular asserts that analogising directly from the domestic 
                                            
13 Ibid; Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B Stewart, “The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law” (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15 [Kingsbury et al, “Emergence 
of GAL”]. 
14 S. Cassese et al, “Foreword” supra note 8 at XXIII. 
15 Ibid at XXIV. 
16Davis, “Introduction Global Governance supra note 1.  
17 Carol Harlow, "Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values" (2006) 17:1 
EJIL187at 190; Susan Marks, “Naming Global Administrative Law”, (2005) 37 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 995 at 995; Peer Zumbansen, “Transnational 
Comparisons: Theory and Practice of Comparative Law as a Critique of Global Governance” in 
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conceptions of administrative law does not yield the expected results. He  
suggests that there is a need to reimagine how accountability is generated at the 
global level.18 Such an exercise is similar to global constitutionalism’s normative 
and pluralist accounts by scholars like Habermas and Walker and their attempts 
to portray our constitutional order. In this regard, I will examine the writing of 
Ladeur and his accounts of postmodern19 global administrative law. Similar to the 
previous chapter, I have characterised these two camps according to my 
interpretation of their respective materials.  
 
The first set of scholars of global administrative law provide a detailed 
description of how international institutions deploy administrative law in their 
everyday interactions. The second, Ladeur, acknowledges the difficulties 
encountered by analogising in this manner, and he proposes to read in 
accountability in how these institutions function.  
 
This chapter then critiques the turn to administrative law principles deployed in 
international law and its institutions as global governance. Fundamentally, I 
argue that global administrative law ignores, obscures, and effaces the 
underlying context of international law and its institutions. Global administrative 
                                                                                                                                 
Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff, eds, Practice and Theory in Comparative Law Practice and 
Theory in Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Karl-Heinz Ladeur 
“The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and Transnational Regulation” (2013) 3:3 
Transnational Leg Theory 243 [Ladeur, “Emergence of GAL”]. 
18 Ladeur, “Emergence of GAL supra note 17 at 245-249. 
19 There are various understandings of postmodernism. For a description of these ideas and their 
application in law, see Jennifer Wicke, “Postmodern Identity and Legal Subjects", (1991) 62 U 
Col L Rev 455; David Kennedy, "On Comments on Law and Postmodernism: A Symposium 
Response to Professor Jennifer Wicke" (1991) U Col L Rev 475. 
 217 
law suggests a particular western understanding of administrative law as 
universal and thus, it re-enacts Anghie’s dynamic of difference. In order to 
demonstrate this facet of global administrative law, I rely on the international 
criminal law case studies canvassed in the first chapter.  
4.2 Global Administrative Law: Global Governance as Administration? 
As both a student of global administrative law, and as a teacher of national 
administrative law, the obvious question in my mind is: What is the significance 
of labelling global governance as administration? Moreover, what are the 
benefits of identifying the existence or the emergence of administrative law 
principles within the global regulatory regimes? Does it benefit anyone?  
 
In our respective domestic experiences, the development of administrative law is 
closely tied to the delegation of the state’s power to administrative agencies and 
the creation of the welfare state.20 Administrative agencies decide on the various 
content of our news, provide services, deliver healthcare, administer schools and 
prisons, and regulate our borders. 21  In Commonwealth jurisdictions, 
administrative law has evolved from the prerogative writs of certiorari, prohibition 
and mandamus that were imposed upon the colonies by their colonial master.22 
                                            
20 Gus Van Harten et al, Administrative Law: Cases, Texts, and Materials 6th edition (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery Publications, 2010) at 3-35. 
21 Colleen Flood and Jennifer Dolling, “An Introduction to Administrative Law: Some History and 
Few Singposts for a Twisted Path” in Colleen Flood and Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in 
Context, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2013) at 2-3. 
22 Laskshman Keerthisinghe, The Application of the Writ of Mandamus in the Exercise of the Writ 
of Jurisdiction of the Superior Courts of Sri Lanka (Colombo: Sarasavi, 2012); Audrey Macklin, 
“Standard of Review: Back to the Future? in Colleen Flood and Lorne Sossin, eds., 
Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 
2013).  
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Administrative law now regulates the conduct of administrative agencies with 
delegated executive authority and government agencies that administer special 
programs and services. The emerging principles that global administrative law 
scholars identify within the international regulatory regimes are an essential 
ingredient in national jurisdictions. These national principles generate 
accountability (through the doctrines of reasonableness and correctness for 
example) of domestic decision-makers.  
 
Benedict Kingsbury and Richard Stewart are the pioneers of global 
administrative law. They have argued that global administrative law contains the 
mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social understanding that 
affect accountability of international regulatory agencies. In particular, they 
suggest that international agencies have developed standards such as 
transparency, participation, reasoned decision-making, legality and effective 
review of the decisions.23 Ultimately, the project of global administrative law, 
which started in 2005, has gained traction and continues to grow. An excellent 
recent example of its expansion is to regulate governance indicators 
operationalised globally international institutions.24 It is now a recognisable field 
                                            
23 Kingsbury et al, “Emergence of GAL” supra note 13 at 17. 
24 Davis, “Introduction Global Governance supra note 1 at 20-21; Sabino Cassese and Lorenzo 
Casini, “Accountability in the Generation of Governance Indicators” in in Kevin Davis et al, eds, 
Governace by Indicators: Global Power through Quantification and Rankings (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015) 464 at 471-474. 
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of global governance theory. The evidence of this growth can be seen through 
the recent publication of a global administrative law casebook.25  
 
One of the central goals of global administrative law is to redeploy global 
governance as administration.26 Proponents suggest that this shift allows the 
recasting of “many standard concerns about the legitimacy of international 
institutions in a more specific and focused way”.27 In the global legal order, and 
unlike its domestic counterpart, there is no potential for direct democratic 
participation by the various constituents. Much more importantly, there  is no 
sovereign at the global level and the respective branches of government are 
hard to discern.  
 
Like any scholarly field, the current literature of global administrative law includes 
both proponents and detractors. Ladeur is a proponent. He demonstrates the 
utility of global administrative law while simultaneously providing incisive 
adjustments to its central tenets.28 Ladeur argues that administrative law’s (and, 
by extension, global administrative law’s) postmodernism necessitates that we 
move beyond relying on ideas of delegation, accountability, and legitimacy. 
Global administrative law is trying theorise global governance by adapting to, 
and experimenting with, the changing nature of postmodern legality. Global 
                                            
25 Sabino Cassese, Bruno Carotti, Lorenzo Casini, Eleonora Cavalieri and Euan MacDonald eds, 
Global Administrative Law: The Casebook (Rome Edinburgh New York: ILRP, 2013). 
26 Kingsbury et al, “Emergence of GAL” supra note 13. 
27 Ibid at 27. 
28 Ladeur, “Emergence of GAL” supra note 18 at 245-249. 
 220 
administrative law is trying to do this while supporting the creation of norms that 
will adjust to the complexities of globalisation. The writings of Ladeur represent 
the second camp that I will review below. 
 
The detractors have rightly challenged the tentative assessments of global 
administrative law. Carol Harlow suggests that it is extremely difficult to identify a 
universal set of administrative law principles. For Harlow, administrative law is 
“largely a western construct, taking its shape during the late 19th century as an 
instrument for the control of public power”.29 Dominated by a philosophy of 
control, “administrative law has played an important part in the struggle for 
limited government, its core value being conformity to the rule of law”.30 Susan 
Marks’ writings suggest that global administrative law “seems to bring an object 
into being, with a solidity and even a monumentality, that risks putting in the 
shade disputes over process, agency, and orientation”.31 Global administrative 
law’s turn away from democracy is what motivates Marks’ arguments. The use of 
delegation, a basic organising principle of global administrative law, therefore 
may not be the best way to usher in legitimacy in international law.  
 
There are other areas of scholarship that point to a need for a much more robust 
examination of the different understandings of modern administrative law. This 
                                            
29 Carol Harlow, "Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values" (2006) 17:1 
EJIL 187 at 190. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Susan Marks, "Naming Global Administrative Law", (2005) 37 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 995 at 995. 
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claim focuses on comparative administrative law’s potential to offer diverse set of 
insights globally.32  Global administrative lawyers could explore how different 
jurisdictions conceptualise administrative law, as opposed to providing a 
definition based on western understandings of administrative law.33 While all of 
these areas can be explored further, in this analysis, I focus on universal nature 
of global administrative law. This is closely aligned to the criticisms that Carol 
Harlow has articulated. 
 
Claims made by global administrative lawyers are far-fetched in that their vision 
of global governance ignores the true markings of the international regulatory 
regimes, as I have demonstrated in the earlier chapters. Moreover, such claims 
to legitimacy, accountability, and other similar principles only obscure the 
realities of international institutions, while simultaneously propagating an outlook 
premised on particular accounts of domestic conceptions of law, regulation and 
governance. In the next section, I will explore two sets of scholarship that are 
part of the current literature on global administrative law.  
 
                                            
32 Peer Zumbansen, “Transnational Comparisons: Theory and Practice of Comparative Law as a 
Critique of Global Governance” in Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds, Practice and Theory in 
Comparative Law Practice and Theory in Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012). 
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4.2.1 Descriptive Accounts of Global Administrative Law as 
Administration: Kingsbury & et al 
Global administrative law’s central goal is to position global governance as 
administration. This type of positioning allows those working under this 
descriptive camp to “recast many standard concerns about the legitimacy of 
international institutions in a more specific and focused way”.34 Supporters of 
global administrative law argue that this approach disturbs orthodox 
understandings of the concept of law within global governance.35 For example, in 
national jurisdictions, law is created through elected representatives by way of 
constitutional arrangements. This is, of course, contested by legal pluralism (and 
more recently global legal pluralism). In this regard, legal pluralists posit that the 
state does not have a monopoly in norm creation. Rather there are multiple 
places in which norm generation occurs.36 
 
Our traditional understanding of legal norm production through the various forms 
of government is not possible within the global governance context. The law-
making capacity of the judges of the two ad hoc tribunals is a good illustration. 
Global administrative law allows to us imagine the international regulatory space 
as containing the mechanisms, principles, practices and supporting social 
                                            
34Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law” (2009) 20:1 EJIL 23 
at 27. 
35 Sabino Cassese, “Global administrative law: The state of the art” (2015) 13:2 Int’l J Constit L 
465at 467; Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law” (2009) 20:1 
EJIL 23 [Kingsbury, “The Concept of Law”]. 
36 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); 
Sujith Xavier, "Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders, Review of Paul 
Schiff Berman: Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders” (2013) 24 EJIL 
981-98. 
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understandings that “promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global 
administrative bodies”.37 In particular, global administrative law ensures these 
international institutions meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, 
reasoned decision, legality, and providing effective review of the decisions they 
make”.38  
 
For global administrative law scholars like Kingsbury and Stewart, there is an 
accountability deficit within international regulatory regimes. Democratic 
participation, analogous to that found in the national jurisdictions is not available 
in international institutions. International institutions are often created by diverse 
sets of actors and they are not accountable to a constituent population (for 
example the ICTY and ICTR). The United Nations Security Council created these 
two international criminal institutions and granted them specific powers to make 
amendments to their respective rules. This rule making power has effectively 
given the judges the power to legislate. Judges are solely accountable to the UN 
Security Council in making these decisions. As I illustrated earlier, the Security 
Council is very keen to deliver justice cheaply and thus instituted the completion 
strategy.39 But these international adjudicatory agencies with these types of 
powers generate decisions that affect portions of the population in Rwanda or in 
the former Balkans for example. This engenders a democracy deficit.  
                                            
37Kingsbury et al, “Emergence of GAL” supra note 13 at 17; For a new articulation of this 
definition, Richard B. Stewart, The normative dimensions and performance of global 
administrative law" (2015) 13 (2) Intl J Constitutional L 499 at 499-500. 
38Kingsbury et al, “Emergence of GAL” supra note 13 at 17. 
39 See Chapter 1, section 1.4. 
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Kingsbury and Stewart suggest that the results from such a democracy deficit 
have produced two possible responses: extension of domestic administrative law 
to intergovernmental regulatory decisions or the development of administrative 
law type mechanisms at the global level to address decisions and rules made 
within the intergovernmental regimes. Kingsbury and Stewart claim that the 
proliferation of international, transnational regulation and administration designed 
to address the “globalized interdependence in such fields as security, the 
conditions of development […]” underlies the emergence of global administrative 
law.40 “Increasingly, these consequences cannot be addressed effectively by 
isolated national regulatory and administrative measures”.41 
 
No particular international regime can takes precedence over another. In fact, 
another distinguishing feature of global administrative law is its acknowledgment 
of the interaction between the domestic and the international.42 There are other 
additional features of global administrative law according to its proponents. To 
those gathered in this camp, global administrative law differs from traditional 
international law that regulates the intercourse between sovereign equals. It is 
sectorial and it relates to the aim of global regulation, which must ultimately 
transcend the single nation state. Yet there are no enforcement mechanisms 
                                            
40 Kingsbury et al, “Emergence of GAL” supra note 13 at 17. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid; Krisch & Kingsbury, “Introduction” supra note 6. 
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available to global administrative law because there is no actual constitutional 
document per se in the international space.  
 
The following example from the ICTR demonstrates how scholars writing in this 
genre of global administrative law can arrive at these respective conclusions. In 
July 2001, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Registrar suspended 
the employment contract of Thadée Kwitonda, a defence investigator. Kwitonda 
was employed as part of Arsène Shalom Ntahobali’s defence team.43 ICTR’s 
Office of the Prosecutor investigated Kwitonda as a potential perpetrator of 
genocide. The prosecutor’s finding led to Kwitonda’s suspension from his role as 
a defence investigator.  
 
In challenging the suspension, Ntahobali argued that his investigator, Kwitonda, 
was the only person with knowledge and confidence of the potential witnesses. 
Kwitonda was an essential member of the defence team and he was 
instrumental in aiding the newly appointed Defence Counsel.44 The prosecutor 
argued that the Registrar’s decision was not subject to judicial oversight, 
                                            
43Arsene Shalom Ntahobali was born in 1970 in Tel Aviv, Israel and is a Rwandan national. He is 
the son of two incumbent Rwandan government ministers during the genocide (Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko, Minister for the Family and Women’s Affairs and of Maurice Ntahobali, former 
President of the Rwandan National Assembly, Minister for Higher Education and Rector of the 
National University of Butare). The Trial Chamber convicted Ntahobal Ntahobali committing, 
ordering, and aiding and abetting genocide, extermination and persecution as crimes against 
humanity, and violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons as a serious 
violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; The 
Prosecutor v. Arsene Shalom Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T  
44  The Prosecutor v. Arsene Shalom Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T; The President’s 
Decision on the Application by Arsène Shalom Ntahobali for Review of the Registrar’s Decision 
Pertaining to the Assignment of an Investigator, ICTR-97-21-T.  
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available through legal provisions within the enabling Statute, secondary 
legislation such as the rules of evidence and procedure or Tribunal policy.  
 
The Tribunal’s Trial Chamber agreed with the ICTR Prosecutor. The Trial 
Chamber relied on the delegated administrative powers and responsibilities of 
the registrar in organising and appointing defence investigators as set out in the 
Statute. The Chamber found that “the issue of re-instatement of a suspended 
[i]nvestigator is an administrative matter resting with the Registry”.45 The Trial 
Chamber, using the language of administrative law, showed deference to the 
policy decision of the registrar.  Those working in the descriptive camp of global 
administrative law can use this decision as evidence to support their arguments. 
 
In response to the decision and relying on Tribunal policy directives46, Ntahobali 
requested that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s President at the 
time, Justice Navi Pillay to review the decision of the registrar and the Trial 
Chamber. Justice Pillay dismissed Ntahobali’s motion. She deferred to the 
administrative decision of the registrar. In her decision, she stated:  
 
[…] In all systems of administrative law, a threshold condition must 
be satisfied before an administrative decision may be impugned by 
supervisory review. There are various formulations of this threshold 
condition in national jurisdictions, but a common theme is that the 
decision sought to be challenged, must involve a substantive right 
                                            
45 The President’s Decision on the Application by Arsène Shalom Ntahobali for Review of the 
Registrar’s Decision Pertaining to the Assignment of an Investigator, ICTR-97-21-T 
46 Directive on Assignment of Defence Counsel and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
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that should be protected as a matter of human rights 
jurisprudence or public policy. 
 
[…] Bearing in mind also, the limited scope of my judicial review 
jurisdiction as opposed to an appeal on merits, I do not find the 
exercise of discretion by the Registrar in the present case to be 
unreasonable or malafide or based on irrelevant or extraneous 
factors. [emphasis added]47   
 
The reference to her capacity to review the administrative decision of the 
registrar may allow global administrative law scholars to propose that 
international institutions have developed administrative law standards. In this 
instance, they would argue that there is the development of a process of 
effective review of the decisions that these tribunals make. 48   For global 
administrative law scholars, this is a good illustration of global governance as 
administration. 49  In a similar vein, Sabino Cassese et al suggest that 
International Criminal Court’s role in deciding Palestinian statehood 
demonstrates the Court’s role as a global administrator.50  
 
If global administrative law is to describe law in the international setting, as 
Kingsbury and Stewart suggest, then it is a description that “diverges from, and 
can be sharply in tension with the classical models of consent-based inter-state 
                                            
47 The President’s Decision on the Application by Arsène Shalom Ntahobali for Review of the 
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50 Yoav Meer, “The Notion of State: The Palestinian’s National Authority’s Attempt to Bring a 
Claim in Front of the International Criminal Court Against Israel” in Sabino Cassese, Bruno 
Carotti, Lorenzo Casini, Eleonora Cavalieri and Euan MacDonald eds, Global Administrative 
Law: The Casebook (Rome Edinburgh New York: ILRP, 2013) at 47-51 
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international law and most models of national law”.51 In this process, global 
administrative law’s law takes on a different character. It is not similar to what 
exists in national jurisdictions. Global administrative law is something that is 
entirely different from the administrative law found within national jurisdictions. 
This is problematic for two reasons. 
 
First, national administrative law is a product of political compromises between 
political actors that were directly selected by their constituents, while 
international law emanates from a dizzying array of actors and norm producers. 
The example from the ICTR demonstrates that the rules of evidence and 
procedure used by the judges are not a product of political compromise. Rather, 
the Security Council granted the judges the power to draft the rules of evidence 
and procedure similar to the Nuremberg Charter so that the Tribunal could 
function. It did so for an arsenal of reasons that I discussed in the first chapter.52 
As we saw from the empirical evidence that I presented in the first chapter, the 
judges and their experts have a pro-conviction bias that surfaces in the manner 
in which the rules of evidence and procedure are amended. 
 
Second, this suggestion circles back to the central claim: a dynamic of difference 
organises the manner in which international law and international institutions 
                                            
51 Kingsbury et al, “Emergence of GAL” supra note 13 at 17. 
52 See Chapter 1, section 1.4. 
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function. 53 To simply assert the existence of administrative law principles found 
in the domestic legal order is discernable in international law and its institutions, 
as indicia of solving the accountability problems, misses the mark. It does not 
take into account the manner in which these tribunals are created, the rationale 
and the politics involved in their creation and how they function. 54  Rather, 
deploying such arguments obscures and reifies the malignant effects of 
international law and its institutions on various parties that are implicated in the 
respective decisions. What is crucial to this argument is the effect that these 
policies (and changes to the rules of evidence and procedure) have on the 
perpetrators and their rights, and more importantly on victims, in whose interests 
the international community supposedly created the ICTR.  
 
The aforementioned Kwitonda decision can be used as a potential reference to 
judicial review by global administrative lawyers from the descriptive camp. Their 
reasoning would be based on how the judges have crafted the respective rules 
of evidence and procedure. As demonstrated in the first chapter, the general 
manner in which the judges and this particular Tribunal have utilised these rules 
has led to a pro-conviction bias that perpetuates western universalism in the 
ICTR. The problem started with the manner in which the ICTR was created. 
Even though the Rwandan government supported the move to create the tribunal 
at the outset, there was a fear that their sovereignty will be eroded and that the 
                                            
53Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) [Anghie, Imperialism]. 
54 See Chapter 1, section 1.4. 
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very structure of the tribunal would generate decisions that would appease the 
conscience of the international community rather than people of Rwanda and the 
victims of the genocide.55    Ultimately the UN Security Council created the ICTR 
to bridge the gap between two cultures, one western and the other, barbaric. It 
followed the same process used to create the ICTY and granted the judges the 
power to create and amend the rules. The rules were then amended regularly as 
a means to comply with the completion strategy and deliver justice quickly at the 
expense of the fair trial guaranteed afforded to the accused. Universalism is 
embodied through the very dynamics of the tribunal. Only in name are the 
accused afforded procedural and due process rights. Constant changes to the 
rules have led to problematic witness testimony, trial delay and a myriad of other 
related problems, all of which highlight the fact that the rights of the accused are 
not seriously applied.56  
 
Even though Justice Pillay was probably right in dismissing the accused’s motion 
using the vernacular of administrative law, this does not mean that we can co-opt 
this example from a specific international institution as demonstrating the 
existence of global administrative law. We must first take a look at the context in 
which these institutions operate as well as how they function. The context of 
Rwanda is such that almost all of the citizens were affected by the conflict and 
the ensuing genocide. Historians such as Mahmood Mamdani have illustrated 
                                            
55 Payam Akhavan "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics 
of Punishment" (1996) 90:3 AJIL501 at 506. 
56 See Chapter 1, section 1.4.2. 
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the difficulty in ascribing individual criminal responsibility, either by commission 
or omission, because nearly all Hutus in Rwanda were implicated in the 
genocide.57  This revelation leads us to ask why did the registrar allow the 
investigator to be employed by the accused in the first place? Do all of the 
accused have investigators with similar histories of allegations? If the 
investigators were alleged perpetrators, then are they intimidating the witnesses? 
These questions force us to contend with the very nature of the Rwandan 
Tribunal, its universalist conduct, and its failures in delivering justice. To use the 
ICTR and its jurisprudence to as an illustration of administrative law principles in 
global governance simply ignores the larger systemic problems endemic in 
international law and international institutions.  
 
The presence of these administrative law principles, as illustrated by Justice 
Pillay’s limited scope of judicial review jurisdiction, says nothing about broader 
accountability or legitimacy of these types of institutions. Simply pointing to the 
use of administrative law does not render international institutions more or less 
legitimate. Rather, it seeks to mask a larger universalist project embedded in 
politics and interests. 
 
Another example is the global administrative law casebook and the Palestinian 
bid for statehood. One of the authors included in the casebook suggest that the 
Palestinian bid for statehood before the ICC is an indicia of global administrative 
                                            
57 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killer (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2002) pages 3-18 &  41-102 & 185- 233. 
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law. Such a suggestion is naïve, to say the least.58 It ignores the context of the 
Palestinian bid for statehood. Palestinian claims to statehood can be traced back 
to the Mandate of the League of Nations, and Arab Israeli conflict starting in 
1848.59 The current state of affairs in Palestine and Israel can be traced back to 
the peace negotiation between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the 
Israeli Government, led by the late Chairman Yasser Arafat and the late Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The peace negotiations resulted in the creation of the 
Palestinian Authority. Initially the parties agreed to the Declaration of Principles 
in September 199360 and subsequently signed the Israeli-Palestinian Interim 
Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (September 1995). The agreement 
delineated the current existing legal governance of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip.61 These two agreements are interim in nature and remain subject to the 
final Permanent Status negotiations, which have not yet materialise. These 
agreements envisioned a gradual delegation of powers from the Occupying 
Forces and the Israeli administration to the Palestinian Authority. The most 
substantive agreement, Oslo 2, stipulates the manner of such delegations of 
                                            
58 Yoav Meer, "The Notion of State: The Palestinian’s National Authority’s Attempt to Bring a 
Claim in Front of the International Criminal Court Against Israel" in Sabino Cassese, Bruno 
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power and eventual redeployment of Israeli Forces from the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip by Israel (article 10 of the Interim Agreement).62  
 
In the 2006 Palestinian general elections, Hamas took control over the Gaza 
Strip and reignited the conflict. With the termination of hostilities in the Gaza Strip 
in 2009,63 the Palestinian Authority’s Minister of Justice, Dr. Khashan, lodged a 
declaration pursuant to article 12 (3)64 of the International Criminal Court’s Rome 
Statute.65 The Palestinian Authority’s Declaration was controversial, particularly 
in light of the Goldstone report.66 In April 2012, the International Criminal Court’s 
Office of the Prosecutor released a statement suggesting that the determination 
of Palestinian statehood rested in the hands of “relevant bodies at the United 
Nations or the Assembly of States Parties to make the legal determination 
whether Palestine qualifies as a state for the purpose of acceding to the Rome 
Statute and thereby enabling the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court under 
article 12(1)”.67  
 
                                            
62 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on September 28, 
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63 Al-Haq, “Operation Cast Lead': A Statistical Analysis” (August 2009), available online: Al-Haq 
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Discussions continue about whether the Palestinian Authority can avail itself of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in light of the recent attacks 
on the Gaza Strip in 2014. The ICC prosecutor has agreed to conduct a 
preliminary investigation in January 2015. By simply looking at the institutional 
framework of the ICC and its capacity to determine statehood ignores the 
background of the conflict and the politics.   
 
The history of international law demonstrates that there are disparities between 
established, and supposedly neutral, legal concepts and their contemporary 
application. As demonstrated in the first chapter, early European attempts to 
curtail the raw power of the sovereign by creating new rules in the form of 
international law resulted in universal applications of western notions of law on 
the newly discovered territories and its inhabitants. 68  Scholars have 
demonstrated that international law, and sovereignty doctrine in particular, was 
used largely to regulate encounters between local inhabitants of the new world 
and the European colonisers.69 This development of international law in the 17th 
and 18th centuries is closely tied to the continuation of colonialism and 
imperialism. 70  By the late 19th and 20th centuries, the accelerated drive of 
international law had resulted in an abundance of international institutions that 
were created to deal with the world’s problems, such as delivering aid to those in 
need and dealing with health related issues. This proliferation of international 
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institutions by the late 20th century created a new international space that 
needed to be described and theorised, given the push of globalisation and the 
changing nature of the nation state. Global administrative law is one incarnation 
of these attempts to describe the existing international landscape inspired by 
domestic understanding of administration as potentially embodying 
administrative law that includes principles such as transparency and 
accountability.  
 
The above analysis demonstrates that actual global administrative law cannot be 
found. Rather, the context and how the respective tribunal or institution functions 
matters because of the very nature of international law. By not engaging in this 
manner, global administrative law claims described earlier succumb to a 
peripheral reading of international institutions. These characterisations 
inadequately reflect the inherent realities of these institutions.  
 
4.2.2 Ladeur and Postmodern Administrative Law 
In the previous section, the dominant and descriptive narrative of global 
administrative law was presented. In this section, I will focus on the scholarship 
of Karl-Heinz Ladeur. Ladeur agrees with other global administrative law 
scholars about its utility and he is committed to the idea of global administrative 
law generally. He nonetheless challenges certain foundational assertions of 
global administrative law. This commitment has precipitated a revision of global 
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administrative law’s central tenets and its commitment to domestic administrative 
law. This is the reason why I have elected to engage with his scholarship.   
 
Ladeur’s contribution seeks to confront the recent attempts in global governance 
to map the existing international legal order based on our understanding of the 
nation state. 71  The fragmentation of private and public spheres and the 
transformation of the legal system undoubtedly affects our conceptions of 
democratic governance. Ladeur suggests that global administrative law may 
provide a much more meaningful means to manage and stabilise the 
complexities of various international regimes.  
 
Ladeur tests his hypothesis by turning to the “evolution of modern administrative 
law” to examine how progress in this field can help us to understand domestic, 
transnational, and global law. One of his central contentions is that 
administration and subsequently administrators, rather than the legislators and 
courts, produces domestic administrative law. With such an understanding of 
administrative law, Ladeur suggests that the paradigms of administrative law 
have undergone serious changes over the last decade from “the construction 
and decision of individual cases to industry related regulation”.72 There is a new 
postmodern model of administrative action that is motivated by experimentation 
and learning, while reflecting the transformation of culture. The technological 
progress has transformed our existing modes of communication. This 
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transformation in communication, as part of globalisation, has facilitated 
specialised epistemic communities and highly sophisticated networks. These 
epistemic communities and specialised networks are a ‘society of networks’.73 
Ladeur suggests that these developments are generated by globalisation and in 
turn have altered the very nature of administration. The creation of networks 
must then be encapsulated within what Ladeur suggests as postmodern 
administrative law. The role of the state has dramatically changed within this 
postmodern reality but it has not lost its relevance. The state does not retreat or 
does it vanish. Rather it has assumed the “role of a player with the responsibility 
for the rules of the game” to regulate the “polycentric practices of 
experimentation in the private realm [that] produce lock-ins as well as perverse 
effects”.74  
 
Based on such a societal transformation, Ladeur theorises the possibility of a 
new perspective for global administrative law. The network-like structure of 
global administrative law is not new, it is a continuation of “fragmentation and, as 
a consequence, the increasingly loose coupling of the different layers of the 
normative system of postmodernity which can be observed at the domestic 
level”.75 Once we understand that the domestic system is not structured by a 
unified normative order, it is much easier to imagine its expansion to the 
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74 Ladeur, “Emergence of GAL” supra note 17 at 249. 
75 Ladeur, “Emergence of GAL” supra note 17 at 245. 
 238 
international space. Ladeur is challenging Kingsbury and Stewart’s assumptions 
about the very nature of domestic administrative law. He is challenging their 
desire to analogise from a domestic administrative law perspective in search of 
accountability and legitimacy.  
 
From this analysis, Ladeur argues that the evolutionary process shapes 
domestic notions of law. There are overlapping and interconnected dimensions 
in the production of the legal order. Ladeur, unlike other supporters of global 
administrative law, asserts that the democratic nature of law should not be 
overstated. Law’s accountability to its democratic constituents and its goals in 
national jurisdictions must be interrogated. In the domestic context, the question 
then is whether the decision-makers are ultimately accountable to the 
constituents that selected them as their policy-makers. For example, are policy-
makers and elected officials actually accountable? Moreover, Ladeur notes that 
within the context of domestic administrative governance, accountability cannot 
be reduced “to the control of compliance rules”.76  
 
The postmodern nature of society had a fundamental effect on the relationship 
between law and its “cognitive infrastructure”, precipitating the evolution of the 
legal system with the creation of new accountability regimes called “entangled 
hierarchies”.77  These entangled hierarchies are characterised by erosions in 
which rules are designed and applied. Spontaneous accountability generated by 
                                            
76 Ibid at 256. 
77 Ibid at 256. 
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networks emerge in this postmodern space. These regimes are not defined in 
advance. They are constituted through a process of network activity. Ladeur’s 
entangled hierarchies point to the possibility of generating accountability beyond 
our conceptions of legitimacy production. Ultimately, in standard understandings 
of global administrative law, there is an overemphasis on democratic 
participation in any regime. For Ladeur, the postmodern nature of our world has 
transformed these means of participation where accountability can now be 
generated through various networks. The control mechanisms conceptualised at 
the state level cannot help in this instance.  
 
Postmodern insights on administrative law’s legitimacy seriously challenge the 
notion that administrative law must have an element of public law. The 
postmodern nature of law, given the rise of the society of organisations and 
networks,78 necessitated administrative law to adapt and give way to new explicit 
re-formulation and re-modifications of the “whole architecture of the normative 
system”.79 This point can be illustrated through the recent shifts in the manner in 
which decision-making power is delegated to traditional private institutions. In a 
similar vein, questions about the legality of global administrative law must take 
stock of the changing nature of national domestic law within the postmodern 
moment.  
 
                                            
78 Ibid at 256.  
79 Ibid at 256. 
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Global administrative law’s animating concern is the democratic deficit in 
international organisations. Ladeur however contends that a focus on the 
democratic deficit is overstated. By taking a critical look at the democratic 
function of law, Ladeur argues that at times, the role of the state requires 
interference with individual rights. Simultaneously, the state is involved in norm 
production which “transform[s] the conditions for the use of rights but do[es] not 
infringe upon subjective rights in the traditional sense”.80 In this instance, Ladeur 
is alluding to the power of the state to transform the conditions of individuals 
through agreements between international institutions. These agreements have 
a drastic effect on individual rights without actually requiring the state to enact 
specific legislation (for example the Treaty of Rome in the European context and 
ICC Rome Statute in the international context). Consequently administrative 
action is now being directed at complex networks rather than individuals. The 
rise of global administrative structures and the fast-emerging norms that regulate 
these networks strengthen the autonomy of administrative function. This is in 
contrast with Kingsbury and Stewart’s version of global administrative law. Their 
version seeks to analogise global administrative law with the domestic 
preconceived notions of administrative law.   
 
For Ladeur, global law must be thought of in procedural terms, “as a law which 
produces its own preconditions for validity and recognition, beyond the sphere of 
                                            
80 Ibid at 252. 
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the state”81 that is part of a fragmented context. Such a context is “characterised 
by a random coming together of national, conventional international and self-
organised global law, on the one hand, and similarly heterogeneous cognitive 
rules […]”.82 The discourse of legitimacy in international law over-analogises the 
domestic reality.  
 
Ladeur’s contestation may be correct but there is also a danger in assuming the 
possibilities of global law in procedural terms with its own preconditions for 
validity and recognition. The rules of evidence and procedure of the two ad hoc 
tribunals illustrate this point. Even though the statutes of the respective tribunals 
have created the preconditions for validity and recognition of the rules, the effect 
of the application of these rules on the accused is problematic for various 
reasons outlined in the first chapter. Take for instance the example of the judges 
of the tribunals repealing judicial decisions using the rules of evidence and 
procedure.83  The judges are using the power granted to them through the 
respective statute to legislative and ultimately overrule a judicial decision.  
 
Ladeur’s global administrative law can draw upon “components of both the more 
hybrid loosely coupled type of the law of networks, which emerges at the 
domestic level, and on components of the new public international law which 
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shatters the hitherto established clear separation from the state-based law”.84 
Fundamentally, the source of law can no longer be viewed as stemming from 
canonical texts. 85  Instead, Ladeur suggests that legal meaning must be 
generated from several overlapping texts and practices that encompass an 
experimental approach. He uses various examples from investment protection 
and environmental governance to suggest that, in these fields, global 
administrative law may allow “for the development of rules below the rather rigid 
structure of public international law”.86 
 
Ladeur’s account however, does not demonstrate the role of special interests in 
the evolutionary process in our society.87 Even though Ladeur notes the dynamic 
shifts within the domestic and national accounts of administration, he does not 
outline whose interests will be taken into account in this process that describes 
the move from cases to regulation. Ladeur’s version of the evolutionary process 
within the national fields of law, as a move away from the legislators and the 
judges to one that is governed by networks, simply omits to mention the 
embedded power structures within and across these networks.88  
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A wholesome understanding global governance includes the rise of networks. 
This does not necessarily imply that these networks are impregnable to capture 
by special interest groups. Regulatory capture denotes the control of the 
“regulatory process by those whom it is supposed to regulate”. Regulatory 
capture is the process by which a small group, possibly those affected by 
regulation, takes control “with the consequence that regulatory outcomes favour 
the narrow “few” at the expense of society as a whole.89 The rise of networks 
does not take in to account the critical interventions from social scientists about 
the very nature of international law and its institutions. 
 
In pushing the boundaries of global administrative law, scholars like Ladeur 
identify the global administrative space and its ability to generate self-regulation 
as a form of spontaneous accountability. Accountability, however, is tied to 
specific biases endemic to interest groups that have captured the spontaneous 
legitimacy producing processes within the international institutions. For example, 
the United Nations Security Council’s created the two ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals to deliver justice and end impunity in the Balkans and Rwanda. 
There were a number of political factors that precipitated their decisions. For 
example, in creating the ICTY, UNSC was concerned with whether the newly 
formed Balkan states would ratify a treaty based international criminal institution. 
Similarly, with Rwanda, the Security Council worried about the criticisms about 
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the disproportionate attention to European problems. In addition to these political 
aspects, the Security Council was preoccupied with a particular set of political 
concerns: the desire to end impunity in the aftermath of the Cold War. In this 
light, it can be argued that a special interest group has captured the tribunals90 
and the interest group is committed to prosecuting those most responsible for the 
heinous crimes, even in cases where there is a clear lack of evidentiary basis to 
proceed.91 The role of experts outlined earlier is important in fostering this pro-
conviction bias.   
 
The employees of these tribunals are intricately connected to a pro-conviction 
bias endemic within their respective international criminal institution. The starting 
point of this pro-conviction bias is the manner in which these tribunals were 
created. The judges and their supporting staff (for example their Associate Legal 
Officers) believe that the accused before the ICTR committed these crimes. 
Their belief is predicated on the fact that the Hutu population of Rwanda 
committed the genocide and other acts prohibited by international law. This fact 
is intrinsically linked to the acceptance of the faulty witness statements.  
 
The arguments in favour of demonstrating a pro-conviction bias are based on 
experts that travel from tribunal to tribunal. As noted earlier, there is now a class 
of international experts that work on post-conflict justice issues who populate the 
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tribunals.92 These international criminal law experts maintain an almost nomadic 
lifestyle based on their professional affiliation to the respective tribunal. As part of 
this lifestyle, they move from one conflict hotspot to another.93 Scholars have 
chronicled the manner in which these international experts have gathered their 
expertise. Their expertise is based on a “lack of local knowledge of post-conflict 
settings, whether that is knowledge of the local legal system, local facts, local 
culture or any other relevant information”.94 To illustrate, 2014 ICTR Appeals 
Chamber Interns in The Hague may become Associate Legal Officers in Arusha, 
Tanzania six months after they have completed their internships. 95  These 
experts, once they have completed at least two years at a Tribunal may want to 
move to Cambodia or back to The Hague to join another tribunal adjudicating 
similar crimes. The content of the law that they work with may be the same but 
the nature of the conflict and the associated history of the regions are vastly 
different.  
 
The international criminal law experts are not  neutral. Their professional careers 
are based on the advancement of universalism by ending impunity and 
prosecuting the responsible war criminals. David Kennedy’s argument that the 
background norms of international institutions are much more relevant than we 
                                            
92 Bhupinder Chimni, "International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making" 
(2004) 15:1 EJIL 1. 
93 Baylis, “Tribunal Hopping” supra note 90 at 364; Thomas Skouteris, “The New Tribunalism: 
Strategies of (De)Legitimzation in the Era of Adjudication” (2006) XVII Finnish YB of Intl L  307 at 
312. 
94 Baylis, “Tribunal Hopping” supra note 90 at 383; Sujith Xavier, “Theorising Global Governance 
Inside Out: A Response to Professor Ladeur” (2013) 3 Transnational Leg Theory 268. 
95 There is a mandatory grace period that is enforced by the UN for interns wanting to return to 
the Tribunal. 
 246 
had originally thought is important in understanding this process.96 The experts’ 
politics shape the results of the adjudicatory process. The adjudicatory process 
is meant to be objective where the accused is given a fair trial. However, our 
international criminal law experts manage background norms, and this 
managerial function results in the determination of how the tribunals operate.97 
As Kennedy has noted, what really matters at the global institutional level is not 
what is in the foreground (the tribunals) or the context (Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia). Rather the experts have “colonized the foreground and the 
context”.98  
 
The judges and their expert’s pro-conviction bias is significant to both the 
accused and the international community. The pro-conviction bias is rooted 
inherently in the way international law is constructed, as part of the dynamic of 
difference.99 As noted earlier, notwithstanding the western guilt, the ICTR was 
created as a means to bridge the gap between two cultures: the civilised and the 
uncivilised. The ICTR was created to bridge the gap between the civilized 
international community and the uncivilized Rwandans and to render justice. The 
tribunal was modelled on an adjudicatory system where the judges were given 
                                            
96 David Kennedy, “Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global governance” (2005) 27 
Sydney J Intl L 8. 
97 Galit Sarfaty, “Measuring Justice: Internal Conflict over the World Bank's Empirical Approach to 
Human Rights” in Kamari Clarke & Mark Goodale eds, Mirrors of Justice: Law and Power in the 
Post-Cold War Era (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009); Annelise Riles, "Collateral 
Expertise Legal Knowledge in the Global Financial Markets" (2010) 51:6 Current Anthropology 
795 at 796. 
98 David Kennedy, “Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global governance” (2005) 27 
Sydney J Intl L 8 at 12. 
99Anghie, Imperialism supra note 52 at 4 & 13-31. 
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the power to legislate through the rules of evidence and procedure. Moreover, 
and building on the political nature of spontaneous accountability creation, 
insights from a historical perspective of international law can be used to illustrate 
that international law is not neutral in how it operates, and demonstrate how it is 
used to generalise a specific set of western values and traditions.100  
 
The very structure of international law includes embedded politics and a 
particular universalistic narrative that is difficult to overcome.101 More importantly, 
the origins of international law foster a specific “set of structures that continually 
repeat themselves at various stages in the history of the discipline”.102 This 
dynamic of international law therefore encourages regulatory capture by 
emphasising specific western set of values and traditions. These values and 
traditions are predominantly western, given the role of the experts and where 
they come from.  
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s history with witness testimony 
is an illustrative example of western universalism. There is regulatory capture by 
special interests that want to facilitate and expedite the prosecutions of alleged 
perpetrators of international crimes. This process starts with the experts that 
populate these institutions and continues up to the judges and the Security 
Council. Such actions may be analogous to the use of international law to further 
                                            
100Ibid at 13-31. 
101 Ibid at 13-31. 
102 Ibid at 7. 
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colonial expansion as witnessed through the civilising mission discussed earlier. 
In this example, the narrative of ending impunity and delivering justice to the 
victims of mass human rights violations is used as means to spread western 
universalism. This is particularly obvious when the assumed objectivity of 
adjudicators, litigators and witnesses are examined. In these instances, there is 
an absence of contextual understanding of Rwanda. More importantly there are 
difficulties in interpreting the witness testimony that support the decisions 
rendered. Arguably, Nancy Combs’ empirical research highlights the explicit 
decisions within these tribunals, which then serve to push against and most often 
contradict, the claims deployed by global administrative law scholars.  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
Globalisation and the fragmentation of international law have led scholars to 
theorise global governance in multiple ways. In the previous chapter, I chronicled 
the efforts of writers to think about this problem through the lens of global 
constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation. In this chapter, I engaged 
scholars writing about global governance through the lens of global 
administrative law. I reviewed two distinct attempts to understand administration 
as global governance. The first was a purely descriptive account of international 
institutions and their use of administrative law principles. In this example, 
scholars argue that the deployment of administrative principles in international 
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institutions can fill the democracy deficit and usher in notions of accountability.103 
As I have illustrated, these claims are not possible. As the evidence from the 
ICTR reveals, even though it is possible to describe the tribunal’s operation in 
terms of administrative law principles, this does not mean that the use of these 
principles lead to more accountability. In fact, arguing for the existence of such 
principles obscures international law’s deeply unbalanced history of 
universalising a specific set of western norms and how international institutions, 
including the ICTR, are imbricated in this history.  
 
The second, as encapsulated within the writings of Karl-Heinz Ladeur, suggests 
that global administrative law must acknowledge administrative law’s 
postmodernism. Previously existing articulations of global administrative law 
must transcend notions of delegation and accountability as a means to secure 
legitimacy within the global space. These concepts, Ladeur notes, are wedded to 
out-dated understandings of the modern nation and ignore societal 
transformations. These transformations, as part of the evolutionary process, 
have generated the capacity to produce spontaneous accountability by networks. 
Global administrative law’s focus, therefore, should not be on generating control 
of compliance rules. Rather for Ladeur, by focusing on entangled hierarchies and 
processes of generating spontaneous accountability through the rise of 
networks, global administrative law should take on a postmodern understanding 
                                            
103 Richard B. Stewart, The normative dimensions and performance of global administrative law" 
(2015) 13 (2) Intl J Constitutional L 499 at 500. 
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of administration. Ladeur’s does not take into account the role of special interest 
in these networks that he relies. 
 
Ultimately, these characterisations of international institutions and the various 
international regulatory bodies are missing the mark by focusing solely on the 
general legal frameworks, rather than embracing the internal dynamics 
emblematic within these institutions. Depicting a very singular narrative that 
focuses on the law on the books, as witnessed by scholars based in Berlin, 
Hamburg, London, New York, and Toronto is not useful. Much more importantly, 
theorising from this superficial perspective may not help us understand the 
different political compromises involved in how international law and its 
institutions are created and how they operate. The description of the international 
legal order cannot be a single story. 
 
There is a need to move beyond this type of a single, universalising, linear, and 
decontextualized narrative. In this vein, the following chapter is my attempt to 
think about how we can theorise global governance from the bottom-up, 
beginning with the global South.   
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Chapter 5:  Theorising from Below? Global South & Third World 
Approaches to International Law and Global Governance  
5.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters, I examined two contemporary theoretical frameworks 
currently used by international legal scholars to theorise global governance. 
These scholars argue that the conditions brought about by globalisation and 
fragmentation spur on the need to usher in accountability and legitimacy into 
international law and its institutions. These scholars suggest that it is possible to 
usher in accountability and legitimacy through global constitutionalism and global 
administrative law. In this chapter, I focus on how to transcend the problems that 
I identified in the previous discussions about global constitutionalism and global 
administrative law.  
 
In my previous analysis, I showed that the first global governance theory uses 
both constitutionalism and constitutionalisation to identify existing legitimacy-
producing mechanisms in international law and its institutions. Scholars working 
in this area suggest that international law and its institutions exhibit 
characteristics akin to constitutionalism and constitutionalisation. 1  Under the 
banner of global constitutionalism, some scholars argue that international law 
should be used to create a better world by imagining a better constitutional 
                                            
1 David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus 
(London: Polity Press, 2004/2013); Jürgen Habermas, Divided West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2006); David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington 
Consensus (London: Polity Press, 2004). 
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future. 2  For example, the United Nations Charter is imagined as a world 
constitution.3   
 
The second global governance theory focuses on recent attempts to imagine 
global governance as administration.4 For those working in global administrative 
law, contemporary international institutions are making use of administrative law 
principles. 5  Those analogising from Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions identify 
administrative law norms within international regimes.6 By taking inspiration from 
domestic administrative law,7 global administrative lawyers argue that the entire 
collection of norms, principles and doctrines that weave together domestic 
administrative law can be found globally.8 By demonstrating the presence, or 
possibilities, of these norms, they suggest that the current international 
regulatory framework explicitly demonstrates or has the potential to produce 
accountability. Richard Stewart recently suggests the following: “Despite vast 
differences in institutional and political circumstances, experience confirms that 
                                            
2 Neil Walker, “Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context” in Matej Avbelj and Jan 
Komarek, eds, Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2012) 17; A similar argument was recently made by global administrative law 
scholars, see Richard B. Stewart, The normative dimensions and performance of global 
administrative law" (2015) 13 (2) Intl J Constitutional L 499 at 500. 
3Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A. Constitutional 
Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998). 
4Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law” (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15 [Kingsbury et al, “Emergence of GAL”]. 
5  Ibid; Karl-Heinz Ladeur “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and Transnational 
Regulation” (2013) 3:3 Transnational Leg Theory 243. 
6 Sabino Cassese, Bruno Carotti, Lorenzo Casini, Eleonora Cavalieri and Euan MacDonald, 
“Foreword” in Sabino Cassese, Bruno Carotti, Lorenzo Casini, Eleonora Cavalieri and Euan 
MacDonald eds, Global Administrative Law: The Casebook (Rome Edinburgh New York: ILRP, 
2013) at XXIII [S. Cassese et al, “Foreword”]. 
7 See chapter 4, Section 4.2.2 for a much a robust discussion of postmodern administrative law. 
8 S. Cassese et al, “Foreword” supra note 6 at XXIV. 
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use of administrative law mechanisms in global administration can help protect 
the rights of individuals threatened with sanctions and […] secure greater regard 
for the politically weak and vulnerable”.9    
 
In describing the various positions within these theoretical discussions on how to 
usher legitimacy and accountability into international law and its institutions, I 
identified a number of problems. The central shortcoming of these two accounts 
of global governance theory is that they ignore and obscure the true nature of 
international law and its institutions. As I have demonstrated in the earlier 
chapters, this is part of a larger trend in international law and its where they 
deploy the western particular are the universal. This particular facet of 
international law can be rooted in its history and the manner in which it was 
forged. As illustrated by Antony Anghie, the early beginnings of international law 
are imbricated in a universal narrative, starting with the manner in which the 
sovereignty doctrine was created.10 This particular aspect of international law 
continues to this day, even in the manner in which we theorise international law 
and its institutions.11 
  
I have relied on a body of literature that seeks to position the global South in 
contradistinction to the global North. By drawing on this body of scholarship, this 
                                            
9 Richard B. Stewart, The normative dimensions and performance of global administrative law" 
(2015) 13 (2) Intl J Constitutional L 499 at 500. 
10 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) [Anghie, Imperialism]. 
11 For a recent attempt to demonstrate the universalism of international law and international 
institutions, see Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic 
Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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chapter explores the various means by which we can overcome the universalism 
imbedded in international law and international institutions. In the global 
constitutionalism chapter, I identified two potential ways in which we can 
transcend the limitations of global constitutionalism. In this chapter, I want to 
return to recent scholarly interventions that engage with the lived realities of the 
people of the global South. This chapter asks: how can international lawyers and 
international law scholars learn from the global South? This question prompts 
another related question: should we learn from the global South?12 The second 
question will be explored first. 
 
This chapter builds on contemporary literature on the global South so that we 
may learn from these diverse perspectives in theorising global governance. 
Some scholars, such as Boaventura De Sousa Santos, have expressly called for 
such a reorientation:13  
 
The antinomies, difficulties, and hard cases analysed […] demand 
that at the beginning of the new millennium we distance ourselves 
from Eurocentric critical thinking. To create such a distance is the 
precondition for the fulfilment of the most crucial theoretical task of 
our time: that the unthinkable be thought, that the unexpected be 
assumed as an integral part of the theoretical work. […] I submit 
that, in the current context of social political transformation, rather 
than vanguard theories we need rearguard theories. I have in mind 
theoretical work that follows and shares the practices of the social 
                                            
12 This second question is prompted by Sundhya Pahuja’s astute reflection during an informal 
conversation during the TWAIL 2015 Cairo conference: should we theorise global governance 
from the perspectives of the global South. 
13 Jean Comaroff & John Comaroff, Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving 
Toward Africa (The Radical Imagination) (London: Paradigm Publisher, 2012) [Comaroff & 
Comaroff, Theory]; Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, “Introduction”, in Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, ed, 
Constitutionalism of the Global South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
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movements very closely, raising questions, establishing synchronic 
and diachronic comparisons, symbolically enlarging such practices 
by means of articulations, translations, and possible alliances with 
other movements, providing contexts, clarifying or dismantling 
normative injunctions, facilitating interactions with those that walk 
more slowly, and bringing complexity when actions seem rushed 
and unreflective and simplicity when action seems self-paralyzed by 
reflection.14 
 
Others have posited examples from the global South as an interruption to the 
Eurocentric focus on constitutional theory.15 The scholars who have expressly 
called for this reorientation arrive from various disciplinary destinations, including 
law. They challenge the manner in which we imagine the global South. They 
argue that the global South is not a carbon copy of the North; rather, it is 
particular in its development. This development therefore should be celebrated. 
From this vantage point, turning to the global South provides an opportunity to 
glean new insights about international law and its institutions.  
 
In what follows, I will set out the basis for this reorientation towards the global 
South. Then I will pursue the global South literature in international law, by 
focusing on the broad theoretical foundations of the Third World Approaches to 
                                            
14 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide 
(London: Paradigm Publisher, 2014) at 44. 
15 Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, “Introduction”, in Daniel Bonilla Maldonado ed, Constitutionalism of 
the Global South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) [Bonilla, “Introduction”]; Jackie 
Dugard, “Courts and structural poverty in South Africa: To what extent has the Constitutional 
Court expanded access and remedies to the poor?” in Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, ed, 
Constitutionalism of the Global South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Manuel 
Iturralde, “Access to Constitutional Justice in Colombia: Opportunities and Challenges for Social 
and Political Change” in Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, ed, Constitutionalism of the Global South 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Menaka Guruswamy & Bipin Aspatwar, “Access 
to Justice in India: The Jurisprudence (and Self-Perception) of the Supreme Court” in Daniel 
Bonilla Maldonado, ed., Constitutionalism of the Global South (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013).  
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International Law (TWAIL) movement. TWAIL scholarship is a reaction against 
the colonial and imperial projects of international law. I set out its main claims 
and then examine its proposals. This arrives at an answer to the second 
question: should we learn from the global South? 
 
Then, I explore the question of how can we learn from the global South. In 
answering this question, I offer two insights. The first is based on the premise of 
international law as a field of practice. Often, international lawyers and 
international law scholars tend to examine the legal mechanisms and the 
ensuing doctrines of international law without reference to geo-political, 
economic, social, and cultural contexts. Chapter three on global constitutionalism 
conveyed that scholars were preoccupied with mapping the existing international 
structures to suggest the existence of a constitutional order. Thinking about 
international law as a field of practice can illuminate its unlit corners that are 
constituted by diverse set of forces at play in today’s society, rather than solely 
focusing on issues of legality. In order to focus on international law as a field of 
practice, we must gather more insights about international law and its institutions 
through ethnographies. The second insight that I offer attempts to problematise 
the ethics of international legal scholarship. In this regard, I focus on the role of 
international lawyers and international law scholars and their ethical obligations 
in light of the material reality of the global South.  
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5.2 Theorising Global Governance from the Global South? 
Scholars from numerous disciplines, such as anthropology, cultural studies, 
history, political science and others, have examined the relationship of the global 
North to the global South. They have sought to critically question the pejorative 
and antiquated understandings the West has of the rest of the world.16  These 
writers have focused on how the global South is imagined and produced,17 and 
the role of national liberation struggles in combating the enduring effects of 
colonialism.18 Early anti-colonial and post-colonial literature has also examined 
this relationship between the global North and the global South.   
 
With this frame of reference, this chapter examines scholarly interventions that 
suggest we should turn to the global South as a site of knowledge production. I 
will focus on the writings of two anthropologists and a comparative constitutional 
and international lawyer. These scholars argue for a specific reorientation 
towards the global South. This will lead into an examination of the reconstructive 
elements embedded in TWAIL. Over the past twenty years, TWAIL scholars 
have sought to critically evaluate international law and its institutions. 
Unfortunately, these interventions have not had a significant influence in 
                                            
16 There is a large body of literature that follows this line of argumentation with a broader focus 
on colonialism and imperialism; see for example Achilles Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 2001); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial 
Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Kamari Clake, 
Fictions of Justice: International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
17 Edward S. Said, Orientalism (New York: Random House, 1979). 
18 Frantz Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1952); Frantz Fanon, The 
Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963). 
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international legal theory,19 in particular in global administrative law or global 
constitutionalism. 20  Accordingly, I use this chapter to examine the diverse 
arguments housed under the moniker of TWAIL in order to understand TWAIL’s 
reformist agenda and to embed this reformist agenda within conversations on 
global governance theories.  
5.2.1 Interdisciplinary Reorientation towards the global South 
Contemporary scholarship has built upon a tradition of critique by questioning 
how the empire speaks to, and can speak about, the metropole. In this vein, 
Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff’s 2012 Theory From The South is a text rich 
in ideas. They start their contribution by noting: 
 
Western enlightenment thought has, from the first, posited itself as 
the wellspring of universal learning, of Science and Philosophy, 
upper case; concomitantly, it has regarded the non-West—variously 
known as the Ancient World, the Orient, the Primitive World, the 
Third World, the Underdeveloped World, the Developing World, and 
now the Global South—primarily as a place of parochial wisdom, of 
antiquarian traditions, of exotic ways and means. Above all, of 
unprocessed data. These other worlds, in short, are treated less as 
sources of refined knowledge than as reservoirs of raw fact: of the 
minutiae from which Euromodernity might fashion its testable 
                                            
19Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters, Introduction: Towards A Global History of International Law 
in Bardo Fassbender et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 2; A recent exception to the rule is Zoran Oklopcic, 
“Provincializing Constitutional Pluralism” (2014) 5:2 Transnational Leg Theory 200 at 203. A 
similar question was raised by Critical Race Scholars in the United States in the early 1980s; see 
for example Richard Delgado, “The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What 
Minorities Want?”, (1987) 22 Harv CR-CLL Rev 301; Richard Delgado, “Critical Race Theory: An 
Annotated Bibliography”, (1993) 79 Va L Rev 461 at 461. 
20 Bonilla, “Introduction” supra note 15 at 11; But see Peer Zumbansen, “Defining the Space of 
Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance & Legal Pluralism” (2012) 21:1 Transnat’l L 
& Contemporary Probs accessed online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934044; Peer Zumbansen, 
Comparative, Global and Transnational Constitutionalism: The Emergence of a Transnational 
Legal-Pluralist Order, (2012) 1:1 Global Constitutionalism 16-52; Peer Zumbansen, starting with 
his Transnational Legal Pluralism article, has argued that global governance scholarship must 
take TWAIL scholarship seriously.  
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theories and transcendent truths. […] But what if, and here is the 
idea in interrogative form, we invert that Order of Things? What if 
we posit that, in the present moment, it is the so-called ‘Global 
South’ that affords privileged insight into the workings of the world at 
large? That it is from here that our empirical grasp of its lineaments, 
and our theory-work in accounting for them, ought to be coming, at 
least in major part?21 
 
Their proposal is based on the realisation that contemporary actors, norms, and 
processes are reconfiguring our understandings of the core-and-periphery. 
Because of the processes of globalisation, the global South is experiencing 
“some of the most innovative and energetic modes of producing value” and this 
is the “driving impulse of contemporary capitalism as both a material and cultural 
formation”.22 Whether it is to mine mineral resources23 or fabricate clothing, it is 
an accepted fact that most materials are now produced cheaply and quickly in 
the global South. Moreover, various modes of governance techniques are being 
deployed in the global South. In order to grasp the history of the present, both 
empirically and theoretically, they suggest that we must study the global South.24  
 
Comaroff and Comaroff’s argument that the global South can open new vistas 
into the way in which our world works is built on two interrelated arguments. 
First, based on insights developed over the last 100 years, they argue that 
                                            
21 Comaroff & Comaroff, Theory supra note 13 at 1. 
22 Ibid at 22. 
23Charis Kamphuis "Foreign Investment and the Privatization of Coercion: A Case Study of the 
Forza Security Company in Peru" (2011-2012) 37 Brook J Intl L 529; Edward Bearnot, 
“Bangladesh: A Labor Paradox’, The World Policy Institute”, online: (May 2013) “Join the 
Conversation”, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2013/Bangladesh - Labor - Paradox>. 
24 Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff, “Theory from the South: Or, how Euro-America is Evolving 
Toward Africa” (2012) 22:2 Anthropological Forum: J Social Anthropology & Comparative 
Sociology 113 at 117 [Comaroff & Comaroff, “Theory from the South”]; Comaroff & Comaroff, 
Theory supra note 13 at 7.  
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modernity, 25  particularly in the African continent (and the global South by 
extension), cannot be understood as a carbon copy, derivative, a Doppelgänger 
or a counterfeit of the Western (American and European) original.26  
 
The term “modernity” has captured the imagination of various scholars. It 
describes the processes of globalisation beginning in the 15th and 16th centuries 
and this process continues today. It is a treacherous, and often contested, 
concept. 27  It is about the shift from traditional modes of governance and 
production to the contemporary modes of regulation with which we are now 
familiar. Modernity is concerned with the transition from the traditional to the 
new, as understood through teleological notions of progress.28   
 
Dipesh Chakrabarty offers a concrete articulation of political modernity:  
 
[…] The phenomenon of “political modernity” — namely, the rule by 
modern institutions of the state, bureaucracy, and capitalist 
                                            
25 For a cursory discussion of the term in the context of international law, see John D. Haskell, 
“The Traditions of Modernity within International Law and Governance: Christianity, Liberalism 
and Marxism” Howard University School of Law, Human Rights & Globalization L Rev (Fall 2014, 
Forthcoming); Comaroff & Comaroff, “Theory from the South” supra note 24 at 118-119 . 
26 Ibid at 117; Comaroff & Comaroff, Theory supra note 13 at 7. 
27 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Pala 
Alto: Stanford University Press, 1991); Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press) at 10; Latour addresses the question of what does it mean to be 
modern with the following: “Modernity comes in as many versions as there are thinkers or 
journalists, yet all its definitions point, in one way or another, to the passage of time. The 
adjective 'modem' designates a new regime, an acceleration, a rupture, a revolution in time. 
When the word 'modern', 'modernization', or 'modernity' appears, we are defining, by contrast, an 
archaic and stable past. Furthermore, the word is always being thrown into the middle of a fight, 
in a quarrel where there are winners and losers, Ancients and Moderns. 'Modern' is thus doubly 
asymmetrical: it designates a break in the regular passage of time, and it designates a combat in 
which there are victors and vanquished”.   
28 Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Is the Post- in Postmodernism the Post- in Postcolonial?” (1991) 
17:2 Critical Inquiry 336 at 341-342. 
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enterprise—is impossible to think of anywhere in the world without 
invoking certain categories and concepts, the genealogies of which 
go deep into the intellectual and even theological traditions of 
Europe. Concepts such as citizenship, the state, civil society, public 
sphere, human rights, equality before the law, the individual, 
distinctions between public and private, the idea of the subject, 
democracy, popular sovereignty, social justice, scientific rationality, 
and so on all bear the burden of European thought and history. One 
simply cannot think of political modernity without these and other 
related concepts that found a climactic form in the course of the 
European Enlightenment and the nineteenth century.29 
 
Similarly, Comaroff and Comaroff suggest that modernity is an orientation about 
how to be in the world. It encapsulates ideas of identity, consciousness, and 
progress, which in itself is closely tied to the idea of modernisation.30  
 
Modernity, in the continent of Africa specifically, and in the global South 
generally, has its own diverse and multipronged path. Such a trajectory has 
shaped the “moral and material” everyday life of the global South. 31 They have 
produced different means through which to make sense of the surrounding lived 
reality of every person. Comaroff and Comaroff characterise this activity as 
fashioning “social relations, commodities, and forms of value appropriate to 
                                            
29 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference  
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008) at 4. 
30 “Modernity refers to an orientation to being-in-the-world, to a variably construed and variably 
inhabited Weltanschauung, to a concept of the person as self-conscious subject, to an ideal of 
humanity as species being, to a vision of history as a progressive, man-made construction, to an 
ideology of improvement through the accumulation of knowledge and technological skill, to the 
pursuit of justice by means of rational governance; to a relentless impulse toward innovation 
whose very iconoclasm breeds a hunger for things eternal (cf. Harvey 1989, 10). Modernization, 
by contrast, posits a strong, normative teleology, a unilinear trajectory toward a particular vision 
of the future—capitalist, socialist, fascist, whatever—to which all humanity should aspire, to 
which all history ought to lead and all peoples should evolve, if at different rates”; Comaroff & 
Comaroff, “Theory from the South” supra note 24 at 118-119. 
31 Comaroff & Comaroff, Theory supra note 13 at 8. 
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contemporary circumstances”. 32  Much more importantly, this lived reality is 
calibrated by the impact of capitalism, colonial contact, and more recently by 
internationalism and globalism. Africa’s own modernity has given rise to “iconic 
cultural forms, like popular Christianity, or mass-mediated musical modes, or 
cinematic genres”.33 African modernity is a “discursive construct and an empirical 
fact” that relates to the traumatic history that was made, and that is continuing to 
be made.34 Yet the global South is posited as the younger backwards child of the 
North that is often trying desperately to catch up.  
 
The second argument relates to the manner in which the global South is 
constructed in our collective imagination. This argument is simple: the processes 
of capitalism and globalisation,35 as we understand them today, were forged and 
deployed first in the global South. In their own articulation, Comaroff and 
Comaroff suggest that the “regions in the South tend first to feel the concrete 
effects of world-historical processes as they play themselves out, thus to 
prefigure the future of the former metropole”.36 As the acceleration of the various 
modes of production by different actors, processes, and norm generators 
expand, it is the global South that is experiencing these repercussions first. This 
insight is invaluable for the current purpose of how we theorise global 
                                            
32 Ibid at 8. 
33 Comaroff & Comaroff, “Theory from the South” supra note 24 at 118. 
34 Comaroff & Comaroff, Theory supra note 13 at 8. 
34 Ibid at 8. 
35  Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Globalizations" (2006) 23 Theory Culture Society 393; 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and 
Emancipation (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002).  
36 Comaroff & Comaroff, “Theory from the South” supra note 24 at 121. 
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governance. As international lawyers like David Kennedy have suggested, the 
global South is where the global governance rubber hits the road.37  
 
In the context of law, Daniel Bonilla’s arguments are analogous to the above 
claims. In his collection of essays in Constitutionalism of the South, he examines 
how the Colombian Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
and the Indian Supreme Court can contribute to modern understandings of 
constitutionalism.38 His point of departure is to recognise the Eurocentricism in 
constitutional theory. Constitutionalism is usually reliant upon Western legal 
thinkers, which results in the exclusion of knowledge production from the global 
South. Bonilla characterises this as the relegation of legal thinkers from the 
global South to “particularly low level” priority and importance.39  
 
In asserting this characterisation, Bonilla makes five arguments. First, he argues 
that legal systems in the global South reproduce the legal systems of the global 
North. Second, Western contributions to legal theory and the adoption of the 
Western legal systems by countries in the global South have reified the claim 
                                            
37David Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, eds, 
Ruling the World; Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) at 41 [Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance”]. 
38 Bonilla thus states: “The book aims to open the discussion about the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court of Colombia, the Indian Supreme Court, and the South African Constitutional 
Court. The articles gathered in this book explore the jurisprudence of these courts on three 
matters: social and economic rights, cultural diversity, and access to justice. These three topics 
are directly related to poverty and inequality, political violence, cultural minorities and the 
consolidation of the rule of law – issues that are fundamental in these three countries. The book 
also aims to bridge the gap that exists between the Global South and Global North on 
constitutional matters. Finally, it aims to make explicit the need to widen the number of 
authoritative interpreters of modern constitutionalism”; Bonilla, “Introduction” supra note 15 at 29. 
39 Ibid at 4. 
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that the legal systems of the global South are similar to the legal systems of the 
global North. This reification has led to the notion that there is little value in 
understanding the global South as a site of unique legal knowledge or rich legal 
traditions.40 Third, the indifference demonstrated by scholars of the global North 
is based on an alleged formalism of the laws in the global South, which 
ostensibly demonstrates the global South’s backwardness and 
underdevelopment. However there is merit in global North scholars studying the 
issues of social justice in the global South as a way to ameliorate the conditions 
of those living there. Ultimately, if one were to pursue this argument, its results 
would be that the global South can be enlightened through the scholarship from 
the global North by showing the underdeveloped how to use law for their 
betterment. The fourth argument is that the academic knowledge production of 
the global North is deemed to be much more robust than the academic 
knowledge production of the global South. Finally, Bonilla stipulates that the 
“closed and parochial character of U.S. legal academy, along with the selective 
openness of most of Western Europe’s legal academy, discourages any dialogue 
with the legal institutions of the [g]lobal South”.41  
 
Bonilla’s arguments generate three rules that “govern the production, circulation, 
and use of legal knowledge”:42  the well of production rule43 ; the protected 
designation of origin rule44; and the effective operator rule.45 
                                            
40 Ibid at 6. 
41 Ibid at 6. 
42 Ibid at 9. 
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The according to the first rule, the global North is the only place able to produce 
legal knowledge. This signifies that the global South is incapable of producing 
original knowledge and that it simply replicates knowledge from other sources. 
Bonilla is accurate in his description of this normative tendency, which is evident 
in how we theorise global governance today. When discussing the descriptive 
accounts of global constitutionalism, there is a propensity to rely on European 
models, European authors and the European experience. For example, in the 
discussions about the descriptive accounts of global constitutionalism, Klabbers, 
Peters, and Ulfstein rely on principles from the European Union and its 
adjudicatory frameworks as illustrative of global constitutionalism. 46  
 
The second rule suggests that all knowledge produced in the North should be 
respected and recognised. This particular insight is extremely valuable to this 
discussion. Even though scholars from the Third World (and their allies) have 
been active in international law and its institutions, their critical insights have not 
been adopted into the literature of global administrative law 47  and global 
                                                                                                                                 
43 “This states that the only context for the production of knowledge is the legal academia in the 
North”; Ibid at 9. 
44 “This indicates that all knowledge produced in the North is worthy of respect and recognition 
per se, given the context from which it emerges”; Ibid at 10. 
45 “This rule indicates that academics and legal institutions from the North are much better trained 
to make effective and legitimate use of legal knowledge than academics and legal institutions 
from the South”; Ibid at 11. 
46 Jan Klabbers, “Setting the Scene” in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein eds, The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
47 In the context of global administrative law, the main interlocutors often cite to Bhupinder 
Chinmni’s work on global administrative law. This reference simply acknowledges that there are 
scholars like Chimni that challenge the central assertions of global administrative law from the 
perspective of the Third World. For a recent example, see Richard B. Stewart, The normative 
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constitutionalism. This critique is similar to the reflections of Richard Delgado in 
1992 about civil rights scholarship. Delgado noted that an: “inner circle of twenty-
six scholars, all male and white, occupied the central arenas of civil rights 
scholarship to the exclusion of contributions of minority scholars. When a 
member of this inner circle wrote about civil rights issues he cited almost 
exclusively to other members of the circle for support”. 48  Similarly in our 
discussions about global administrative law and global constitutionalism, there is 
a reluctance to even acknowledge the presence of Third World-based 
scholarship.49     
The final rule - effective operator - indicates that, when compared to their global 
South counterparts, the institutions and the academic community of the global 
North are much better equipped and trained to make use of legal knowledge. 
The analysis provided in the first chapter on the history of international law and 
its institutions is relevant in this instance. Experts in the international criminal law 
context move quickly from one tribunal to another, taking with them their 
particular sense of expertise.50 Their expertise and the institutions are evidence 
of the Bonilla’s effective operator rule.   
 
                                                                                                                                 
dimensions and performance of global administrative law" (2015) 13 (2) Intl J Constitutional L 
499 at footnote 2. 
48 Richard Delgado, “The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How To Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten 
Years Later” (1992) 140 U Pa L Rev at 1352. 
49 For a recent example, see Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters, Introduction: Towards A Global 
History of International Law in Bardo Fassbender et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the History 
of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 2. 
50 See Chapter, section 1.4.1.2.  
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In short, Bonilla’s work illustrates the current reality in legal theories about global 
constitutionalism and global administrative law. This is specifically true in terms 
of the argument that many fields of the global South academy tend to repurpose 
original thinking from the global North.  
 
Bonilla’s assertions are grounded in Comaroff and Comaroff’s claim that to 
understand the history of the present vis-à-vis theories about constitutionalism 
for example, both empirically and theoretically, we must study these phenomena 
in the global South.51 This is predicated on two interrelated arguments. The first 
is that the modernities of the global South are unique and must be understood on 
their own terms. Second, the daily modalities of capitalism and globalisation are 
experienced first in the global South. Thus, in order to understand the dynamics 
of global governance we must turn to the global South as the harbinger of the 
future.52 Bonilla’s arguments thus demonstrate the urgency in this endeavour by 
illustrating the lack of self-awareness in literature from the global North about the 
global South.  
 
The merits of Bonilla’s claims can be examined through the different types of 
legal norms, and the doctrines used to interpret these norms. Bonilla suggests 
that these arguments and rules tend to obscure reality by hiding the diversity of 
                                            
51 Comaroff & Comaroff, “Theory from the South” supra note 24 at 117; Comaroff & Comaroff, 
Theory supra note 13 at 7.  
52 This argument is not without criticism. For instance, the reliance on the global South as an 
experiment for the future seems rather odd and ill informed. For example there may be a 
tendency to romantaise the experience of the global South. 
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the global South’s legal communities, both in terms of knowledge that is 
produced and the strength of the different academic communities located 
therein. Fundamentally, the various arguments and their resulting rules 
categorically ignore the rich and valuable theories and doctrines that are being 
produced by the global South. Bonilla’s collection of essays ultimately seeks to 
initiate a conversation about what we can learn from the global South.53  I 
highlighted some of the arguments from South Africa and Colombia in the global 
constitutionalism chapter. 
 
Bonilla’s contributions signify a number of important observations about global 
administrative law and global constitutionalism, which I briefly raised earlier. The 
first rule about the well of production is visible in the discussions on legitimacy of 
international law and its institutions. Even though there are significant overtures 
to include scholars from the global South (especially in terms of their physical 
presence in edited collections, journal articles, and conferences54), the current 
field of global governance theory vis-à-vis international law and its institutions 
can be characterised as devoid of contextual analysis from the perspective of the 
global South.55 For example, there is an assumption that Northern scholars’ 
cursory top-down view of how international institutions operate may capture the 
essence of how these international institutions actually function in their 
                                            
53 Bonilla, “Introduction” supra note 15 at 29-30. 
54 B.S Chimni, “Cooption and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law” (2006) 37 
NYUJ Intl L & Pol 799. 
55 For example Yoav Meer, "The Notion of State: The Palestinian’s National Authority’s Attempt 
to Bring a Claim in Front of the International Criminal Court Against Israel" in Sabino Cassese, 
Bruno Carotti, Lorenzo Casini, Eleonora Cavalieri and Euan MacDonald, eds, Global 
Administrative Law: The Casebook (Rome Edinburgh New York: ILRP, 2013) at 47-51.  
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respective contexts, such as the ICTR’s operations in Arusha, Tanzania. This 
analysis reinforces Bonilla’s positing that the “only context for the production of 
knowledge is the legal academia in the North”. 56  By ignoring the relevant 
discussions about the global South, including the critical insights of the subaltern 
studies movement57  and its progenies,58  there is a reliance on the well of 
production rule in global governance theories.59 
 
The second and third rules - “protected designation of origin"60 and “effective 
operator”61 - are very much present in our conversations about international law 
and its institutions. We can broadly discern that there is a general emphasis that 
Northern legal knowledge production is worthy of respect and recognition “per 
se, given the context from which it emerges”.62 This can be illustrated by the 
                                            
56 Bonilla, “Introduction” supra note 15 at 9. 
57 There are various schools of thought within the subaltern studies movement. Scholars writing 
under the broad umbrella of subaltern studies movement include: Ranajit Guha, History at the 
Limit of World-History (Italian Academy Lectures) (New York: Columbia University Press 2002); 
Ranjit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, Delhi, 1983 & New edition: Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern 
Speak?” in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, eds, Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988) 271-313. 
58 See scholarship on TWAIL: Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni, “Third World Approaches to 
International and Individuals Responsibility in Internal Conflicts” (2003) 2:1 Chinese J Intl L  Law 
71 [Anghie & Chimni, “TWAIL and Individual Criminal Responsibility”]; B.S. Chimni, “The World of 
TWAIL: Introduction To the Special Issue” (2011) 3:1 Trade, L & Development 14at 20; James 
Gathii, “TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative 
Bibliography” (2011) 3(1) Trade, L & Development 26 [Gathii, “TWAIL: A Brief History”]; But see 
Karin Mickelson, “Taking Stock of TWAIL Histories,” (2008) 10 Intl Community L Rev355 
[Mickelson, “Taking Stock”]. 
59 See discussions in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
60 “This indicates that all knowledge produced in the North is worthy of respect and recognition 
per se, given the context from which it emerges”; Bonilla, “Introduction” supra note 15 at 10. 
61 “This rule indicates that academics and legal institutions from the North are much better trained 
to make effective and legitimate use of legal knowledge than academics and legal institutions 
from the South.” Ibid at 11. 
62 Ibid at 8-10. 
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failures of global administrative lawyers and global constitutionalism scholars to 
incorporate critical insights from and about the global South, as well as the 
results of liberal legalism on the lived realities of the people of the global South.63  
 
International criminal law scholarship provides further evidence of this omission. 
With the advent of the ICTY and the ICTR, as well as the creation of different 
international criminal institutions, English language international criminal law 
literature has generally focussed on the dynamics of the field. In particular, this 
literature has focussed on the dispensation of the anti-impunity agenda as 
constructed in the West and popularised by international non-governmental 
organisations. Scholars such as Anthony Anghie, Kamari Clarke, and Bhupinder 
Chimni have sought to question the liberal legalism of international criminal 
law.64  
 
Clarke has recently argued that there is an overemphasis on the prosecution of 
alleged war criminals.65  By reviewing the prosecution of Charles Taylor, the 
former Liberian leader by Special Court of Sierra Leone, Clarke suggests that the 
                                            
63 For a similar claim in the American domestic context, see Richard Delgado, "The Imperial 
Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature" (1984) 132 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 561 at footnote 2. 
64 Vasuki Nesiah, “The Trials Of History: Losing Justice In The Monstrous And The Banal” in 
Peer Zumbansen and Ruth Buchanan, eds, Law in Transition: Development, Rights and 
Transitional Justice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) [Nesiah, “Trials of History]; Makau Mutua, 
“Africa and the International Criminal Court: Closing the impunity gap”, The Broker Magazine 
(December 07, 2010) [Mutua, “Closing the Immunity Gap”]; Kamari M Clarke, Fictions of Justice: 
The International Criminal Court and the Challenges of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) [Clarke, Fictions of Justice]; Tim Kelsall, Culture 
under Cross-Examination: International Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) [Kelsall, Culture]. 
65 Kamari Clarke, "The Rule of Law Through Its Economies of Appearances: The Making of the 
African Warlord” (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Legal Studies 7 at 9. 
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focus on perpetrator responsibility elides and obfuscates the role of political 
economy in how the Sierra Leonean conflict started. She is acutely aware of the 
role of colonialism and the resource extraction industries in fuelling the conflict. 
Similarly, Anghie and Chimni, as early as 2003, were critical of international 
criminal justice. They argued that the shift to individual criminal responsibility and 
the move away from national prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity would not be productive.66 But the anti-impunity agenda, as reflected 
through the International Criminal Court’s prosecution policy, continues, ignorant 
to these critical reflections.67  
 
The above analysis suggests that there is a strong emphasis for a reorientation 
towards the global South as a site of knowledge. In the next section, I focus on 
TWAIL’s attempt to reorient its own field of inquiry.  
 
5.2.2 Third World Approaches to International Law  
TWAIL’s origins can be attributed to an emergence of both reactive and 
proactive scholarships against the various colonial and imperial projects of 
international law. The first ever TWAIL conference was organised at Harvard 
Law School in 1997.68 The movement has grown since then, and now includes 
scholars from diverse disciplines and locations. Accordingly, there have been a 
                                            
66 Anghie & Chimni, “TWAIL and Individual Criminal Responsibility” supra note 58. 
67 John Reynolds & Sujith Xavier, Taking Stock of Third World Perspectives on International 
Criminal Law, paper presented at Institute for Global Law and Policy conference on ‘New 
Directions in Global Thought’, Harvard University (3 June 2013) [manuscript on file with author]. 
68 A draft of the memo of the conference invitation is on file with the author.  
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number of conferences, with the most recent taking place in 2015 in Cairo, 
Egypt.  
 
Given the origins of its first conference, TWAIL’s foundations are rooted in critical 
scholarship, especially US legal realism, critical legal studies, feminism and 
critical race theory. 69  TWAIL’s origins can also be located in postcolonial 
theory.70 I note the controversy in tracing TWAIL’s origins to US-based legal 
theory, but TWAIL scholars have alluded to this connection themselves. For 
example, James Gathii, one of the graduate students who organised the first 
conference, states: 
 
In the spring of 1996, a group of Harvard Law School graduate 
students initiated a series of meetings to figure out whether it was 
feasible to have a third world approach to international law and what 
the main concerns of such an approach might be. On Friday, April 
26th, 1997 background papers were presented to the group by 
Bhupinder Chimni who was a Visiting Fellow at the Graduate 
Program at Harvard Law School in the 1995-1996 academic year 
and myself.71  
 
                                            
69 Gathii, “TWAIL: A Brief History” supra note 58 at 28. 
70 Frantz Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1952); Frantz Fanon, The 
Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963); Edward S. Said, Orientalism (New York: 
Random House, 1979); Achilles Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 2001). 
71 Gathii, “TWAIL: A Brief History” supra note 58 at 28 especially note 3; For a similar account, 
see Makau Mutua, "Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-Outsider" 
(2001) 45 Vill L Rev 84; Anghie & Chimni, “TWAIL and Individual Criminal Responsibility” supra 
note 58. 
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5.2.2.1 Contemporary TWAIL  
TWAIL can be characterised as an anti-hierarchical counter-hegemonic 
coalitionary movement that is deeply suspicious of universal creeds and truths.72 
It is anti-hierarchical because it challenges the Eurocentricity of the history of 
international law and continued propagation of particular monolithic universal 
values therein. These include, as demonstrated by this analysis in the previous 
chapters, specific claims to global administrative law and global constitutionalism 
as universal creeds. In a subversive turn, TWAIL scholars suggest a dialogic 
maneuverer across cultures. TWAIL calls for the recognition of existing inequities 
within the structures of international law. It also calls for the recognition of the 
subaltern voices and demands that all voices be represented.73  
 
Various scholarly views can be grouped under the TWAIL movement. The 
movement’s unifying raison d’etre is to: 
 
challenge the hegemony of the dominant narratives of international 
law, in large part by teasing out encounters of difference along 
many axes- race, class, gender, sex, ethnicity, economics, trade 
etc. – and in inter-disciplinary ways – social, theoretical, 
epistemological, ontological and so on.74  
 
                                            
72 Makau Mutua, “What is TWAIL?” (2000) 94 American Society Intl L Proceedings  31 [Mutua, 
“What is TWAIL”]. 
73Ibid; Antony Anghie, “What is TWAIL: Comment” (2000) 94 Am Soc Int’l Proc 39 
74 Gathii, “TWAIL: A Brief History” supra note 58 at 37. 
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By challenging these dominant narratives, TWAIL seeks to “reduce the distance 
of the world of international law from the lives of ordinary peoples”.75 
 
TWAIL scholars have identified two generational moments in the development of 
TWAIL scholarship. 76  The first moment can be classified as the work of 
international lawyers from the 1960s to 1980s. This is generally known as TWAIL 
I scholarship. Even though these lawyers did not classify their scholarship as 
such, and this type of classification is subject to some contestation,77 early 
TWAIL-minded scholars, such as Ram Prakash Anand, argued that international 
law legitimised the subjugation of the Third World. Moreover it was argued that 
the pre-colonial southern societies had a vernacular of international law prior to 
the colonial encounter.78 These scholars also recognised the impossibility of 
rejecting international law by the newly independent states. More importantly this 
group of scholars argued that the grammar of international law could be 
transformed to accommodate the demands of the global South. They argued that 
international law had the potential to be emancipatory and should be used as a 
way to de-colonise the global South.79 
 
                                            
75 B.S. Chimni, “The World of TWAIL: Introduction To the Special Issue” (2011) 3:1 Trade, L & 
Development 14at 20 [Chimni, “Introduction to Special Issue”].  
76 Gathii, “TWAIL: A Brief History” supra note 58 at 14; Anghie & Chimni, “TWAIL and Individual 
Criminal Responsibility” supra note 58. 
77 Mickelson, “Taking Stock” supra note 58. 
78 Anghie & Chimni, “TWAIL and Individual Criminal Responsibility” ” supra note 58 at 80. 
79 Ibid; Gathii, “TWAIL: A Brief History” supra note 58; But see Mickelson, “Taking Stock” supra 
note 58.  
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TWAIL II scholars, on the other hand, were much more theoretically attuned to 
politics, economics, international relations, and other interdisciplinary insights. 
They focussed on the relationship between law, markets, and society as a way to 
track the influence of colonialism and imperialism. They articulated the following 
powerful claim: “colonialism is central to the formation of international law”.80 This 
observation focused their attention on the role of the civilising mission in recent 
governance projects, such as the modern nation-state81. 
 
TWAIL II is deeply critical of the contributions of their predecessors as evidenced 
by the structuring of their arguments in direct opposition to TWAIL I. These 
scholars are critical of the post-colonial state: “TWAIL II scholars have developed 
powerful critiques of the Third World nation-state, of the processes of its 
formation and its resort to violence and authoritarianism”.82 TWAIL scholars are 
therefore interested in the lived realities of the people of the global South, and 
not simply the formal equality ushered in by decolonisation. By honing in on lived 
realities, these scholars continue to systematically decentre the grand narratives 
that are embedded within multiple doctrines of international law and its more 
recent progenies such as international rule of law, law and development, and 
human rights.  
 
                                            
80 Anghie & Chimni, “TWAIL and Individual Criminal Responsibility” ” supra note 58 at 84. 
81  Obiora C. Okafor, “After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the 
Construction of Legitimate Statehood in Africa” (2000) 41 Harv Intl LJ 503. 
82Anghie & Chimni, “TWAIL and Individual Criminal Responsibility” supra note 58 at 83. 
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Makau W. Mutua formulated TWAIL II’s three central tenets in 2000.83 The first is 
to understand, deconstruct, and unpack the uses of international law as a 
medium for the creation and perpetuation of a racialised hierarchy of 
international norms and institutions that sub-ordinate non-Europeans and 
Europeans alike.84 The recent scholarship under the auspice of TWAIL II can be 
grouped under these tenets. The previous chapters in this dissertation were 
conceptualised and written in this tradition. The second component of TWAIL is 
much more prescriptive in that it seeks to create alternative normative legal 
edifices for international governance. This is what I hope to achieve in this 
chapter. Third, through policy scholarship, TWAIL scholars aim to eradicate the 
conditions of underdevelopment in the global South (through praxis for 
example).85 This reformist agenda presents a natural opportunity for building 
bridges between conceptions of global governance and critical insights about the 
global South.  
 
There are a number of scholars using the proscriptive elements of TWAIL. The 
fundamental task of these scholars is to articulate the emancipatory ideals 
housed in international law. These overtures are analogous to the arguments 
deployed by TWAIL I scholars, who called for the emancipation of the former 
colonies using international law.  
 
                                            
83 Mutua, “What is TWAIL” supra note 72. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
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Nevertheless, these critical claims from these international law scholars have not 
garnered much influence on substantive reforms or in theoretical debates. For 
example, in the fields of international criminal law and transitional justice, TWAIL 
scholars are quite active in describing the problematic nature of prosecutions of 
international criminal institutions,86 polemics of transitional justice,87 or sole focus 
of prosecution by the International Criminal Court in Africa.88 Such projects, while 
worthwhile, reinforce the claim made in 1983 by the first Tanzanian President 
Julius Nyerere that “[i]n international rule making, we [the Third World] are 
recipients not participants”.89 Given the inequities perpetuated by the on-going 
proselytisation of universal values, there is a need to interrupt this narrative and 
reimagine a better future. This is a future that includes the various places and 
peoples of the global South as both recipients and active participants in 
international law and its theories.  
 
Critics of TWAIL allude to its potential for nihilism.90 The charge of nihilism is 
predicated on TWAIL scholars’ critical position towards international law. These 
claims of nihilism ignore TWAIL’s reformist aims. It is precisely these neglected 
reformist aims that I seek to position in conversations on theorising global 
                                            
86 Mutua, “Closing the Immunity Gap” supra note 64; Clarke, Fictions of Justice supra note 64; 
Kelsall, Culture supra note 64. 
87 Nesiah, “Trials of History” supra note 64. 
88 Mutua, “Closing the Immunity Gap” supra note 64. 
89 Mutua, “What is TWAIL” supra note 72 at 30. 
90 Jose Alvarez, “My Summer Vacation Part II: Revisiting TWAIL in Paris”, online: Opinio Juris 
available at:  
 http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/28/my-summer-vacation-part-iii-revisiting-twail-in-paris/; David P. 
Fidler, Revolt Against or From Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future 
Direction of International Law (2003) 2:1 Chinese J Intl L  Chinese J Intl L 29 (2003). 
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governance. In this regard, analogous to the other disciplines and other fields of 
law that I discussed earlier in this section, TWAIL too does call for a reorientation 
towards the global South. The proscriptive elements housed within TWAIL are 
part of this reorientation. 
 
There is another line of criticism that has centred on the Marxist tradition. Robert 
Knox, who works within the frame of TWAIL, argues that TWAIL scholarship is 
wedded to liberal legalism.91 Using the idea of principled opportunism,92 Knox 
suggests that TWAIL, and critical scholarship in general, must now rethink its 
efforts to achieve systemic change. His fear is that by focusing on immediate 
concerns, critical scholars lose track of the larger strategy. Scholars committed 
to a better world end up confusing the current tactic for immediate gains with the 
overall strategy of broader systemic change.93 Knox is absolutely correct in his 
observation. This particular chapter is written in this tradition of trying to move 
beyond the immediate tactics that Knox is critical of to one where we can 
theorise global governance from the vantage point of the global South.  
 
Having identified a various perspectives that argue in favour of a reorientation 
towards the global South and setting out TWAIL’s foundational pillars, I will now 
                                            
91 Robert Knox, “Strategy and Tactics” (2012) 21 Finnish YB of Intl L  193. 
92  Knox defines institutional aspects of “principled opportunism” as: “[D]emands that the 
deployment of legal argument be openly subjected to political exigencies, with divergent 
arguments being deployed whenever necessary. As such, legal argument is being geared 
towards the strategic aim of building a movement to overthrow capitalism, rather than on its own 
terms. On the one hand, this will involve defensive struggles, where legal argument is deployed 
in order to defend political activists when the state seeks to attack them”; Ibid at 224. 
93 Ibid. 
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elaborate on TWAIL’s prescriptive components as it relates to the question: how 
can we learn from the global South in theorising global governance?  
 
5.3 Resistance and Renewal: How to Learn from the Global South?  
While current TWAIL literature can be broadly categorized as a form of 
resistance, it is also important to note the calls for reform.94 As suggested earlier, 
the first tenet of TWAIL is to deconstruct and unpack the existing hierarchies 
within international law and its institutions. The current TWAIL II literature seeks 
to challenge western universalism in particular. In the first chapter, I sought to 
challenge the ideals encapsulated within international law and its institutions, in 
particular international criminal justice by pointing to the manner in which 
particular values are made to seem universal and how this affects the rights of 
the accused.  
 
A small number of contemporary academics are working on reformative projects 
in TWAIL II. These projects seek to redeem international law’s promise. TWAIL’s 
prescriptive elements are more prevalent in the writings of TWAIL I scholars 
though. These writers sought to harness the emancipatory power and promise of 
international law. Not entirely dissimilar to their predecessors, academics 
working under the more contemporary umbrella of TWAIL II are not keen on 
                                            
94  Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, “Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the 
Universality of International Law" (2012) 3: 1 Trade, L & Development 103 at 110 [Eslava & 
Pahuja, “Between Resistance and Reform”]. 
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eliminating international law either.95 Rather, these TWAIL II scholars argue for a 
reconstruction of international law in a manner that reflects the concerns of the 
global South.96  
 
One such example is the scholarship of Balakrishan Rajagopal. Even though he 
recognizes that such attempts may render minimal results,97 he suggests that it 
is “legitimate to use international law as an explicit counter-hegemonic tool of 
resistance”.98 The current TWAIL II scholarship is hopeful that international law 
can realise its emancipatory potential. An illustration of this hopefulness is 
apparent in Anghie’s writing: 
 
I continue to hope, together with the many scholars who are working 
to reconstruct international law precisely because of their 
awareness of the many ways in which it has operated to exclude 
and subordinate people on account of their gender, race and 
poverty, that international law can be transformed into a means by 
which the marginalized may be empowered. In short, that law can 
play its ideal role in limiting and resisting power. At the very least, I 
believe that the Third World cannot abandon international law 
because law now plays such a vital role in the public realm in the 
interpretation of virtually all international events.99 
 
                                            
95 Ruth Buchanan, “Writing Resistance into International Law” (2008) 10 Intl Community L Rev 
445 [Buchanan, “Writing Resistance”]; Richard Falk, Balakrishnan Rajagopal and Jacqueline 
Stevens, International Law and the Third World: Reshaping Justice (New York: Rutledge-
Cavendish, 2010). 
96Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “Counterhegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and 
Development as a Third World Strategy”, (2006) 27:5 Third World Q 767 [Rajagopal, 
“Counterhegemonic”]; Richard Falk, Balakrishnan Rajagopal and Jacqueline Stevens, 
International Law and the Third World: Reshaping Justice (New York: Rutledge-Cavendish, 
2010).   
97 Buchanan, “Writing Resistance” supra note 95 at 453-454. 
98 Rajagopal, “Counterhemonic” supra note 96 at 772. 
99 Anghie, Imperialism supra note 10 at 318. 
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Even though the hopefulness expressed by Anghie and other TWAIL scholars 
has been the subject of a recent debate,100 it is certain that there are at least two 
prospective prescriptive claims that we can discern in answering the question of 
how can we learn from the global South in theorising global governance.  
 
The first claim, forged as a response to TWAIL’s flirtations with monism, is to 
take stock of international law as a field of practice and to expand ethnographic 
research that is committed to a TWAIL-based ideology. Here the argument 
centres on the potential use of ethnography as a means to study the field of 
international law from the perspective of the global South and to provide insights 
into how global governance mechanisms affect the daily lived realities of the 
people of the global South.101  
 
The second centres on the duty of international lawyers and international law 
scholars to contend with the material reality of the global South. In this section I 
argue that as intellectuals, they have an ethical responsibility to articulate 
                                            
100 Buchanan, “Writing Resistance” supra note 95 at 454; Buchanan focuses on the idea of 
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Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015)  
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accurate portrayals of global governance initiatives and its effects on the lives of 
the people of the global South.  
5..3.1 International Law as Field of Practice 
Some writers believe that while TWAIL scholars engage in thoughtful political 
arguments that lead them to the edge of the abyss, they are nonetheless unable 
to go beyond the precipice because they are wedded to monist understandings 
of law.102 Monism is the belief that international law, made through international 
relations, must be brought home through sovereign enactment by way of 
domestic governments. Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja make the following 
argument:  
TWAIL scholarship gestures toward the idea that what gives 
international law its emancipatory appeal is its promise of 
universality as such. Such a promise of universalism is quite 
different from international law’s usually formal claims to 
universality, which are in themselves, as TWAIL scholars have 
argued, the carriers of specific particularities. Because of this 
recognition or in some cases, intuition, most TWAIL scholars 
eschew attempts to re-establish a putatively genuine universality. 
Such an attempt would be to engage in a neo-Kantian enterprise of 
finding a new, genuinely universal ground for law. TWAIL’s concern 
for history has shown us repeatedly that these ostensibly genuine 
universals invariably end up elevating a particular meaning to the 
universal, thus enacting a familiar mode of power”.103 
 
Eslava and Pahuja’s intervention signals a warning to TWAIL’s reformist agenda. 
What we can gather from their analysis is rather prescriptive. They hint that 
TWAIL’s political project calls for the recognition of a universality. To them, it is a 
normative conception of international law’s promise of universalism and they see 
                                            
102 Buchanan, “Writing Resistance” supra note 95 at 454. 
103 Eslava & Pahuja, “Between Resistance and Reform” supra note 94 at 121. 
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it as being “quasi-transcendent”.104 There is no material reality at the moment in 
which to achieve emancipation as a result of TWAIL’s criticisms. Such 
recognition gives way to the potential of plurality. In effect, they posit a moving 
away from monist conceptions of international law to one that envisions 
international law as domain of practice.105 
  
In this imagining, we are able to rely on international law’s specific procedures, 
“artefacts and forms of being that operate at the mundane and quotidian level 
and that tie together a vast raft of heterogeneous phenomena in a specific kind 
of way”.106 TWAIL’s body of scholarship has already identified political, cultural 
and economic biases buried deep within the structure of international law. Eslava 
and Pahuja’s approach would shine a light on how these embedded vernaculars 
affect day-to-day lives of those that must confront the effects of international 
law.107  
 
Taking our cue from Obiora Okafor’s position that TWAIL is a theory and 
method, this proposal seriously pushes for a methodological shift, analogous to a 
                                            
104 Ibid at 122.  
105 Ibid at 125; “The turn away from monism of international law is not novel. This approach can 
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power, rather law can emanate from diverse set of actors”. See also Peer Zumbansen, 
“Transnational Legal Pluralism” (2010) 1: 2 Transnational Leg Theory 144. 
106 Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, “Beyond the (Post)Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life 
of International Law” Journal of Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America - Verfassung 
und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ), (2012) 45:2 195 at 213.  
107 Luis Eslava, Local Space, Global Life: The Everyday Operation of International Law and 
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call to arms. 108  This call demands TWAIL “build explicitly on the legal-
ethnographic method currently being applied explicitly in international sites and 
artefacts such as international criminal courtrooms or international NGOs”.109 
Eslava and Pahuja call for an ethos of ethnography as TWAIL’s new unexplored 
frontier in which scholarship seeks to identify embedded biases in multiple 
registers.  
 
Ethnography as a field of study is intricately connected to social sciences like 
anthropology and sociology. It is a method of study deployed by social scientists, 
including legal scholars. It is generally understood as the study of people in 
“naturally occurring settings or ‘fields’ by methods of data collection which 
capture their social meanings and ordinary activities, involving the researcher 
participating directly in the setting”. 110  The purpose is to collect data in a 
systematic fashion without externally imposing meaning.111  
 
Ethnography has evolved over the years. At its inception, it was the handmaiden 
of colonialism and imperialism.112 It was used as a means to track and study the 
indigenous populations of the newly discovered world by the various colonisers. 
This field of study has evolved, integrating insights from various disciplines and 
                                            
108 Obiora C. Okafor, “Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, 
Methodology, or Both?” (2010) 10 Intl Community L Rev37. 
109 Eslava & Pahuja, “Between Resistance and Reform” supra note 94 at 126. 
110 John Brewer, Ethnography (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000) at 6. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid at 11. 
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theoretical positions, including postmodernism and postcolonialism. 113  In 
particular, there is a burgeoning sub-field of critical ethnography that focuses on 
power relations and effective systemic changes “toward greater freedom and 
equity”.114  
 
Most recently, Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson has added another layer to the 
discussions about ethnography that is premised on the politics of refusal. This is 
important in thinking about ethnography as potential tool in learning how to 
theorise global governance from the perspective of the global South. Simpson 
coins her intervention the “cartography of refusal,” which requires an 
acknowledgment of the role of ethnography in constructing and defining 
indigenous groups and their politics.115 In describing this refusal, Simpson notes: 
These conditions have led to this book as an ethnography that 
pivots upon refusal(s). I am interested in the larger picture, the 
discursive, material and moral territory that was simultaneously 
historical and contemporary (this “national” space) and the ways in 
which Kahnawa'kehró:non had refused the authority of the state at 
almost every turn and in doing so instantiated a different political 
authority. […] 
There is no place in the existing literature for these articulations; nor 
is there now a neat placement for them within postcolonial studies 
or analysis. Kahnawa'kehró:non were not free from occupation, 
which naturalized as immigration, as multiculturalism, and was and 
is a legalized, settler occupation of the territory that they claim. Thus 
there was no doubleness to their political consciousness, a still-
                                            
113  Robin Patric Clair, “The Changing Story of Ethnography" in Robin Patric Clair, ed, 
Expressions of Ethnography Novel Approaches to Qualitative Methods (Buffalo: SUNY University 
Press, 2003). 
114 Soyini Madison, Critical Ethnography Method, Ethics, and Performance 2nd ed., (New York: 
Sage Publication, 2012) at 5. 
115 Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus {Political Life Across Borders of Settler States} (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2014) at 33. 
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colonial but striving-to-be “postcolonial consciousness,” that denied 
the modern self, which Frantz Fanon, Homi Bhabha, and Anthony 
Giddens speak of and from […]. Here I want to push “turning away” 
into the ambit of refusal - of simply refusing the gaze of 
disengagement - and to the possibilities that this structures: subject 
formation, but also politics and resurgent histories. In my 
ethnographic work I was deeply mindful of the range of possibilities 
available for political life, for identification and identity within and 
against recognition, all instantiated in refusals. There seemed, 
rather, to be a trippleness, a quadrupleness to consciousness and 
an endless play, and it something like this: I am me, I am what you 
think I am, I am who this person to the right of me thinks I am, and 
you are all full of shit, and them maybe I will tell you to your face 
and let me tell you who you are”.116     
 
This new layer adds further nuance to the study of ethnography. This layer holds 
a significant amount of potential for future TWAIL-based ethnographies about the 
material reality of the people of the global South. Simpson thus posits the idea of 
using ethnography as both a form of resistance and as a tool of emancipation. 
  
The turn to empiricism in law can be traced back to the early 1900s,117 and in 
particular to two legal theories: legal pluralism and American legal realism. This 
empirical turn greatly influenced scholarship of the legal pluralist in the 1960s. 
Social scientists, especially anthropologists, sociologists and others, have 
additionally contributed to our understanding of law from varying disciplines 
utilising different methods. Legal pluralism can be traced back to the early 19th 
                                            
116 Ibid at 106-107. 
117Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harv L Rev 457; Sally Falk Moore, 
“Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate subject of study”, (1973) 
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and 20th century.118 In the late 20th century, legal anthropologists set out to 
document how multiple legal spaces co-existed and how ‘semi-autonomous’ 
fields of norms (whether formal or informal) influenced each other. In 
documenting various legal spaces, scholars had to deploy various social science 
tools, in particular ethnography. 
 
In her now classic text, based on fieldwork in Africa and informal discussion with 
workers in the garment industry in New York, Sally Falk More examined how 
external law and internal norms regulate group behaviour amongst the Chagga 
and New York City garment workers.119 The formal legal structures coexist along 
with the internal norms. Furthermore, the internal norms of each community are 
self-regulating and formal laws are invoked when individuals within the social 
field decide to gain access to the law such as reporting bribes. This perspective 
can be seen as a novel approach to formal and informal law in society. Formal 
law is subject to, and contingent upon, the informal norms of the particular 
community. These informal norms, therefore, have a greater organizing effect 
than the formal structure of law. Thus, by studying the way in which groups 
navigate the terrain of law and non-law, we are able to understand how 
communities interact with state power. 
 
                                            
118 Henry Sumner Maine, International Law; A series of Lectures delivered Before the University 
of Cambridge 1887 (NYC: Henry Holt and Company, 1888); Eugen Ehrlich The Fundamental 
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This turn to empiricism is also part of the American legal realist critique. It was 
inspired by Oliver Wendell Holmes’ canonical Path of Law, which sought to 
question established and traditional understandings of law. 120  Legal realist 
scholars, such as Holmes and Wesley Hohfeld, were struck by the formal 
structures of law and they sought to question its very foundation. 121  More 
contemporary versions of the realist critique have emerged, the latest incarnation 
being new legal realism; its aim is to provide a counter narrative to law and 
economics and new formalism.  
 
New legal realists, similar to the legal realist of the 1900s, have attempted to 
provide an account of decision-making, conceptions of the state, and individuals, 
and to a large extent legal scholarship.122 New legal realists are concerned with 
inequality at the broader level, and thus they seek to expose power and 
distributive conflicts in law through empiricism or as some have characterised as 
the continual reminder of the need to include the bottom.123  
 
We must return to Eslava and Pahuja’s suggestion for further empirical and 
ethnographic scholarship with an understanding that this field of study is 
multifaceted with its own boundaries. More importantly, the call for ethnographic 
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research and empirical studies is not new as I have detailed above. Rather it is 
part of a rich history in interrogations imbedded in critical approaches to law. 
Earlier chapters in my analysis relied on anthropological, ethnographic and 
empirical research from the international criminal institutions to provide the 
narratives of resistance.124 The move towards ethnographies from the global 
South as a means to theorise global governance continues quite simply to be 
within the confines of the first central tenets of TWAIL. Yet it does offer us the 
potential to map out the existing material reality relying on data collected based 
on observations. These observations can capture the social meanings of 
everyday occurrences in international law and its institutions. There are a handful 
of examples of scholars who have provided such analysis.125 Luis Eslava has 
undertaken an ethnographic analysis of international development policies in 
changing the internal dynamics of Bogota, Columbia.126 But we need more such 
scholarship, especially as it relates to lived realities of the people of the global 
South and how global governance mechanisms affect their daily lives.  
 
Conducting ethnographic work is complicated. In theorising global governance 
from the perspective of the global South, we must contend with the complications 
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that arise out of ethnographic research. We are well served to take account of 
Audra Simpson’s warnings. Taking stock of the work of critical ethnographers 
and the interventions by Simpson, there is a need to engage in this type of 
scholarship with a commitment to the politics of the global South. Much more 
importantly, in undertaking this type of work, scholars must engage with the 
politics of recognition and the politics of refusal.127 The politics of recognition 
centre on the possibility of engaging the contemporary legal orders as a means  
to make material changes outside the confines of liberalism.128 The politics of 
refusal is centred on the material reality that current legal structures will not yield 
any such possibilities. Emancipation is not possible through international law. 
What is important about this type of scholarship is that it demonstrates it is 
possible to live and resist in this world without engaging. In this instance, there 
are various possibilities of that are part and parcel of this research agenda. For 
example, does the Palestinian Boycott Divestment and Sanctions Movement 
represent as an aspect of the politics of refusal? Or are there other alternatives 
that are predicated on much more closer reading of Simpson’s politics of refusal 
in the international law context?  
 
What we can learn from Eslava and Pahuja’s articulation of international law as 
practice is the need to examine the broader context in which international law 
and international institutions function. Analogous to the discussion about the bias 
                                            
127 Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus {Political Life Across Borders of Settler States} (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2014) at 33. 
128 See chapter 3, section 3.6. 
 291 
of judges in the ICTR in the previous chapters, it is necessary to be attuned to 
the socio-political, cultural and economic factors that surround the examples that 
are used to denote the legitimacy of international law and its institutions. The 
exercise of thinking about international law and its institutions as a field of 
practice shifts our perspective away from one centred on legal mechanisms. By 
repositioning our attention to the realm of practice, we are able to take note of 
divergent factors that shape the operationalisation of international norms on the 
ground, or where the rubber of global governance hits the road.129  
 
5.3.2 International Lawyers, International Law Scholars and Ethics 
What Lassa Oppenheim suggested in 1908 – that international lawyers should 
plough their fields – is still very relevant today.130 When writing about global 
constitutionalism, global administrative law, public international law, and global 
governance, international lawyers and international law scholars often craft the 
territorial boundaries of their respective subfields. For example, scholars such as 
Cherif Bassiouni and others have helped define the field of international criminal 
law. These practical implications about the very nature of international legal 
practice are analogous to, and bound up in, concerns that domestic legal 
professional regulatory bodies and domestic practitioners often grapple with.131  
 
                                            
129 Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance” supra note 37. 
130 Lassa Oppenheim, “The Science of International Law: Its Task, Its Method” (1908) 2 AJIL313. 
131 These subsequently arise in how lawyers should behave towards their clients; David M. 
Tanovich, “Law’s Ambition and the Reconstruction of Role Morality in Canada” (2005) 28 
Dalhousie Law Journal 267; David B. Wilkins, “Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and 
Professional Responsibility” (1998) Maryland  Law Review 1502. 
 292 
These implications centre on such questions as: what is the role of the 
international lawyer and international law scholars in contemporary society? 
What are the professional responsibilities and obligations of international lawyers 
to their clients, and much more importantly, who exactly is their client? What is 
the significance of the international lawyer or international law scholar’s 
understanding of context in delivering opinion (for example do they have 
competent understanding of Rwandan history or Yugoslavian politics)? I argue 
that it is important for international lawyers and international law scholars to take 
stock of the material and lived realities of the global South. It is their duty as 
intellectuals to portray events in a broader context, depicting and talking about 
various portions of people that may be differently affected by the manner in 
which international law and its institutions function.  
 
In national jurisdictions, various legal professions regulate the provision of legal 
services. In the global South, legal transplants have ushered in professional 
bodies that are similar to their former colonial masters.132 As seen in Sri Lanka, 
the legal profession is regulated by a law society that functions akin to those 
found in the United Kingdom, Canada and the rest of the commonwealth. 
Domestic practitioners must adopt a specific attitude in how they behave with 
their clients.133 Domestic lawyers, depending on their respective jurisdictions, are 
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heavily regulated through the respective rules of conduct by their professional 
bar. A lawyer’s professional license is contingent upon ethical behaviour towards 
the client, the court, the legal community, and the general public.  
 
In the international context, there is no such governing regulatory framework. 
James Crawford thus suggests the following: “There is clearly no international 
law bar comparable to domestic bars – there are no qualifications which 
someone must attain before appearing before international courts and tribunals, 
no international code of ethics with which they must comply, and no international 
association to sanction them for misconduct”.134 There is only a fragmented set 
of rules that apply to advocates and counsels before the International Criminal 
Court, the ad hoc tribunals and other such organisations.135  Without reinforcing 
the liberal legalism imbedded within these professional regulatory regimes136, the 
questions that fuel this discussion are, to what extent should international 
lawyers take note of the global South and its material reality, and do they even 
have an obligation to do so? Questions such as these underscore the 
                                            
134 James Crawford,  “The International Law Bar: Essence Before Existence?” (2014) University 
of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 19/2014; ESIL 2013 5th Research Forum: 
International Law as a Profession Conference Paper No. 11/2013 at 1 [Crawford, “International 
Bar”]. 
135 Philip Sands, “The ILA Hague Principles on Ethical Standards for Counsel Appearing before 
International Courts and Tribunals”, (2011) 10 Law & Prac Intl Cts & Trib 14. 
136 I recognize that reference to professional rules of conduct is a turn to liberal legalism. See for 
example, Constance Backhouse, “Gender and Race in the Construction of ‘Legal 
Professionalism’: Historical Perspectives” at 2-3 - 2-13 (“Barriers to Entry: Something Less than a 
Warm Welcome?”), paper presented at the Chief Justice of Ontario’s Advisory Committee on 
Professionalism, First Colloquium on the Legal Profession (October 2003), online: LSUC 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/constance_backhouse_gender_and_race.pdf; David B. Wilkins, 
“Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility” (1998) Maryland Law 
Review 1502.  
 294 
responsibility of the international lawyers and international scholars in a 
regulatory space devoid of formal regulation.137  
 
Before delving into a potential answer, it is important to note the overlap between 
international lawyers and international law scholars. Throughout this analysis, I 
have referred to a number of academics who are both international lawyers and 
international law scholars. James Crawford is a good example. He is an 
established academic with a long history of teaching in Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and other countries. Crawford is also an established international 
lawyer. He was counsel in a number of leading international law cases before the 
International Court of Justice. 138  Crawford was recently appointed to the 
International Court of Justice. In a similar vein, a number of scholars have 
demonstrated the connections between the role of specific international lawyers 
and the development of international law (M. Cherif Bassiouni is a good 
example).139 Thus, given the fragmented nature of the various standards of 
conduct and the various roles performed by international lawyers and 
international law scholars, it may be more useful to think of these individuals, 
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given their overlapping functions, as intellectuals engaged in praxis of 
international law. 
 
Various writers have theorised the role of intellectuals in our modern society.140 
Edward Said’s contributions are especially significant. Said states: “the principal 
intellectual duty is the search for relative independence from such [societal] 
pressures. Hence my characterizations of the intellectual as exile and marginal, 
as amateur, and as the author of a language that tries to speak the truth to 
power”.141  
 
The latter point is of particular importance in answering the question: to what 
extent should international lawyers and international law scholars take note of 
the global South and its material reality? It is important because international 
lawyers and international law scholars, as intellectuals, are constantly imbricated 
in the milieus of power and authority that shape the lived realities of the people of 
the global south. Said suggests that intellectuals should move away from specific 
specialisation (or as he coins it professionalisation) to the much more accessible 
attitude of an amateur: 
 
I have already suggested that as a way of maintaining relative 
intellectual independence, having the attitude of an amateur instead 
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of a professional is a better course. But let me be practical and 
personal for a moment. In the first place amateurism means 
choosing the risks and uncertain results of the public sphere - a 
lecture or a book or an article in wide and unrestricted circulation- 
over the insider space controlled by experts and professionals. 
Several times over the past two years I have been asked by the 
media to be a paid consultant. This I have refused to do, simply 
because it meant being confined to one television station or journal, 
and confined also to the going political language and conceptual 
framework of that outlet. Similarly I have never had any interest in 
paid consultancies to or for the government, where you would have 
no idea of what use your ideas might later be put to. Secondly, 
delivering knowledge directly for a fee is very different if, on the one 
hand, a university asks you to give a public lecture or if, on the 
other, you are asked to speak only to a small and closed circle of 
officials. That seems very obvious to me, so I have always 
welcomed university lectures and always turned down the others. 
And, thirdly, to get more political, whenever I have been asked for 
help by a Palestinian group, or by a South African university to visit 
and to speak against apartheid and for academic freedom, I have 
routinely accepted.  
 
[…] 
 
But what are these amateur forays into the public sphere really 
about? Is the intellectual galvanized into intellectual action by 
primordial, local, instinctive loyalties one's race, or people, or 
religion -or is there some more universal and rational set of 
principles that can and perhaps do govern how one speaks and 
writes? In effect I am asking the basic question for the intellectual: 
how does one speak the truth? What truth? For whom and where?  
 
Unfortunately we must begin to respond by saying that there is no 
system or method that is broad and certain enough to provide the 
intellectual with direct answers to these questions.142 
 
In asking these questions, Said helps us move away from understanding 
international lawyers and international law scholars as specialised professionals 
embarking on their duties by ploughing their respective fields. Rather, Said 
forces us to ponder on the material reality of the work that international lawyers 
                                            
142 Ibid at 87 to 88. 
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and international law scholars undertake in shaping and writing their fields. Thus 
in effect, this forces us to come face to face with those that are directly affected 
by the laws and polices that is shaped and created by intellectuals working with 
international law.  
 
Recently, Chimni captured one of the central concerns of TWAIL as part of its 
reformist agenda: “Is human emancipation and environmental protection possible 
by altering the material structures or does it require an “evolved ethical and 
spiritual self”?143 He thus enquires about the role of international lawyers (and 
international law scholars) in thinking and bringing about equitable relations 
between and amongst nations states and those that live in these constructed 
boundaries. The rationale for his newfound search for answers is rooted in the 
following:  
 
The absence of a self that is rooted in duties to strive for self-
knowledge and promote the global common good is based on an 
excessive faith in the idea of restructuring international laws and 
institutions for creating a humane world. However, by facilitating 
accelerated capitalist globalization these laws and institutions 
continue to marginalize subaltern classes and nations and entrench 
in multifarious ways a singular conception of good life that is 
inhospitable to the idea of an ethical and spiritual self. In other 
words, the present day accent on reconfiguring international law 
and institutions has not produced an adequate focus either on deep 
structures of global capitalism or on the ethical and spiritual self, 
embedded in the notion of duty to humanity […].144 
 
                                            
143 B.S. Chimni, “The Self, Modern Civilization, and International Law: Learning from Mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule” (2012) 23: 4 EJIL 1159 at 1160. 
144 Ibid at 1160. 
 298 
In trying to respond to these important questions, Chimni acknowledges that the 
Marxist tradition, which he has relied on to deliver his TWAIL-based arguments 
against international law, is not useful in providing adequate insights for reform. 
This is especially the case because of the “uneasy experience of actually 
existing socialism” that we experienced over the years that is rooted in  
“philosophy of militant materialism as a basis for building a world that expands 
the realm of human freedom”.145  
 
Chimni subsequently turns to Gandhi’s 1904 Hind Swaraj to find inspiration for 
some of the central organising problématiques embedded in TWAIL. The 
rationale for this choice is based on the relationship that Gandhi constructs 
between the self and social transformation as a critique of modern civilisation. 
Building on Hind Swaraj, Chimni seeks to address Marxism’s failings by clarifying 
the need to be simultaneously “attentive to material structures and to work on the 
self”.146 He proposes a number of critical observations that attempt to fill these 
gaps. By drawing directly from Gandhi, Chimni maps out a number of significant 
proposals about the state, the grounds for obedience to laws, the understanding 
of the legal profession and passive resistance. 147  By reflecting on these 
important factors, Chimni reveals glimpses into alternative global futures, the 
                                            
145 Ibid at 1160. 
146 Ibid at 1163 
147 Ibid at 1167.  
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means by which we can create a better world, and locate the role of international 
law and international lawyers in that process.148  
 
In this regard, I want to hone in on one of the central themes that Chimni 
identifies in creating a better world - the function and role of international lawyers 
and by extension international law scholars. Focusing on this proposal about 
international lawyers and international law scholars opens up new vistas in 
imaging various futures from the perspectives of the global South.  
 
Gandhi’s criticisms about the legal profession were based on the role of the 
courts and lawyers in maintaining and sustaining the colonial rule and the 
oppression of the people of the global South. Gandhi’s cynicism about the legal 
profession was precipitated by the disparity between the colonised and 
colonisers, and the resulting unequal treatment between the European right 
bearers and Non-Europeans without rights. His cynical views extended further to 
the belief that the legal profession teaches immorality because lawyers benefit 
from conflicts that they seek to mediate. Chimni explicates some of these 
implications for international lawyers and international law scholars with the 
following: 
 
In my view Gandhi’s critique of the legal profession raises crucial 
issues with respect to the responsibility of international lawyers. I 
will flag some of them. The first matter relates to the role of the legal 
adviser to governments. In giving advice should legal advisers 
                                            
148 Ibid at 1167. 
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privilege truth, read as the global common good and our common 
humanity, over perceived national interests? Should a legal adviser 
do a Gandhi to his client if truth were not spoken with regard to the 
material facts in issue? Secondly, should international lawyers 
charge exorbitant fees even when that prevents poor individuals 
and nations from seeking justice? Thirdly, are international lawyers 
willing to assume personal responsibility for particular 
interpretations of international law with troubling outcomes for 
subaltern groups and peoples in the world? Can the ethical self use 
the legal form as a shield to deflect criticisms? Finally, does a 
shadow fall between the ideals that often inform the writings of 
international lawyers and their practices in their professional lives? 
An example of the latter is the jostling for power and positions in 
universities and professional bodies. The shadow between 
aspiration and practice is not unique to any profession or vocation. 
In many ways it represents mundane reality. The point is that 
modern professions are subject to an inner dynamic that occludes 
reaction on the ethical self. What we can learn from Gandhi is that 
in a very profound sense (to invert Ludwig Wittgenstein) deeds are 
words.149  
 
It is imperative that those making legal decisions about the very nature of 
particular regimes become aware of the lived reality of the global South and the 
dynamics that spur on international law and its institutions. The UN Secretary-
General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (March 2011) 
recommendation for the establishment of an “independent international 
mechanism” is illustrative.150 Were the drafters of this recommendation151 aware 
                                            
149Ibid at 1170.  
150  UN Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, Report UN 
Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, UNSGOR, September 
2011, SG/SM/13791 HR/5072. SG/SM/13791 HR/5072; United Nations Secretary General’ 
Panel’s Report, Recommendation 1: Investigation (B): The Secretary General should 
immediately proceed to establish an independent international mechanism, whose mandate 
should include the following concurrent functions: 
(i) Monitor and assess the extent to which the Government of Sri Lanka is carrying out an 
effective domestic accountability process, including genuine investigations of the alleged 
violations, and periodically advise the Secretary-General on its findings; 
(ii) Conduct investigations independently into the alleged violations, having regard to genuine and 
effective domestic investigations; and 
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of the serious problems with the role of the judiciary in amending the rules or 
serious concerns over witnesses and the rights of the accused within the current 
international ad hoc tribunals? Did they pay close attention to the manner in 
which witness testimony is elicited before the international criminal tribunals? Put 
differently, why did the UN Panel of Experts recommend the creation of an 
international mechanism when they should have known about the problems 
international criminal institutions are facing? Unpacking the rationale for these 
questions is another project.152  
 
International lawyers and scholars have an ethical obligation to relay their claims 
to actual evidence from the ground (based on ethnographic research), rather 
than relying on antiquated notions about the very nature of law and our society. 
Such a reflection takes us back full circle to Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff’s 
Theory from The South and their central intervention. Their thesis is that 
contemporary actors, norms and processes are reconfiguring our understandings 
of the core-and-periphery.153  Thus to grasp the history of the present, both 
empirically and theoretically, we must study the global South.154  
                                                                                                                                 
(iii)Collect and safeguard for appropriate future use information provided to it, which is relevant to 
accountability for the final stages of the war, including the information gathered by the Panel and 
other bodies in the United Nations system.  
151 In the example of UN Sri Lanka Panel, the drafters of the report were: Marzuki Darusman 
(Former Attorney General of Indonesia and Politician), Yasmin Sooka (Former judge of the 
Witwatersrand High Court), Steven R. Ratner (University of Michigan Law School Professor). 
152 Sujith Xavier “Looking for ‘Justice’ in all the Wrong Places: An International Mechanism or 
Multidimensional Domestic Strategy for Mass Human Rights Violations in Sri Lanka?” in 
Amarnath Amarasingam & Daniel Bass, eds, Post-War Sri Lanka: Problems and Prospects 
(Forthcoming New York:Hurst/Oxford University Press, 2015). 
153 Comaroff & Comaroff, “Theory from the South” supra note 24at 117. 
154 Comaroff & Comaroff, “Theory from the South” supra note 24 at  117; Comaroff & Comaroff, 
Theory supra note 13 at 7.  
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5.4 Conclusion 
In preceding chapters, I took two ad hoc international criminal institutions and the 
International Criminal Court as case studies to demonstrate the deeply 
ahistorical and contradictory nature of global constitutionalism and global 
administrative law. Broad and general claims to administration or 
constitutionalism as forms of global governance are problematic, because of the 
inherent structural bias built into the international system and the indeterminacy 
of liberal legalism. In this chapter, I relied on interdisciplinary insights and TWAIL 
to address current gaps in international law, its institutions, and global 
governance theories. This chapter was organised around two specific questions: 
should we learn from the global South in theorising global governance; and how 
can we learn from the global South in theorising global governance.  
 
In answering the first question, I relied on interdisciplinary scholarship and 
scholars working under the moniker of TWAIL to suggest that this question has 
already been answered.   
 
In answering the question how can we learn from the global South, I advanced 
two arguments. First, I argued that international law and its institutions are 
mediated, moulded, and mitigated by multiple political and material forces. 
Theories of global governance thus should take these factors into account by 
thinking about international law and its institutions as a field of practice. Doing so 
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invites a realisation that there is a need for further investigation of on-the-ground 
realities and effects of global governance. This, in turn means that we need 
much more robust ethnographic research, which can better chronicle the effects 
of global governance on the people of the global South.  
 
Similarly, my second argument sought to locate the role of the international law 
scholar and international lawyer in this exercise of contending with the lived 
realities of the global South. I argued that international lawyers and international 
law scholars as intellectuals have a duty to transform and improve the material 
reality of the people of the global South. 
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Conclusion: Theorising from Below 
International law and international institutions are intimately involved in the lives 
of the people of the global South. Yet theories of global governance, global 
constitutionalism, and global administrative law in particular, ignore the 
significant importance of the global South in our global order. In the forgoing 
analysis, two central arguments were pursued: First, both global 
constitutionalism and global administrative law, as theories of global governance, 
ignore colonial history of international law and the on-going significance of this 
lineage. Second, as a means to transcend these limitations of global 
governance, I articulated a modest proposal of engagement to link global 
governance with the global South and its respective literature.  
 
The first four chapters in this analysis focused on the first question and identified 
the problems with global constitutionalism and global administrative law. The 
final chapter sought to address ways by which we can build bridges between the 
existing literature on the global South and global governance. Fundamentally, I 
have argued that the manner in which we theorise global governance is wrong 
as it ignores the colonial past of international law and the ensuing repercussions 
are side-lined. This occurs because of our inability to contend with the lived 
realities of the global South and the proselytisation of western normativity. 
Second, and as a result of this omission, international lawyers and international 
law scholars must engage with the global South by asking how can we learn 
from this material space.  
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Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic state: “legal storytelling movement urges 
black and brown writers to recount their experiences with racism and the legal 
system and to apply their own unique perspectives to assess law’s master 
narratives”.1 Scholars use critical race theory’s method of personal stories and 
narratives to describe, understand, and theorise their subject position vis-à-vis its 
field of study.2 They use this method as a means to transgress law’s formalism 
and capture their own particular voice as form of resistance. Situated scholarship 
is an offshoot of storytelling employed by critical race scholars.  
 
In developing their method of analysis, critical race scholars have posited that to 
analyse and challenge power-laden beliefs, it is possible, if not necessary to 
“employ counter stories, parables, chronicles, and anecdotes aimed at revealing 
their contingency, cruelty, and self-serving nature”.3 This type of analysis is novel 
for international lawyers and international law scholars. In particular, there is a 
controversy in international legal thinking about objectivity, neutrality and subject 
position.4 
 
In this vein, my arrival to this project has been shaped by my own personal 
experience with international law and international criminal law. My interest in 
                                            
1 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction (New York: New 
York University Press, 2012) at 9. 
2 Ibid at 1-16; Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (London: Virgo Press, 1993). 
3 Milner S. Ball, “Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities” (1989) 87 Michigan Law 
Review 2280; Regina Austin, “Sapphire Bound!” (1989) Wis L Rev 539; Richard Delgado, 
“Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography”, (1993) 79 Virginia Law Review 461 at 461. 
4 For a discussion about objectivity in legal scholarship, see Sujith Xavier, “Book Review - Victor 
Kattan’s From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict 1891-1949 (2009)”, 11 German LJ1038-1045;  
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international law and international criminal in particular stem from my own 
personal history and my situatedness in the geo-politics of the global South. 
Undoubtedly, my experiences as a refugee fleeing war affected Sri Lanka in the 
1980s is one of the motivators for my keen interest in, and continued faith in, 
international law. This experience has incubated a firm belief in the potential to 
secure some form of accountability for the countless victims. I am related to, 
friends with, or had the honour of working alongside some of these victims.    
 
In this vein, I draw inspiration from my experience of working with non-
governmental organisations in Sri Lanka and Palestine, and the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. By working in institutions located in 
areas of acute conflict and with an international appeals court tasked with 
adjudicating human suffering have undoubtedly shaped my understanding, faith 
and subsequent disenchantment with international law and its institutions.    
 
In early 1999, I was part of a Sri Lankan led initiative to document war crimes 
and crimes against humanity in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of the 
country. As part of Australian Government funded project, we embarked on 
tracking and monitoring human rights violations perpetrated by both parties to 
the conflict. The fundamental purpose of the project was to determine who did 
what to whom as a means to ensure some form of accountability was possible 
for the victims. The evidence collected over a span of 10 years remains unused, 
stored away in boxes in Colombo Sri Lanka, waiting to tell the stories of the 
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victims. Some of these materials did eventually make their way to the UN 
Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Sri Lanka, but that report too is 
collecting virtual dust in the annals of the internet.  
 
Similarly, while working in Palestine for a Palestinian non-governmental 
organisation, I helped author affidavits from victims in the West Bank that were 
submitted to the international inquiry lead by Richard Goldstone in Gaza (2008-
2009). It was by working in these spaces that I noticed an undeniable belief in 
international law and its institutions’ potential to change the material reality of the 
people of the global South. The superhuman amounts of energy and time spent 
in engaging with international agencies as a strategy to end impunity cannot be 
measured. All of this to say that there was, and continues to be, a sense of 
hopefulness in pushing for the recognition of the rights of victims. There is a 
fundamental belief in the potential of law, especially international law. Patricia 
Williams has characterised this belief (vis-a-vis rights) as: “Rights” [international 
law, international criminal law etc] feels new in the mouths of black people. It is 
still deliciously empowering to say. It is the magic wand of visibility and 
invisibility, of inclusion and exclusion, of power and no power”.5 
 
While in graduate school at York University, I spent six months working for Judge 
Agius of the ICTY and ICTR Appeals Chamber. Even though I cannot disclose 
the intricate details of what I saw and touched, I can speak to a sense of loss 
                                            
5 Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (London: Virgo Press, 1993) at 164. 
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that I felt as I left the institution after six months. Elena Baylis and Janet Halley 
have theorised elements of this encounter.6 There is a sharp distinction between 
my experiences of working in these two specific places - Sri Lanka and Palestine 
- in the global South and my experience of working as professional within the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY and ICTR. The latter experience is one of 
disappointment, not of hope. The drastic regulatory capture by a universalistic 
ethos of ending impunity without much attention to the procedures and practices 
of the tribunals is unfortunate. This is a missed opportunity.  
 
These experiences have fundamentally shaped my understanding of 
international law and its institutions. My legal experience working for Judge Agius 
in the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for former 
Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda7, my practical legal 
experience working with non-governmental organisations and clients in the 
global South (Sri Lanka and Palestine) and my subject position (as a queer Tamil 
refugee) have shaped the conceptualisation of this research project. Ultimately I 
have attempted to weave in my personal encounter with harnessing the potential 
power of international law while working in the global South with the 
disappointment of perpetuating universalism through international criminal 
institutions through the questions I have answered in this project. In particular, by 
                                            
6 Elena A. Baylis, “Tribunal-Hopping with the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies” (2008) 10 Or Rev Int’l 
L 361; Janet Halley, “Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related 
Violence in Positive International Criminal Law” (2008-2009) 30 Mich J Intl L 1. 
7 I am bound by a confidentiality agreement and I have not included any materials directly drawn 
from my time at the Appeals Chamber of ICTY/ICTR. 
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focusing on the theories of global governance, I identified some of the inherent 
problems with the manner in which our international criminal organisations were 
formulated. Moreover, I was hopeful that by centring my critique of the theories 
of global governance, we might be able to learn from the global South in the 
future as we continue to regulate internationally. 
 
In this context, this analysis has sought to achieve two objectives. First, it sought 
to challenge the false universalisms in global governance theories. My analysis 
in the first chapter identified a specific trend in international law and its 
institutions theorised by Antony Anghie as the dynamic of difference. This 
dynamic characterises how the western particular has become universalised 
through international law and its institutions. Moreover, this trend continues 
unabated. More specifically, the demarcation of one culture as barbaric and 
another as civilised fosters international law’s authority to regulate various 
diverse forms of relationships. By framing one culture (the different people of the 
global South) as inferior and the western as superior creates the mechanism by 
which we can transcend this difference and apply universal western conceptions 
of law. I chronicled this feature of international law and international institutions 
and focused on the newly minted international criminal institutions ushered in to 
end impunity in the Cold War’s wake.  
 
By providing the empirical evidence from these institutions, this analysis 
challenged current theories of constitutionalism, constitutionalisation and 
administration in global governance. These pages presented the argument that 
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these theories mischaracterise how international institutions function because 
they ignore international law’s colonial past and this past’s enduring legacy of 
exclusion as witnessed in how these institutions function today.  Then I turned to 
my second question that focused on transcending the limitations of global 
governance theories. In this respect, I asked how can we learn from the global 
South? 
 
In coming to these conclusions there are two themes that are poignant. 
International law’s past has a way of catching up to its present and its future. I 
have chronicled this via the international criminal justice regimes. Second, 
international law is a construct and a tool, the experts and professionals driving 
this process of instrumentalisation matter. With the reference to the first theme, 
as we have seen from the manner in which these international institutions 
operate and how they are unable to grapple with distinct local witnesses. Their 
modus operandi is premised on western values and culture, which are 
subsequently unable to understand the local witnesses. Second, the people 
populating these institutions also matter. International criminal institutions are 
operationalised by a specific class of experts that seem to ignore the real 
problems of translation, rights of the accused and other similar issues. 
Connectedly, the same experts then theorise global governance using models 
inspired by domestic law that are unable to grapple with the difficulties endemic 
in international law.  
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There is much work to be done. Much more robust ethnographies focusing on 
the various global governance institutions and their relationship to the global 
South are urgently needed. For example, within the field of international criminal 
law, there is a need to trace how local officials in countries like Sri Lanka handle 
transitional justice questions. How judges and advocates before the local courts 
conceptualise and reason transitional justice in both public and private law 
matters. By thinking about the local responses to transitional justice, a much 
more robust international understanding can be developed.  
 
What would global governance from the global South entail? What does 
constitutionalism of the South look like? What are its possible features? Why is 
this a viable project? Should scholars and practitioners engage in this type of 
theorising?  
 
These questions highlight the need for a theoretical foundation and an 
increasingly nuanced understanding of how international law and its institutions 
are functioning. By building bridges between theory and practice, between the 
global South and global governance, we ensure that international law, 
international institutions and global governance can generate some form of 
emancipation for the people of the global South.
Xavier Global Governance Bibliography July 28, 2015 
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